BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP: ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE ON THE FUTURE PATH OF EUROPE

Policy implications and future scenarios for the EU in times of crisis
The European Union (EU) was conceived as a unique and ambitious project meant to guarantee long-lasting peace and prosperity for a troubled continent. Since 1957, more and more European nation states have set aside their pride and created avenues to make communal decisions on an increasing number of issues; other countries joined the initial group of six, paving the way to a supranational system that today includes 27 countries and more than 500 million citizens who are free to move, travel, study, and settle across a territory of four million square kilometers, most of which uses the same currency.

Yet the project of European integration has not been without its challenges. Diversity is both a source of Europe's richness and a cause for tensions among conflicting needs. The EU's framework for political representation has been torn between intergovernmental relationships, with national governments representing member states' interests in the Council, and supranational mechanisms with the direct election of the European Parliament; meanwhile, the European Commission represents both options at once, combining intergovernmental interactions with supranational authority.

As a result, many European citizens have come to see EU institutions as too distant, too unaccountable, and too technocratic, a source of outside interference more than anything else.

Over the past ten years, the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and security crisis have put the European Union under further strain, and challenged its ability to provide satisfactory policy responses. It is difficult to say whether citizens’ dissatisfaction stems from the actual insufficiency of policy solutions or the way issues have been framed in the public discourse; however, there is clear evidence that the EU's shortcomings at critical junctures have inflamed existing Euroskeptic feelings among its citizens. Moreover, the uneven impact of these crises on European countries has revealed the deep underlying rifts and the lack of solidarity between member states, with less affected countries often proving reluctant to share the burdens of the countries under pressure. This has paved the way for the rise of Euroskeptic challengers, new parties and leaders ready to exploit citizens' dissatisfaction and delegitimize both national and European elites. Even established national leaders and parties have often been tempted to shift the blame for national problems to Brussels, pointing out the limits imposed by the EU on national decision-making that thwart effective policy action at the national level. Traditional and new media both play key roles in these times of crisis by giving voice to feelings of dissatisfaction and opening new channels of communication between citizens and elites.

Underestimating or failing to address these challenges in a timely manner could lead to serious and irreversible consequences for the future of the European project. The United Kingdom's choice to leave the Union in June 2016 represents a clear signal of the destabilizing consequences these trends could have if allowed to develop unfettered.

Over the past three years, the EUENGAGE project has sought to examine the changes and challenges that exist in the European political landscape, and provide a deeper understanding of the positions of European citizens (the “demand” side), European political actors (the “supply” side), and the media. To enhance the reach of this analysis, EUENGAGE has utilized a variety of methods, data sources, and approaches. The ultimate goal of the EUENGAGE project has been to use the results of the analyses carried out between 2015 and 2018 as the baseline for an insightful and well balanced reflection on the future of the EU.
An important step in this direction was the inspiring EUENGAGE Final Event, which took place in Brussels on February 27, 2018. EUENGAGE researchers, policy makers, stakeholders, and think tankers came together to discuss policy scenarios and formulate policy recommendations grounded in the data the project had collected.

### Evidence and Analysis

The data generated by the EUENGAGE project produced a number of interesting findings, which provide significant insight into the changes and challenges the EU is currently facing in this time of crisis. In particular, the research focused on the following subjects:

- The increasing polarization of the public and political debates on the European Union, with evidence of the further spread of Euroskeptic feelings among European citizens and a surge of political movements and leaders that promote fierce opposition to European elites and institutions;
- Tensions between desires for stronger EU powers and competencies and desires for a return to national sovereignty; and
- Stronger divergences between member states in their opinions on the crises and the EU's alleged lack of solidarity.

It is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of the vast amount of research conducted within the EUENGAGE project here. Instead, this policy brief offers a few insights drawn from EUENGAGE research that address these three areas of focus, examining each within the frameworks utilized in the full study: the demand side, the supply side, and the media. These insights are intended as food for thought and a baseline for policy analyses and recommendations.

The bulk of the EUENGAGE data was collected in 10 European countries – the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK – which represent different “regions” of the EU. Meanwhile, party manifestos and attitudes were analyzed in all 27 member states and the UK.

**The demand side: The EU in its citizens’ view**

*European citizens seem to be critical more of the EU’s responses to recent crises than of the European project itself…*

In 2017, two-thirds (66%) of Europeans thought their country benefited from being a member of the EU, a slight increase from 2016 (61%); however, that aggregate number hides large differences between member state populations, ranging from 45% of Italians to 89% of Poles. Only 26% of Europeans would vote for their country to leave the EU in a referendum, but here again there were significant country differences: Czechs showed the highest propensity to abandon the union (42%) and the Portuguese the lowest (11%). A majority (78%), however, thought that those who make decisions in the EU do not (or did not, in the case of the UK) take the interests of their country into sufficient account, with Greeks (93%), the Italians (90%), and the Czechs (88%) the most highly unsatisfied and the Germans the least critical (60%). Furthermore, nearly 49% of Europeans thought the EU had demonstrated leadership in dealing with the multiple crises, ranging from 31% in the Czech Republic to 65% in Poland.

…They call for more national sovereignty on economic and migration policy, but not on security…

Overall, European citizens show a limited inclination to give the EU more authority on economic and migration policy, especially the Czechs, while Italians were more neutral on migration, and Spaniards on the economy. On the other hand, majorities within the EU
thought that EU member states should respond to major security threats together rather than chart their own courses [Figure 1].

**Figure 1**
National vs. EU Sovereignty
(average values)

EUENGAGE Mass survey July-August 2017. “For each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you fully support the policy on the left and 10 means that you fully support the policy on the right. If your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that best describes your position.”

...While solidarity seems to correlate with self-interest, except on security.

European citizens seemed to support burden-sharing at the EU level on economic and migration issues. When looking at national figures, however, the picture is more varied. There was general support for solidarity measures on migration, though it was stronger in those countries that are more exposed to the refugee crisis like Greece and Italy and weaker in the Visegrad group’s countries included in the survey, namely the Czech Republic and Poland. Likewise, those countries that have been most affected by the financial crisis like Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain are more amenable to economic burden-sharing than the other countries [Fig. 2].

**Figure 2**
EU Burden-sharing
(average values)

EUENGAGE Mass survey July-August 2017. “For each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you fully support the policy on the left and 10 means that you fully support the policy on the right. If your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that best describes your position.”
On the other hand, there was a strong desire (86%) for solidarity among member states when it came to the security concerns of the most vulnerable countries, ranging from 72% in the Czech Republic to 93% in Portugal.

Increasing awareness of representative mechanisms, citizens' dialogue, and mutual understanding: The potential of deliberative processes

The online deliberation exercise conducted with a sample of 285 citizens from the ten countries seems to have produced some effect, albeit slight, on people’s attitudes on the process of decision-making within the framework of a representative democracy. Before the exercise, for example, 33% of respondents said that “decisions should be made by elected politicians,” while 40% said this afterwards; on the other hand, the percentage who said that “decisions should be made by ordinary citizens” remained unchanged (31%). The most significant changes occurred among those who expressed neutral stances before the deliberation exercise. In other words, among those who had no previous preference for either direct or representative democracy, the online deliberation exercise seems to have raised awareness about the benefits of indirect participation in democratic decision-making through designating elected representatives.

The deliberation exercise also seems to have produced an effect on people’s understanding of and sensitivity to the feelings and thoughts of others. For example, before the exercise began, 78% of respondents agreed with the statement “It’s rare that some issue is ever black and white - usually the truth is somewhere in between.” After the study, that number increased by five percentage points.

The supply side: The EU as a new political fault line?

Parties talk more about the EU, but with an increasingly critical tone…

The Eurocrisis and the migration crisis drew political attention to Europe and migration, mirroring increasing public concern – especially regarding the migration crises, as demonstrated by the EUENGAGE general population surveys, in which 51% of Europeans said they were very concerned by the flow of immigrants. Furthermore, these crises intensified divisions within mainstream parties and led to a surge of rejectionist political parties.

The portrait of party attitudes that emerged from the expert survey showed that Euroskeptics and anti-immigrant parties are also those paying more attention to Europe and immigration in their political discourse.

This was confirmed by a content analysis of the party manifestos of European Parliament elections, which showed far-right parties putting more emphasis on issues related to the competences, legitimacy, and complexity of the EU than mainstream and far-left parties. These parties adopted very critical positions on the EU's handling of migration policies.

...and tend to split across a new divide between “open” and “closed”.

The increased relevance of EU-related issues in European political discourse means that the party system has reacted to concerns about migration, European integration, austerity measures, and so on. Both the expert surveys and party manifesto analyses further reveal, however, that moderate, mainstream parties that have traditionally taken moderate positions on the EU have not shifted position on these issues, or only did so in a limited way; that said, internal dissent within these parties on EU-related issues has grown considerably, according to the expert surveys.

The increase in attention devoted to the EU and immigration in the political discourse has benefited new challenger parties, which have adopted a sharply negative tone in their discussions of the EU, austerity measures, and the EU's management of the migration issue.
These findings support the idea that crises in Europe have reinforced a new transnational political cleavage, featuring a contraposition between libertarian, universalistic values on the one hand and a defense of nationalism and particularism on the other. In other words, a divide between those who welcome immigrants and those who would impose restrictions on their arrival; between those who would open up to global trade and those who would protect domestic industries with customs duties; and between those who would strengthen the EU and live in a more supranational system and those who want to return to national states.

Political leaders tend to shift the blame for inadequate policy responses to the Eurocrisis to the EU or other EU member states…

Within parties and institutions, leaders play a particularly important role in shaping political discourse. A systematic analysis of leaders’ speeches revealed that, when electoral risk is high but governments’ policy options are severely limited, prime ministers tend to engage in blame-shifting – that is to say, their discourse on banks, EU institutions, other EU member states, and the Troika became increasingly negative. This does not bode well for burden-sharing. Furthermore, national leaders, facing skeptical public opinion, tended to undermine integration. When Euroskeptic parties had fully realized their voter potential, governments’ rhetoric tended to turn more positive, but the issue was also discussed less in general.

…While national politicians’ attitudes on the EU mirror those of citizens. Who leads whom? Mirroring citizens’ attitudes (see above), national parliamentarians expressed few doubts concerning the benefits of EU membership for the countries they represented – although again with differences between countries, ranging from 77% in the Netherlands to 100% in Greece. On the other hand, significant majorities saw the EU as insufficiently attentive to the specific interests of the respective countries, especially in the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Politicians also generally complained about the EU’s lack of leadership in coping with the multiple crises it has encountered in recent years, though responses differed significantly between the first wave of the survey (2016) and the second wave (2017), suggesting a decrease in blame-shifting to the EU among national elites.

Like their publics, national elites showed a certain reluctance to give more authority to the EU on the economy, with the notable exception of elites from Spain. Responses were polarized on migration: The Czech, the British and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch parliamentarians adopted more sovereigntist positions, while in other countries support for a more EU-driven refugee relocation policy prevailed. When asked about burden-sharing, European politicians were deeply divided; those countries that have been more exposed to the refugee crisis (e.g. Greece and Italy) supported sharing the costs of providing asylum, while Eastern countries and the UK did not. However, most national elites converged on a shared responsibility for hosting migrants, except in the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, the UK, while Polish elites took a neutral position. European elites were divided on the creation of a budget for the Euro area to help countries in financial need. This idea was seen favorably by large majorities in the countries most affected by the Eurocrisis, like Greece (100%), Italy (75%), Portugal (78%), Spain (88%), Poland (77%), and France (78%), while it garnered less support in the Czech Republic (35%), Germany (37%), the Netherlands (29%), and the UK (36%).

Finally, there was broad general support among national political elites for the idea that all the countries of the EU need to contribute to and participate in responses to security challenges, and that the EU member states should have a common security policy.
The media

How national outlets discuss the EU…

The tone of coverage of EU issues in the European media throughout the period analyzed (January-October 2016) was predominantly – and increasingly – positive in Germany and the Netherlands, negative in the UK in the months leading up to its referendum, and roughly equally mixed in the other seven countries, as well as in the UK after the referendum. Overall, the online media analyses revealed that there is not yet a common EU public sphere: National media discourses are distinct, and are determined largely by national and historical contexts, which remain largely immune to change even in the face of media digitalization.

…And how the EU was tweeted (the case of the Brexit campaign)

Social media data shows that in the Brexit debate on Twitter most Leave politicians’ tweets discussed the excessive volume of EU migrants and the UK government's loss of control over migration. In contrast, tweets by Remain MPs focused on the false claims made by the Leave campaign and the benefits of European migration. Remain users tweeted more on the economy than Leave users, whose concerns about potential economic consequences did not run as deep. Remain Twitter users were also more concerned about the negative impact Brexit might have on the stock market, but these users paid the referendum little attention before June, and the topic only surged in interest in the few weeks at the end of the campaign period.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

As EUENGAGE data shows, the EU is at a crossroads. The multiple crises have seriously challenged the European integration project, and have further exposed the weaknesses stemming from the EU's perceived “democratic deficit” and its institutional inefficiencies. As a result, there is little support for further strengthening the EU's authority or its solidarity measures.

It is impossible to predict the future of European integration with any certainty in a situation as complex as the one the EU finds itself in today. However, three possible scenarios for the near-term future of Europe (2030) warrant consideration: DISINTEGRATION, BUSINESS AS USUAL, and INTEGRATION. For each potential scenario, a group of researchers, think tankers, and stakeholders has sought to identify three key elements:

1. The main drivers that make the scenario more likely, meaning structural conditions and trends like migration flows and rate of economic growth;
2. The branching points, if any, that could shift Europe's trajectory from one outcome to another within a given scenario, meaning the turning points, such as elections, referendums, surges of support for specific party families, unexpected natural disasters, and social upheavals; and
3. The possible outcomes of each scenario, that is to say the different “shapes” they could take.

DISINTEGRATION: Drivers, branching points, and outcomes

There are a number of drivers that could lead to a disintegration of the European project, even if such a disintegration might not be obvious, or even clearly observable, in the next ten years. The first driver is the fragmentation of political elites; Euroskeptic challengers are rising across Europe, and mainstream political actors have failed to effectively campaign for the EU, let alone address concrete issues like redistribution and transnational solidarity. The second driver is the EU's seeming inability to incorporate public opinion in its decision-making processes, along with the lack of accountability of the EU...
institutions, which further alienates the EU from its citizens. The third factor is representation at the national level, with MEPs often considering themselves more accountable to their national constituencies and fellow citizens than Europe as a whole. Fourth, Germany and its leadership play a hegemonic role in the EU institutions, shaping decisions and policies at the EU level, stirring the antagonism of other countries. Fifth, calls for new referendums to leave the EU, following the example of the United Kingdom. Sixth, structural transformations of capitalist economies and international markets, global migration, changes to transatlantic political norms, and rising global powers like China and Russia all alter the international environment in which the EU operates.

A possible response to these drivers is “re-integration”, that is, moving from interdependency to new forms of integration, including a multiple-speed Europe. This process might represent either a risk or an opportunity; it could further destabilize the existing EU institutional scheme, or provide an opportunity to build legitimacy and stronger connections between the peoples of Europe.

New constellations of power may also emerge: National disintegration, like that threatened in breakaway regions like Catalonia and Scotland, may create new opportunities for integration among the regions of Europe. Cities and mega-cities would form the center of this new scenario, acting as engines of innovation. In this institutional framework, integration would be chiefly functional rather than territorial, and networks of cooperation would often be global rather than European. Spontaneous, informal, and hybrid cooperative arrangements between numerous private and public actors would develop.

The result would be a polyphonic (neo-Medieval) Europe, with states no longer able to respond to external conditions (i.e., economic shocks, migration, security risks, etc.). In the coming years, new cleavages will likely emerge both across and within European countries and alternative identities will likely gain ground, and it will be new entities (e.g., regions, corporate alliances, mega-cities) and new national coalitions that will likely lead this process of re-integration.

BUSINESS AS USUAL: Drivers, branching points, and outcomes

A number of factors advancing a “business as usual” scenario are evident. First and foremost, a “status quo” is often easier than significant change; most political leaders have little incentive to undertake any dramatic change, especially as public opinion tends to be against it. Second, the EU has already survived serious crises without structurally changing. In this sense, Brexit has created a precedent: One country leaving will not mean EU disintegration. Third, there is still some consensus on the “founding baseline” of the Internal Market.

Other likely drivers include the rise of Euroskeptic parties, which push traditional parties to re-affirm their pro-integration positions. Furthermore, should a new crisis arise or existing crises suddenly gain urgency, an interest in continuing the current economic recovery, even if it has been slow and uneven, might compel member states to simply leave the EU as it is.

Since a “status quo” is by nature a subjective notion, however, this scenario includes several possible alternative outcomes:

- A “Status quo minus,” meaning an EU shaped by conflict between national member states’ needs and the EU’s responses, leading to increasing dissatisfaction and diminished European ambitions;
- A “two-level EU,” with some member states driving the group towards deeper integration while others lean towards national sovereignty; and
- A “Status quo plus,” meaning an EU that has finalized the European Stability Mechanism, updated legislation governing the internal market, and provided funding to implement these tools. This scenario also assumes what could be called “easy solidarity,” which would rely on income from new taxes to increase the resources available to redistribute to member states.
INTEGRATION: Drivers, branching points, and outcomes

Institutional drivers, like the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council, as well as policy drivers, such as the financial, security, and refugee crises and globalization, might lead member states to pursue further integration. Other trends that could lead in the same direction include the increasing inequalities between EU member states and the emergence of pro-EU leaders, and also – albeit somewhat paradoxically – Brexit. For these drivers to lead to further integration, some crucial events will have to occur. For instance, Brexit could drive further integration if the UK cannot work out a deal that secures its position after it leaves the union. Meanwhile, an open conflict between Turkey and the USA might spur on efforts to coordinate security policy more at the EU level. And all the other potential drivers (increasing inequality, the emergence pro-EU leaders, the supranational efforts of EU institutions, the fallout of the Eurocrisis and the financial crisis, etc.) might compel states to further strengthen the union, though only if national elections and the EP elections in 2019 produce favorable results for pro-EU parties; the electoral success of Euroskeptic challengers, on the other hand, would reduce the chances of further integration.

Further integration could lead to two possible scenarios: a more federal EU, with stronger supranational institutions like the EP, or a “two speed Europe” featuring a highly integrated core of countries and a periphery of less integrated member states.

Recommendations for a more accountable, social, equal, and visible Europe

A few specific recommendations to increase the likelihood of the integration scenario emerged during the final event. First, concrete institutional EU reforms, like the direct election of the president of the European Commission, coupled with more transnationally active European parties, should be supported to make Brussels institutions more directly accountable to citizens; second, welfare systems should be harmonized across countries, including the adoption of a pan-European minimum wage, to help combat inequality and tackle social dumping; third, the EU budget should be reformed to strengthen redistributive policies at the EU level and reduce economic and social divergences between and within member states; fourth, member states should be given incentives to undertake structural reforms, in recognition of the economic, financial, and political costs these reforms can entail. In the long term, other actions that could make an integration more likely include increased EU public relations efforts and information campaigns to better communicate the benefits of cohesion and integration and demonstrate why nationalist and protectionist policies are ineffective in a globalized world; likewise, the EU should invest more in the younger generations of Europeans, for example through education, to “build” a truly European community based on common values.

Research Parameters

Over three years, EUENGAGE has sought to explore the changing orientations of public opinion, parties, political leadership, and the media in times of crisis as they relate to the identity, cohesion, institutions, and policies of the EU. The project has pursued four main goals:

- To ascertain which aspects of the European integration project are seen more critically;
- To gauge the gaps between citizens and political leaders;
- To study ways to address these gaps; and
- To propose policy remedies to address the challenges the EU is facing, based on the insights provided by EUENGAGE data.
EUENGAGE addressed these goals through an interactive, dynamic, multilevel, and repeatable quasi-experimental research design, using a variety of both well-established and new observational instruments. This multi-method approach yielded a valuable amount of data, allowing for the triangulation of various data points. Most of the data was collected in a subset of ten European countries: the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. They were selected to cover the main dimensions of variation across the EU: North/South, more/less affected by the Eurocrisis and the refugee crisis, old/new member states, East/West, and Eurozone/not Eurozone. Further data was gathered in all 27 member states plus the UK.

The following section provides an overview of the project’s activities and the methodologies adopted.

A public opinion panel survey, conducted in 2016 and 2017 with the same pool of respondents in the ten EUENGAGE countries, offers a thorough overview of citizens’ attitudes towards European integration (the “demand” side), with a focus on the issues of the economy, migration, and security, and shows how these views have evolved. It explores themes such as the surrender of competencies to the EU, the mechanisms and actors of political representation, Brexit, and citizens’ support for burden-sharing measures at the EU level. It also investigates attitudes on a wide range of issues related to the EU, as well as individual positions on tolerance, trust, solidarity, globalization, and ideology.

The “supply” side was explored with three research tools, each addressing a specific level of the political system, namely parties, political leaders, and political elites. First, expert surveys were conducted in 2014 and 2017, and a content analysis of the party manifestos published before the EP elections of 2014 provided estimates of party positions on a wide range of issues, including those related to the EU. The 2014 expert surveys included data from parties in 28 member states plus Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, and was supplemented by separate surveys conducted in the Balkan candidate countries; the 2017 expert surveys included data from the ten EUENGAGE countries plus Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Sweden. Euromanifestos data was collected for all relevant parties, meaning those with at least one seat in the EP that were running in 2014 elections. Second, an analysis of speeches delivered between 2007 and 2015 by the leaders of the main European institutions and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the prime ministers of the ten EUENGAGE countries, offers an overview of leaders’ political discourse in times of crisis. Third, waves of elite surveys were conducted in parallel with the two waves of the mass survey in the ten EUENGAGE countries to explore the attitudes of national parliamentarians, plus a small sample of European parliamentarians, and to gauge the areas of convergence and divergence with their respective constituencies. In order to compare elites and public attitudes, and therefore to gauge gaps, the public opinion and elite questionnaires were mostly overlapping. The research done on the supply side also sheds light on the ongoing transformations of the political system and the increasing importance of new vectors of political conflict.

The “media” side was explored through the analysis of social and online media, which provided an in-depth understanding of the public debate on the European Union. Social media analysis collected tweets from, to, or mentioning EP candidates, and Twitter communication concerning the 2016 Brexit referendum. Online media analysis, meanwhile, examined the content of news articles from 30 of the most important media outlets from the ten EUENGAGE countries, covering topics like Brexit, immigration, security, and the economy.
Finally, an **online deliberation exercise** was carried out in October 2016 to explore the potential of **participation** to foster political awareness and public engagement at the EU level. The EUENGAGE online deliberation exercise created a mediated, responsive, and informed environment, where, for eleven days, a group of 285 people selected from the same pool of respondents as the public opinion survey could discuss Europe and the challenges it is facing, interact with experts and politicians on these themes, play role-playing games on distributive justice and public policy choices, and formulate policy proposals.

The research tools developed by the project should provide the scientific community with not only a rich database for the study of European integration, but also templates for future research that might find application in other contexts.

**FURTHER READING**


- Braun Daniela, Sebastian A. Popa. Forthcoming. “This time it was different? The salience of the Spitzenkandidaten system among European parties.” *West European Politics*.


WEBSITE
www.euengage.eu

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Guidelines for discussion

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