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***Should it stay or should it go?
A natural (quasi)experiment on Brexit in 10 EU countries***

Keywords: EU membership; Brexit; Field experiment; Referenda; Public opinion.

ABSTRACT

While scrutinizing the evolution of people's preferences over time, the paper examines the micro-foundational mechanisms of the determinants of support for or opposition to Britain's departure from the EU in comparative perspective. In doing this, the paper first attempts to identify the factors that influenced European public's approval of the UK's membership of the EU. Then, it tests the presence and possible explanatory factors of a "backpedal effect", that is, the reconsideration of reasons for Brexit, after the referendum results became known. The paper explores these issues by exploiting a natural (quasi)experiment, involving a sample of citizens and businessmen from ten different EU countries, conducted in the weeks immediately before and after the British referendum on EU membership.

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Introduction¹

On June 23, 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union in a referendum that brought to an end 43 years of EU membership. In the aftermath of the so-called “Brexit” referendum, the “leave” success caused deep political and economic consequences in London as well as in other EU capitals. While the British Pound fell to its lowest level against the US Dollar since September 1985 and the Euro Stoxx bank index dropped at the height of the Eurozone debt crisis in 2012 (“Britain turns” 2016, “Pound Tumbles” 2016), the vote left Britain in a political crisis and Europe in a state of bewilderment. On the domestic side, the national political landscape was in upheaval as Prime Minister David Cameron announced his resignation from office, Jeremy Corbyn lost a no-confidence motion with more than 80% of Labour MPs voting against him, and Nigel Farage stepped down as UKIP leader after successfully campaigning for the country to leave the EU. Adding to this uncertainty, was the pro-independence pressure from Scotland and Northern Ireland, which voted to remain in the EU by 62 to 38 per cent and 56 to 44 per cent respectively. In continental Europe, the response to the UK’s decision to leave the EU was diverse, with the representatives of EU institutions urging the British government to clarify its position and “give effect to this decision [...] as soon as possible, however painful that process [could] be” (Schulz et al. 2016) and country leaders projected to the future of Europe. Although regretting Britain’s decision (“EU leaders call” 2016), they acknowledged that Brexit represented a test for the European project and committed themselves “to secure profound change rather than decline” (Hollande 2016; see also Renzi 2016) in order to avoid that a “chain reaction”, inspired by Eurosceptic forces, lead other states of the Union either to follow the exit route or to use the Brexit results to make their own requests for major concessions from Brussels while threatening to hold similar referenda.

Although the question of whether or not such a utilitarian approach to the EU membership was supported by Britons and other European citizens is a matter of debate that deserves specific investigation, it is hardly disputable that the Brexit referendum did not pass unobserved, receiving extensive media coverage both at home and abroad. The referendum campaign was marked by an intense mainstream and social media activity (Howard and Kollanyi 2016) and Brexit was the leading story of British and European press after the referendum results were announced (Lees 2016). Interestingly, while the tone of coverage in Britain seemed to favour the “leave” side in the pre-referendum period (Levy, Aslan and Bironzo 2016; Llewellyn and Cram 2016; “Study shows that” 2016), pro-leave activists were reported to reconsider their position as the side effects of their choice became clearer (“Having Won” 2016). By contrast, a content analysis of the print editions of daily newspapers in Europe and the United States shows that “Europe’s newspapers were overwhelmingly negative towards Britain’s vote to leave the European Union” (Lees 2016).

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Whether and how this media climate was reflected in public attitudes is a matter of study in this paper. While scrutinizing the evolution of people's preferences over time, the paper examines the micro-foundational mechanisms of the determinants of support for or opposition to Britain's departure from the EU in comparative perspective. In doing this, the paper first attempts to identify the factors that influenced European public's approval of the UK's membership of the EU. Then, it tests the presence and possible explanatory factors of a "backpedal effect", that is, the reconsideration of reasons for Brexit, after the referendum results became known. The paper explores these issues by exploiting a natural (quasi)experiment involving both citizens and business leaders. As part of a larger project on political representation in Europe, a survey was conducted in the weeks immediately before and after the British referendum on EU membership. A sample of about 25,000 individuals (22,032 citizens and 3,185 businessmen) from ten different EU countries (i.e., Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) was interviewed. Individuals were asked questions on the opportunity and consequences of the referendum as well as on different aspects of the EU and its policies. This represents a unique natural opportunity to investigate the perceived benefits of the EU membership when it is under attack.

A natural (quasi)experiment on Brexit in 10 EU countries

In social sciences natural experiments are defined as those events occurred in the uncontrolled natural or social world that are then reconstructed by scientists through a "reverse design". Contrary to field experiments, where "scientists make their own planned interventions and institute their own forms of control" (Morgan 2013: 350) manipulating the treatment that each group receives, natural experiments imply that "controls are not naturally present but have to be added retrospectively by the scientist to establish the natural experimental site" for study (Morgan 2013: 344). Given the impossibility for the researcher to manipulate the social and political reality and randomly assign subjects to treatment and control groups, natural experiments are commonly referred as "observational studies" (Dunning 2008: 290) or "quasi-experimental" designs (Campbell and Stanley 1963: 34). The condition separating the experimental group from the control group is the occurrence of a real event at a given point in time that the researcher assumes to have been assigned *as-if* at random (Dunning 2008, 2012). This assumption, as aptly remarked by Sekhon and Titiunik (2012), is sometimes referred to *exogeneity* and "implies that the treatment and control groups created by the natural experiment are similar in terms of all observed and unobserved factors that may affect the outcome of interest, with the exception of the treatment and confounders that the researcher controls for" (Sekhon and Titiunik 2012: 36).

In our study the event discriminating the treatment and control group is the UK's referendum on EU membership that took place on June 23, 2016. In each of the ten surveyed countries (i.e., Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom), about half of the

sample (control group, N=12,132) was interviewed before results were announced (T1) while the other half (treatment group, N=13,085) was interviewed after the results became known (T2) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for details by country)². Two groups of participants took part in the experiment. The first group constitutes of citizens randomly drawn from an online panel managed by TNS, the world's largest custom market research company, with a presence in 80 countries in all five continents. The second group is composed of representatives of business and industry, who were sourced through Research Now, a leading UK international on-line panel provider offering an international B2B panel to the market research industry³. Participants were randomly assigned to the two conditions (i.e., before and after the referendum) and offered monetary incentives to stimulate participation in the survey. Quota targets were set to ensure the pre-Brexit and post-Brexit samples did not greatly differ in terms of key demographics, such as gender, age and region, and to allow post hoc comparison. As for the business group, the sector and the company size were used as filters to select respondents.

Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix report comparisons of sample distributions for socio-demographic and business-related characteristics before and after the Brexit vote. Both samples do not show a significant difference in the level of education of respondents interviewed at T1 and T2. Mixed results are instead found for gender, age and occupation. While businessmen interviewed in T2 are on average younger than those interviewed in the post-Brexit three weeks (-1.1 year), the proportion of female respondents belonging to the mass public's is slightly (+1.9%) higher in the post-Brexit period. Similarly, small differences exist in the distribution of the mass sample by occupation. As for sample-specific characteristics, community type does not capture relevant differences between citizens interviewed at T1 and T2. While household income is comparatively skewed, albeit slightly, towards the lowest categories in the post-Brexit, variables measuring company size (i.e., turnover and number of employees) are proportionally distributed towards the highest values in the very same period. Small differences exist for the sector of activity measured using the European classification of economic activities (NACE rev.2).

Although Chi-Square tests show that the distributions of some variables significantly differ from T1 and T2, the two samples are very similar as far as structural characteristics are considered. On average, percentage differences between T1 and T2 are smaller than 3%, with only age group and company turnover showing differences greater than 5% in the business sample. In consideration of these results and the random assignment of panellists to treatment and control groups created by the natural experiment, we can

² T1 goes from June 14, 2016 to June 24, 2016 1PM CET; T2 includes interviews completed in the period between June 24, 2016 2PM and July 20, 2016.

³ The sample includes managers from export-oriented SMEs (i.e., with between 10 and 249 employees) as well as big business in the following business sectors: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, information and communication, financial and insurance activities, administrative and support services, education. In Greece, due to the lack of an on-line business panel, a mixed mode, phone-to-web approach was used to complete the interviews with senior business decision-makers.

therefore be confident that both groups are similar in terms of socio-demographic and business-related characteristics.

Should it stay or should it go?

As stated above, our study is a retrospective analysis of the factors that influenced European public's support for or opposition to the UK's membership of the EU. Secondly, we are interested in whether and why a "backpedal effect" was evident following the announcement of the referendum's outcome on the 24th of June. Our dependent variable is operationalized using a question that, after a premise on the content of the referendum, asked respondents, before the vote, whether the UK should leave or remain a member of the EU and, after the referendum, whether the British people should have voted to leave or remain in the EU⁴. The variable is coded as a dummy, with 0 for respondents who answered "the UK/British people should (have voted to) leave the EU" and 1 for those who opted for "the UK/British people should (have voted to) remain a member of the EU".

Table 1 displays the frequency distribution of this variable for the two samples. Overall, a large majority of businessmen (67.4%) and citizens (66.5%) support the UK's membership of the EU, with a "back pedal effect" statistically confirmed at the mass level (from 69.3% in T1 to 63.9% in T2) but not at the business level (from 68.8% in T1 to 66.1% in T2).

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Predictably, these results turn out to be sensitive to country differences (see Table A.5 in the Appendix). While all EU countries show a majority of "remainers" in the pre-referendum period, with percentages higher than 70% in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, followed by Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, France and, last but not least, the UK, a negative reaction to the Brexit vote is statistically confirmed in Czech Republic, Greece, Italy (both at the mass and business level) as well as in the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal (in the mass public sample). An opposite response to the referendum outcome, that is, an increased percentage of "remainers" in T2, is evident in France, Germany and Spain, although it is found to be statistically significant only among French businessmen. There is only one country in which business leaders and citizens do not show the same trend in the comparison of treatment and control groups: the United Kingdom. While British entrepreneurs become more supportive of their country's membership of the EU after the referendum results were announced (+6.8%), the percentage of "Brexiters" slightly increases

⁴ The full wording for the pre-Brexit period is: *As you may know, the British Prime minister, David Cameron announced a referendum to be held on 23 June this year, to ask the British people whether they want to leave or stay in the EU. In your opinion, should the UK leave the EU or remain a member of the EU?* (0 = "The UK should leave the EU"; 1 = The UK should remain a member of the EU). In the post-Brexit period, the question is: *As you may know, in the referendum held on 23 June the British people voted to leave the EU. In your opinion, should the British people have voted to leave or remain a member of the EU?* (0 = "The British people should have voted to leave the EU"; 1 = The British people should have voted to remain a member of the EU").

(+1.4%) in the mass sample. In both cases, however, the statistical significance of these results is not confirmed by a t-test for independent samples.

Arguments for Brexit

Looking at the media content in the weeks before the referendum, it has been observed that two issues dominated the debate on the UK's withdrawal from the EU and these issues were often interconnected: the implications of EU membership for the national economy and immigration from outside and within Europe. Disillusionment with the EU was not just a matter of state sovereignty or democratic deficit. Economic anxieties and anti-immigration sentiments were greatly and – according to final polls of the campaign (see Curtice 2016) – successfully exploited by “pro-leave” proponents (“The uncomfortable question” 2016; “Brexit Vote Gives” 2016).

On the one hand, EU membership was presented as a financial cost that could not be afforded in a period of economic distress. Notably, the slogan displayed on the side of the Vote Leave group's battle bus was “we send the EU £350million a week – Let's fund our NHS instead”. Two days before the polls opened, Nigel Farage, who had repeatedly portrayed the EU as a “racket”, openly linked Brexit to economic recovery. In a *Daily Express* article, the leader of the UKIP party wrote that Britain “must leave the European Union so that not only can wages increase for British workers but so that living standards rather than declining can start going up” (“Why We Must” 2016). On the other hand, as noticed by *Financial Times* columnist Gideon Rachman, “the Leavers have sometimes deliberately blurred the distinction between legal immigrants from the EU and asylum seekers fleeing the Middle East” (“Immigration could swing” 2016). Images and references to the refugee crisis and EU rules on the freedom of movement for EU citizens were interchangeably used by pro-Brexit politicians to capitalise on voters' fear of uncontrolled immigration. One of UKIP's controversial posters, for instance, featured a line of immigrants crossing the Slovenia-Croatia border with the phrase “Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all. We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders.” Boris Johnson, another leading proponent for Britain's departure from the EU, reinforced the mantra of “taking back control” claiming, among other things, that “we have absolutely no power to control the numbers who are coming with no job offers and no qualifications from the 28 EU countries” making his statement even clearer when he said that the decision on “who has the right to live and work in your country – has been taken away and now resides in Brussels” (Johnson 2016).

In order to evaluate the effect of these two issues on our respondents' attitudes towards Brexit, three sets of variables were used. First, concern for the economic crisis and the flow of immigrants to Europe were included in our analysis to assess whether real or perceived fears of these two issues have a detrimental effect on support for the remain camp. Second, six attitudinal questions on immigration were indexed into a single interval variable, ranging from 0 to 1, to measure general feelings towards immigrants, with higher values indicating a positive sentiment. This variable will allow us to verify whether anti-immigrant

attitudes are positively related to “pro-Brexit” stances. Third, questions presenting the respondent with a trade-off in terms national responsibility vs. European responsibility in matters of economic and immigration policies were indexed into two independent variables, ranging from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating approval of (EU) shared solutions to (or ‘Europeanization’ of) immigration and economic problems. In this case, we expect a positive relation between the two indexes and support for intra-European cohesion.

Since Europeanism is expected to strongly influence support for EU membership, a typology of attachment to the country of origin and Europe was created, using people who are neither attached to Europe nor to their own country as baseline. Reasonably, individuals who feel attached to Europe (or to Europe and their country) should support EU integration, whereas those with an exclusive national identity are more likely to lean towards the Euro-sceptic – and thus leave – pole. Analogously, people who agree with the statement “the unification of the EU has gone too far” should be associated with pro-Brexit positions, while those who are eager to see further integration should support a remain vote.

We assume that intensity of opinions is positively related to the approaching of an event and that both support for Remain (or Leave) and a hypothetical “backpedal effect” could be stronger in the days ahead and immediately following the EU membership referendum. In order to check for the expected (positive) impact of time on intensity of opinions, we introduced a variable counting the number of days to (negative sign) and after (positive sign) the referendum. Political ideology, measured on the traditional left-right scale (rescaled to range 0-1 where 0 is extreme left and 1 is extreme right), will be monitored to verify whether “remainers” lean towards the conservative or liberal pole of the political axis.

As for socio-demographics, preliminary research has demonstrated a positive relationship between age (e.g., Curtice 2016), community type and likelihood to support Brexit, leading some commentators to speak both of a “generational divide between “millennials” (pro-remain) and “baby boomers” (pro-leave) (e.g., “Brexit: How much” 2016; “Brexit’s generational divide” 2016) and a “urban” (pro-remain) – rural (pro-leave)” gap in the referendum vote (“Cities and Brexit” 2016; Katz and Jones 2016). On the contrary, level of education, occupation and income were found to be inversely related to support for Brexit, with graduates, professionals and higher income citizens voting to remain in the EU and labourers, less educated and lower income individuals strongly in favour of leaving (“Who voted for” 2016; “The areas and demographics” 2016; “Brexit: voter turnout” 2016; “Brexit’: How Britons” 2016).

Finally, with regards to business-specific characteristics, annual turnover and number of employees will be used as proxies of the company’s size to investigate whether representatives of small enterprises were more likely than large-size businessmen to favour a Brexit before the referendum as reported by some economic analysts (“Small British Companies” 2016) and pollsters (“UK small businesses” 2016). By the same token, size of business will be examined to

identify the typology of entrepreneurs who showed the greatest concern for the referendum outcome in the post-Brexit period.

Results

In order to investigate the relative influence of selected predictors on European citizens and businessmen's support for the UK's membership of the EU two separate binary logistic regression models were developed for each sample at T1 and T2. Data were analysed separately for British and other European respondents adjusting standard errors by country clusters in the EU-9 group.

The discussion of regression results is organized as follows. We examine separately the determinants of attitudes towards Brexit in the UK and in the rest of Europe. For both, we first analyse the determinants of attitudes towards the referendum in T1 and then what happens to the same determinants in T2. Then, we compare results for the two samples (i.e., businessmen and the general public). For each group, we discuss three blocks of variables: those related to the issues of immigration and the economy, namely concern for the economic crisis and the flow of immigrants to Europe, feelings towards immigrants, and support for the 'Europeanization' of these policy areas; those related to European attachment and support for further European integration; and, last, socio-demographics and business-specific characteristics. The full set of regression results for the UK and the rest of Europe is reported in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.

Pre-Post BREXIT in the UK

The main points we see looking at the pre-Brexit results are four. First, the paramount importance of immigration issues in driving people's attitudes towards the Remain vs. Leave. No other issue is so systematically relevant and in the direction the Leave campaign worked for: those more concerned about immigrants, less dispositionally favourable to immigrants and less willing to 'Europeanize' immigration policies are also those more likely to vote Leave. Economic concerns are inconspicuously absent in the pre-Brexit model. Moreover, economic issues are not significant – although in the expected direction – in the case of the Europeanization question. Second, attitudes towards the EU are (surprisingly?) less influential than those about immigration. With the exception of speed EU integration – whose effect is quite powerful – all other variables are insignificant (although in the expected direction). This result might suggest that there is some merit in the claim that the referendum was more about how immigration should be coped with domestically than about being part of the EU or not. Third, coefficients indicate the importance of ideology and gender in explaining attitudes towards the Remain vs. Leave. Individuals leaning on the right of the political spectrum and females are all more favourable to the Leave option than those on the left and males. The relevance of the Left-Right cleavage is somehow surprising, considering how lukewarm the Labour campaign has been. Fourth, and in line with post-vote segmentation analyses, income variables show the upper income classes to be definitely pro-Remain as compared to the lower income categories – whose

coefficients are not significant. By contrast, we do observe neither a generational nor an urban-rural divide among British respondents in T1. Similarly, level of education and occupational status do not emerge as statistically significant predictors of individual preferences on Brexit.

What happens when we look at the same model after June 23? The most important consequence the same regression model shows is about the motivations to Leave or to Remain for both camps in the Post-Brexit sample.

Many more considerations become relevant when it comes to explain those who are in favour or against the results of the referendum, with an interesting cleavage between those who were in favour of Leave and those of Remain. Concerns for economy and immigration become both significant and they work at cross-purpose. While the former boosts attitudes towards the Remain option, the latter works in the opposite direction. The coefficients are strong, significant and unequivocal. This seems to suggest that the arguments used by both the Leave and the Remain campaign started to make their inroads felt only after the result of the referendum became known. Arguments in favour of Remain stressed the (negative) economic implications of the Brexit and arguments in favour of the Leave emphasized the immigration issue. Although both issues were agitated by the two camps, still it seems that they made different inroads among supporters and opponents of the Leave option, but only after the referendum occurred. This “clarifying” impact of the referendum on the British general population seems to us the most interesting result from the UK sample so far.

General orientation towards immigrants as well as disposition towards a greater role for the EU in both the economy and immigration policies are strong predictors of the Remain position. This is not surprising, given the fact that Brexit would mean no further Europeanization of these policies. The strong role of disposition towards immigration sheds further light on the role attitudes towards immigration have had in this campaign and puts in a wider framework the result discussed above. Ideology becomes not statistically significant after the referendum; another indicator that results cut across traditional party lines. On the contrary, attachment to Europe and to the country now exerts a positive impact on the remain side, as it was (and still is) for support for further EU integration.

What happens to the businessmen? There are both similarities and differences when it comes to the comparison of business leaders with the general population. Two are the most important similarities. The first is represented by the effect of the referendum results on both samples. As for the general population, also for the businessmen the results of the referendum makes a wider set of considerations relevant in explaining attitudes towards Remain vs. Leave. The second similarity is the importance that immigration has for the businessmen, as compared to the economic considerations. The most important difference, however, is how immigration considerations play out in the businessmen sample. Both before and after the referendum, the position to take was explained, among other things, by the respondent’s preferences on how to

deal with immigration. Those who are in favour of a greater Europeanization of immigration policies are in favour of the Remain option, while those who are against it are in favour of Leave. This result confirms what seems to be the major difference with the general population: attitudes towards Europe. Before the referendum, entrepreneurs' attitudes towards Europe were as important as their attitudes on immigration in accounting for their position on the Brexit. After the referendum, immigration continues to play a role among the business sample while orientation towards European integration ceases to be a significant predictor of attitudes towards the Remain vs. Leave.

The role of the two structural variables, turnover and number of employees, is harder to interpret. While turnover seems to work in the expected direction – bigger enterprises are more favourable to Remain – the number of employees is in the opposite direction. In both cases, however, only the intermediate category is significant. One could wonder whether here there is an effect due to the technological maturity of enterprises: high turnover, low occupation firms (typically web and services) seems to be pro-Remain, while big firms with a high number of employees (industry) turn out to be against Remain. Undoubtedly, further analysis is needed to determine how these two characteristics relate to our dependent variable.

Pre-Post BREXIT in the rest of Europe

In Europe, on average, the role of economic and immigration concerns operates differently in the pre-Brexit period. First, a wider set of concerns and issues affect attitudes towards Brexit (more variables are statistically significant) in Europe than in the UK. Concern for the economy is significant and it motivates people to suggest the UK should leave, while concern for immigration moves in the direction of Remain, although it is not statistically significant. Europeanization of both policies works in favour of Remain and feelings towards immigrants is a powerful predictor of the Leave vs. Remain attitudes. In general, concern for the economy and the preference towards a Europeanization of this policy area seem to be more important than concern for the immigrants and the desire to 'Europeanize' immigration policies. This result seems to be in line with the importance given to the economic consequences of the Brexit in Europe.

Both attachment to Europe and support for the EU integration process are in the predicted direction and contribute to the remain position. Political ideology (Left-Right), instead, seems to play no role in Europe, even though this could be an effect of aggregating different countries in this exploratory regression model.

It is interesting to notice the impact of gender, which works in opposite directions in the UK and the rest of Europe. While British females are more pro-Leave than British men, females are more pro-Remain than males in the rest of Europe. Finally, household income, occupation, level of education and community type are not significant predictors at T1.

The post-Brexit regression shows a movement similar to the one occurring in the UK but on a smaller scale, given the importance of a much wider set of variables in the pre-Brexit period in Europe. Concerns for the economy becomes not

significant (but still the coefficient is in the same direction of the pre-Brexit regression). All other variables related to the topics of economy and immigration are significant and in the expected direction. Those who are concerned about immigrants and are more favourable to Europeanize both economy and immigration are pro-Remain.

While attachment to Europe and support for further EU integration continues to be strong predictors of the remain position, gender differences disappear in Europe after the referendum. Interestingly, the coefficient for the group of Southern European countries (including, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal) become significant and pro-Leave. In general, the group of countries in the South (those most affected by the financial and immigration crises) are systematically more pro-Leave than the rest of the nine EU countries. Finally, household income becomes positively related to remain: the higher the income the greater the coefficient associated to our dependent variable.

Remarkably, the European businessmen show a similar pattern to their counterparts in Britain. In general, factors related to the economy seem to be more relevant than for the British businessmen (the Europeanization of the economy variable is significant both before and after the referendum in the rest of Europe, while it is not significant in both periods for British businessmen). Attitudes towards Europe and immigration are both important and in the expected direction.

In the rest of Europe, once the result of the referendum get known, immigration attitudes become a significant predictor (and in the expected direction) and a few variables flip from not significant to significant after the referendum: political ideology, with Right leaning entrepreneurs less favourable to the Remain, gender (with females, like in the UK, less in favour of Remain), and age (with older respondents more in favour of Remain). Also among the businessmen, countries of Southern Europe are systematically more favourable to the Leave option than those of the Northern and Eastern part of Europe.

Conclusions

The paper investigated how European citizens assessed the consequences of the “Brexit” referendum. Our tool of analysis was a between subjects natural (quasi) experiment involving more than 25,000 individuals from ten different EU countries. By comparing their attitudes towards the UK exit from the EU after and before the referendum, we were able to detect whether a “back-pedal effect” occurred and which factors lead people to reassess the reasons for Brexit.

We chose to focus our analysis on a set of variables related to the economy and immigration as well as to the European identity and scope of governance. For evident reasons we assessed the impact of these factors by analysing separately UK and the other European countries.

Our first key finding is that in the UK, while immigration issues were the main determinants of people's attitudes before and after Brexit, concerns for economic factors become relevant only after the referendum results became known. We interpret this finding as evidence that this unexpected event had a 'clarifying' effect pushing British respondents to consider (more rationally?) the consequences of Brexit and to become aware of a wider set of issues. This explanation is further supported by the fact that values such as ideological orientation (for all the population) and sense of attachment to Europe (for businessmen) become not statistically significant after the referendum.

Differently enough, in the rest of Europe the determinants of attitudes towards Brexit were affected by the referendum but in the opposite direction. The concern for economy becomes not significant, while the attitude for immigration become significant after Brexit. This effect seems to be more pronounced in the Southern European countries that, while more pro-Leave than other countries, are those most affected by the economic and immigration crises. Thus, although out of UK a larger set of variables affects people's attitudes, in the rest of Europe referendum results also had a significant impact on how their consequences were assessed.

Overall, our findings confirm that a sort of a "back-pedal effect" was shared by all the countries included in our experiment. This evidence supports the view expressed by some observers after Brexit.

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Tables

Table 1: Frequency distribution of DV for the two samples

		Businessmen				Citizens			
		Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post	Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post
Leave	%	31.1	33.5	32.4	-2.4	30.3	35.6	33.1	-5.3
	N	456	575	1,031	-119	3,234	4,047	7,281	-813
Remain	%	68.8	66.1	67.4	2.7	69.3	63.9	66.5	5.4
	N	1,009	1,136	2,145	-127	7,390	7,267	14,657	123
DK	%	0.1	0.4	0.3	-0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	-0.1
	N	2	7	9	-5	41	53	94	-12
Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702
t-test (pre-post)		1.490 (Satterthwaite's df=3,116.8)				8.401*** (Satterthwaite's df=21,925.3)			

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

t-test based on leave (0) and remain (1) categories adjusted for unequal variances at p<.05 or lower level. * statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.

Table 2: Logistic regression (UK)

	CITIZENS						BUSINESSMEN					
	PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)			PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)		
	Odds ratio	SE	z-value	Odds ratio	SE	z-value	Odds ratio	SE	z-value	Odds ratio	SE	z-value
ISSUE SPECIFIC VARIABLES												
Concern (economic crisis)	1.00	0.32	-0.01	2.18 *	0.81	2.09	1.90	1.93	0.63	4.86 *	3.89	1.97
Concern (immigration)	0.47 *	0.16	-2.15	0.45 *	0.18	-2.06	0.39	0.33	-1.10	0.59	0.44	-0.70
Attitudes towards immigrants (index)	11.51 ***	4.39	6.40	8.69 ***	3.13	6.00	21.09 ***	22.04	2.92	32.22 **	36.42	3.07
Europeanization (economy)	2.19	1.36	1.26	5.48 ***	2.86	3.26	8.24	13.92	1.25	21.40	34.12	1.92
Europeanization (immigration)	5.53 **	3.28	2.89	3.45 **	1.69	2.53	19.21 *	26.01	2.18	14.90 *	20.50	1.96
EUROPEANISM												
Attachment												
to country not to Europe	0.71	0.27	-0.90	0.73	0.29	-0.79	1.07	1.35	0.05	2.14	2.40	0.68
to Europe not to country	1.20	0.86	0.25	3.00	2.24	1.47	0.54	1.09	-0.31	6.36	9.12	1.29
both to Europe and to country	1.71	0.64	1.44	2.33 *	0.87	2.27	3.11	3.59	0.98	6.83	6.92	1.90
EU Integration	36.77 ***	18.52	7.16	10.13 ***	4.78	4.90	27.64 **	37.02	2.48	1.30	1.29	0.26
Days to/after Brexit	1.15 *	0.08	1.95	0.95	0.03	-1.45	0.67	0.14	-1.92	1.11	0.08	1.41
Ideology (left-right)	0.15 **	0.09	-3.09	0.45	0.26	-1.38	0.11	0.17	-1.39	0.13	0.21	-1.24
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS												
Gender (ref. Male)	0.59 **	0.13	-2.48	0.84	0.18	-0.81	0.88	0.55	-0.20	0.50	0.32	-1.10
Age (in years)	1.01	0.01	1.63	1.00	0.01	-0.22	1.08 **	0.03	2.53	1.01	0.03	0.27
Level of education (ref. Medium)												
Low	0.80	0.35	-0.51	0.84	0.30	-0.50	0.66	0.73	-0.37	0.39	0.43	-0.85
High	1.36	0.34	1.22	1.36	0.31	1.31	0.75	0.52	-0.41	0.39	0.26	-1.40
Occupation												
Self-employed	1.46	0.84	0.66	0.72	0.27	-0.87	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employee	1.20	0.67	0.33	0.79	0.27	-0.68	3.19	2.16	1.72	0.95	0.59	-0.08
Manual worker	0.32	0.30	-1.23	0.46	0.28	-1.29	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other (SPECIFY)	1.77	1.21	0.84	0.92	0.38	-0.21	-	-	-	-	-	-
Community type (ref. Rural)												
Metropolitan zone	0.76	0.23	-0.90	0.93	0.28	-0.24	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other town/urban centre	1.09	0.25	0.38	1.03	0.23	0.12	-	-	-	-	-	-
Household income												
€8,001-€24,000	2.35	1.48	1.35	2.13	1.47	1.10	-	-	-	-	-	-
€24,001-€40,000	2.36	1.49	1.36	3.41	2.35	1.79	-	-	-	-	-	-
€40,001-€56,000	3.05	1.96	1.73	4.47 *	3.18	2.11	-	-	-	-	-	-
€56,001-€72,000	3.88 *	2.55	2.06	4.05	2.99	1.90	-	-	-	-	-	-
> €72,000	5.61 **	3.81	2.54	5.67 *	4.17	2.36	-	-	-	-	-	-

(Continued)

Table 2: (Continued)

	CITIZENS						BUSINESSMEN					
	PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)			PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)		
	Odds ratio	SE	z-value	Odds ratio	SE	z-value	Odds ratio	SE	z-value	Odds ratio	SE	z-value
BUSINESS-SPECIFIC												
Turnover												
€1.6m-€8m	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.26	4.70	1.86	3.76	3.42	1.46
€8m-€40m	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.07	1.64	0.04	18.32 *	23.28	2.29
> €40m	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.22	0.44	-0.76	5.46	8.73	1.06
Number of employees												
10-49	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.76	0.63	-0.34	0.24	0.20	-1.74
50-249	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.11	0.14	-1.74	0.08 *	0.10	-1.98
>= 250	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.88	1.61	-0.07	0.11	0.19	-1.30
Constant	0.08 *	0.09	-2.18	0.03 ***	0.03	-3.20	0.00 **	0.00	-2.98	0.01 *	0.02	-2.02
MODEL EVALUATION												
N	931			923			173			172		
Log likelihood	-348.36			-356.88			-55.831			-59.20		
χ^2	576.54 *** df=26			551.93 *** df=26			128.12 *** df=22			116.10 *** df=22		
McFadden's R2	.453			.436			.534			.495		
Nagelkerke's R2	.619			.603			.698			.660		

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

* statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.

Table 3: Logistic regression (EU9)

	CITIZENS						BUSINESSMEN					
	PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)			PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)		
	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value
ISSUE SPECIFIC VARIABLES												
Concern (economic crisis)	0.80 *	0.09	-1.95	0.93	0.08	-0.85	0.95	0.20	-0.24	1.22	0.21	1.16
Concern (immigration)	1.08	0.17	0.50	1.19 *	0.10	2.15	0.97	0.27	-0.12	0.84	0.09	-1.68
Attitudes towards immigrants (index)	1.52 *	0.26	2.43	2.39 ***	0.27	7.75	1.13	0.35	0.40	1.99 ***	0.30	4.52
Europeanization (economy)	3.54 ***	0.50	8.91	5.79 ***	1.33	7.66	4.13 ***	1.53	3.84	5.68 ***	1.87	5.29
Europeanization (immigration)	1.41 *	0.23	2.16	1.74 **	0.30	3.17	2.12	0.90	1.76	1.44	0.49	1.08
EUROPEANISM												
Attachment												
to country not to Europe	1.19 *	0.10	2.24	0.99	0.27	-0.04	0.78	0.21	-0.92	0.91	0.16	-0.52
to Europe not to country	1.62 **	0.27	2.85	1.94 **	0.42	3.04	1.11	0.40	0.30	1.42	0.40	1.24
both to Europe and to country	2.39 ***	0.35	5.86	2.59 ***	0.31	8.02	1.97 **	0.45	3.00	2.21 ***	0.43	4.04
EU Integration	4.82 ***	1.22	6.21	7.70 ***	2.14	7.35	4.26 ***	1.50	4.13	3.42 ***	0.92	4.57
Days to/after Brexit	0.99	0.04	-0.16	1.00	0.01	0.19	1.03	0.04	0.89	1.01	0.01	0.44
Ideology (left-right)	0.59	0.19	-1.62	0.69	0.30	-0.85	0.48	0.23	-1.50	0.50 **	0.14	-2.54
Areas of Europe (ref. North)												
South	0.88	0.27	-0.42	0.53 *	0.17	-1.97	1.20	0.44	0.50	0.63 *	0.13	-2.21
East	1.29	0.28	1.17	0.97	0.17	-0.17	1.54	0.37	1.77	0.89	0.13	-0.80
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS												
Gender (ref. Male)	1.31 ***	0.11	3.20	1.08	0.08	1.00	1.00	0.16	0.01	0.83 **	0.06	-2.48
Age (in years)	1.00	0.00	1.14	1.00	0.00	0.51	1.01	0.01	1.82	1.01 *	0.01	2.05
Level of education (ref. Medium)												
Low	0.99	0.12	-0.08	0.90	0.13	-0.74	0.51	0.43	-0.79	1.13	0.38	0.35
High	0.94	0.04	-1.52	1.02	0.11	0.15	1.15	0.18	0.93	1.37	0.25	1.74
Occupation												
Self-employed	1.00	0.13	0.01	0.77 *	0.09	-2.32	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employee	1.09	0.07	1.47	0.87	0.09	-1.37	1.09	0.30	0.32	1.14	0.28	0.54
Manual worker	0.79	0.14	-1.28	0.77	0.13	-1.56	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other (SPECIFY)	1.09	0.05	1.82	0.86	0.10	-1.37	-	-	-	-	-	-
Community type (ref. Rural)												
Metropolitan zone	0.94	0.06	-1.10	1.05	0.08	0.58	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other town/urban centre	0.97	0.10	-0.34	0.95	0.07	-0.62	-	-	-	-	-	-
Household income												
€8,001-€24,000	1.08	0.09	0.96	1.43 **	0.17	3.02	-	-	-	-	-	-
€24,001-€40,000	1.25	0.16	1.76	1.58 *	0.37	1.96	-	-	-	-	-	-
€40,001-€56,000	0.91	0.11	-0.73	2.02 **	0.51	2.78	-	-	-	-	-	-
€56,001-€72,000	1.04	0.11	0.33	1.56	0.58	1.20	-	-	-	-	-	-
> €72,000	1.26	0.29	1.01	2.00 **	0.49	2.83	-	-	-	-	-	-

(Continued)

Table 3: (Continued)

	CITIZENS						BUSINESSMEN					
	PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)			PRE-BREXIT (T1)			POST-BREXIT (T2)		
	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value	Odds ratio	Robust SE	z-value
BUSINESS-SPECIFIC												
Turnover												
€1.6m-€8m	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.46 ***	0.08	-4.43	0.83	0.15	-1.04
€8m-€40m	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.59	0.21	-1.49	0.69	0.17	-1.52
> €40m	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.77	0.14	-1.42	0.77	0.23	-0.86
Number of employees												
10-49	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.53	0.48	1.36	0.92	0.25	-0.32
50-249	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.38	0.52	0.86	0.96	0.18	-0.21
>= 250	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.71	0.23	-1.07	1.32	0.20	1.79
Constant	0.24 ***	0.08	-4.23	0.09 ***	0.03	-7.93	0.24 *	0.15	-2.25	0.13 ***	0.06	-4.21
MODEL EVALUATION												
N	8,146			8,722			1,282			1,523		
Log pseudolikelihood	-4287.37			-4446.2			-643.94			-808.15		
McFadden's R2	.131			.213			.161			.160		
Nagelkerke's R2	.147			.230			.175			.183		

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

* statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.
Standard errors adjusted by country clusters in the EU-9 group.

Appendix

Table A.1: Comparison of sample (businessmen and citizens) distributions for *country* before and after Brexit

	Businessmen						Citizens					
	Fieldwork starts	Fieldwork ends		Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Total	Fieldwork starts	Fieldwork ends		Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Total
Czech Republic	June 16, 2016	July 16, 2016	%	43.9	56.1	100	June 16, 2016	July 1, 2016	%	50.0	50.0	100
			N	118	151	269			N	1,105	1,105	2,210
France	June 16, 2016	July 12, 2016	%	46.7	53.3	100	June 16, 2016	July 1, 2016	%	50.1	49.9	100
			N	155	177	332			N	1,104	1,100	2,204
Germany	June 17, 2016	July 8, 2016	%	49.9	50.1	100	June 17, 2016	July 6, 2016	%	50.0	50.0	100
			N	174	175	349			N	1,101	1,100	2,201
Greece	June 21, 2016	July 19, 2016	%	48.7	51.3	100	June 17, 2016	July 20, 2016	%	43.1	56.9	100
			N	171	180	351			N	947	1,248	2,195
Italy	June 16, 2016	July 18, 2016	%	45.1	55.0	100	June 16, 2016	July 5, 2016	%	50.0	50.0	100
			N	141	172	313			N	1,101	1,101	2,202
Netherlands	June 16, 2016	July 15, 2016	%	41.0	59.0	100	June 16, 2016	July 5, 2016	%	50.0	50.0	100
			N	116	167	283			N	1,099	1,100	2,199
Poland	June 17, 2016	July 15, 2016	%	44.1	55.9	100	June 17, 2016	July 4, 2016	%	50.1	49.9	100
			N	134	170	304			N	1,107	1,102	2,209
Portugal	June 16, 2016	July 19, 2016	%	39.0	61.0	100	June 16, 2016	July 19, 2016	%	44.6	55.4	100
			N	112	175	287			N	984	1,222	2,206
Spain	June 17, 2016	July 12, 2016	%	49.3	50.7	100	June 17, 2016	July 19, 2016	%	46.1	53.9	100
			N	171	176	347			N	1,015	1,187	2,202
UK	June 14, 2016	July 12, 2016	%	50.0	50.0	100	June 14, 2016	July 12, 2016	%	50.0	50.0	100
			N	175	175	350			N	1,102	1,102	2,204
Total	June 14, 2016	July 19, 2016	%	46.1	53.9	100	June 14, 2016	July 20, 2016	%	48.4	51.6	100
			N	1,467	1,718	3,185			N	10,665	11,367	22,032

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

Table A.2: Comparison of sample (businessmen and citizens) distributions for gender, age, level of education and occupation before and after Brexit

			Businessmen				Citizens			
			Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post	Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post
Gender	Male	%	70.1	69.8	70.0	0.3	50.1	48.2	49.2	1.9
		N	1,029	1,199	2,228	-170	5,346	5,482	10,828	-136
	Female	%	29.9	30.2	30.1	-0.3	49.9	51.8	50.9	-1.9
		N	438	519	957	-81	5,319	5,885	11,204	-566
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702	
	Chi-Square	0.047 (df=1)				7.942** (df=1)				
Age	Mean		46.2	45.1	45.6	1.1	45.6	45.6	45.6	0.0
	N		1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702
	t-test (pre-post)		2.613** (Satterthwaite's df=3,148.2)				-0.087 (df=22,030)			
Age Group	18-39	%	29.6	35.0	32.5	-5.4	38.8	39.1	39.0	-0.3
		N	434	601	1,035	-167	4,137	4,446	8,583	-309
	40-64	%	66.0	59.0	62.2	7.0	46.1	45.3	45.7	0.8
		N	968	1,014	1,982	-46	4,921	5,151	10,072	-230
	65+	%	4.4	6.0	5.3	-1.6	15.1	15.6	15.3	-0.5
		N	65	103	168	-38	1,607	1,770	3,377	-163
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
		N	1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702
	Chi-Square	16.933*** (df=2)				1.856 (df=2)				
Level of education	Low	%	3.1	2.5	2.8	0.6	7.5	7.7	7.6	-0.2
		N	45	43	88	2	803	875	1,678	-72
	Medium	%	20.2	22.1	21.2	-1.9	39.9	39.6	39.7	0.3
		N	296	380	676	-84	4,249	4,501	8,750	-252
	High	%	76.5	75.0	75.7	1.5	52.2	52.2	52.2	0.0
		N	1,122	1,289	2,411	-167	5,562	5,930	11,492	-368
	Refusal	%	0.3	0.4	0.3	-0.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0
		N	4	6	10	-2	51	61	112	-10
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
		N	1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702
	Chi-Square	2.687 (df=3)				0.657 (df=3)				
Occupation	Self-employed	%	39.2	36.8	37.9	2.4	12.9	12.0	12.5	0.9
		N	575	632	1,207	-57	1,380	1,367	2,747	13
	Employee	%	60.8	63.2	62.1	-2.4	51.5	48.8	50.1	2.7
		N	892	1,086	1,978	-194	5,488	5,541	11,029	-53
	Manual worker	%	-	-	-	-	3.3	3.4	3.4	-0.1
		N	-	-	-	-	351	388	739	-37
	Without a professional activity	%	-	-	-	-	17.2	19.6	18.4	-2.4
		N	-	-	-	-	1,838	2,225	4,063	-387
	Other	%	-	-	-	-	14.3	15.3	14.8	-1.0
		N	-	-	-	-	1,522	1,737	3,259	-215
	Refusal	%	-	-	-	-	0.8	1.0	0.9	-0.2
		N	-	-	-	-	86	109	195	-23
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702	
	Chi-Square	1.951 (df=1)				33.594*** (df=5)				

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

* statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.

Table A.3: Comparison of sample (citizens) distributions for *community type* and *household income* before and after Brexit

		Citizens			Difference Pre-Post	
		Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall		
Community type	Metropolitan	%	34.9	33.6	34.2	1.3
		N	3,726	3,819	7,545	-93
	Urban	%	41.3	42.3	41.8	-1.0
		N	4,402	4,803	9,205	-401
	Rural	%	23.8	24.2	24.0	-0.4
		N	2,537	2,745	5,282	-208
	Total	%	100	100	100	0
	N	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702	
	Chi-Square	4.443 (df=2)				
Household Income	Less than € 8,000	%	13.8	14.0	13.9	-0.2
		N	1,476	1,588	3,064	-112
	€ 8,001-16,000	%	20.8	22.1	21.5	-1.3
		N	2,217	2,514	4,731	-297
	€ 16,001-24,000	%	16.5	16.8	16.6	-0.3
		N	1,755	1,904	3,659	-149
	€ 24,001-32,000	%	11.6	11.1	11.4	0.5
		N	1,239	1,266	2,505	-27
	€ 32,001-40,000	%	6.9	7.3	7.1	-0.4
		N	733	831	1,564	-98
	€ 40,001-48,000	%	5.0	4.6	4.8	0.4
		N	533	527	1,060	6
	€ 48,001-56,000	%	3.7	3.4	3.5	0.3
		N	390	388	778	2
	€ 56,001-64,000	%	2.4	2.1	2.2	0.3
		N	254	234	488	20
	€ 64,001-72,000	%	1.9	1.3	1.6	0.6
		N	204	152	356	52
	€ 72,001-80,000	%	1.4	1.2	1.3	0.2
		N	153	140	293	13
More than € 80,000	%	2.7	2.5	2.6	0.2	
	N	283	283	566	0	
DK/Refusal	%	13.4	13.6	13.5	-0.2	
	N	1,428	1,540	2,968	-112	
Total	%	100	100	100	0	
	N	10,665	11,367	22,032	-702	
	Chi-Square	26.155** (df=11)				

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

* statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.

Table A.4: Comparison of sample (businessmen) distributions for *company turnover, number of employees and sector of activity* before and after Brexit

		Businessmen			Difference
		Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Pre-Post
Company turnover	Less than € 1.6M	% 56.5	51.1	53.6	5.4
		N 829	878	1,707	-49
	€ 1.6M-8M	% 22.8	22.5	22.7	0.3
		N 335	387	722	-52
	€ 8M-40M	% 12.5	14.3	13.5	-1.8
		N 184	245	429	-61
	More than € 40M	% 8.1	12.1	10.3	-4
	N 119	208	327	-89	
Total	% 100	100	100	0	
	N 1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	
Chi-Square		18.382*** (df=3)			
Number of employees	Less than 10	% 43.9	42.5	43.1	1.4
		N 644	730	1,374	-86
	10-49	% 26.0	23.1	24.5	2.9
		N 382	397	779	-15
	50-249	% 19.1	20.8	20.0	-1.7
		N 280	358	638	-78
	More than 249	% 11.0	13.6	12.4	-2.6
	N 161	233	394	-72	
Total	% 100	100	100	0	
	N 1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	
Chi-Square		8.638* (df=3)			
Sector of activity (NACE rev.2 classification)	Agriculture, forestry and fishing	% 1.5	1.8	1.7	-0.3
		N 22	31	53	-9
	Mining and quarrying	% 0.9	1.3	1.1	-0.4
		N 13	23	36	-10
	Manufacturing	% 12.6	16.0	14.4	-3.4
		N 185	275	460	-90
	Electricity, gas, steam & air conditioning supply	% 1.7	2.7	2.2	-1.0
		N 25	46	71	-21
	Water supply; sewerage; waste management	% 0.8	0.9	0.8	-0.1
		N 11	15	26	-4
	Construction	% 10.1	10.2	10.1	-0.1
		N 148	175	323	-27
	Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	% 8.5	6.2	7.3	2.3
		N 125	106	231	19
	Transportation and storage	% 4.6	3.9	4.2	0.7
		N 67	67	134	0
	Accommodation and food service activities	% 2.5	3.6	3.1	-1.1
		N 36	62	98	-26
	Information and communication	% 6.3	6.6	6.5	-0.3
		N 93	114	207	-21
	Financial and insurance activities	% 5.1	4.7	4.9	0.4
		N 75	80	155	-5
	Real estate activities	% 2.9	3.4	3.1	-0.5
		N 42	58	100	-16
	Professional, scientific and technical activities	% 7.9	7.6	7.8	0.3
		N 116	131	247	-15
	Administrative and support service activities	% 4.0	3.8	3.9	0.2
		N 59	66	125	-7
	Public administration and defence	% 2.2	1.9	2.0	0.3
		N 33	32	65	1
	Education	% 5.3	4.1	4.6	1.2
		N 77	70	147	7
	Human health and social work activities	% 4.0	3.7	3.8	0.3
		N 58	63	121	-5
Arts, entertainment and recreation	% 3.5	2.9	3.2	0.6	
	N 52	49	101	3	
Other service activities	% 14.9	14.0	14.4	0.9	
	N 218	240	458	-22	
Activities of households as employers	% 0.1	0.5	0.3	-0.4	
	N 1	8	9	-7	
Activities of extra-territorial organisations and bodies	% 0.8	0.4	0.6	0.4	
	N 11	7	18	4	
Total	% 100	100	100	0	
	N 1,467	1,718	3,185	-251	
Chi-Square		34.079* (df=20)			

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

* statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.

Table A.5: Support for “Leave” and “Remain” in the two samples before and after Brexit

			Businessmen				Citizens			
			Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post	Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post
CZECH REPUBLIC	Leave	%	31.4	44.4	38.7	-13.0	34.7	51.3	43.0	-16.6
		N	37	67	104	-30	383	567	950	-184
	Remain	%	68.6	53.6	60.2	15.0	64.3	47.2	55.7	17.1
		N	81	81	162	0	710	521	1,231	189
	DK	%	0.0	2.0	1.1	-2.0	1.1	1.5	1.3	-0.4
		N	0	3	3	-3	12	17	29	-5
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	118	151	269	-33	1,105	1,105	2,210	0	
t-test (pre-post)			2.344* (Satterthwaite's df=257.5)				8.158*** (Satterthwaite's df=2,173.5)			
FRANCE	Leave	%	45.8	30.5	37.7	15.3	40.4	38.2	39.3	2.2
		N	71	54	125	17	446	420	866	26
	Remain	%	54.2	69.5	62.4	-15.3	59.3	61.3	60.3	-2.0
		N	84	123	207	-39	655	674	1,329	-19
	DK	%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.4	-0.3
		N	0	0	0	0	3	6	9	-3
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	155	177	332	-22	1,104	1,100	2,204	4	
t-test (pre-post)			-2.883** (Satterthwaite's df=315.8)				-1.015 (Satterthwaite's df=2,193.0)			
GERMANY	Leave	%	29.3	25.1	27.2	4.2	27.1	26.0	26.5	1.1
		N	51	44	95	7	298	286	584	12
	Remain	%	70.7	74.9	72.8	-4.2	72.4	73.9	73.2	-1.5
		N	123	131	254	-8	797	813	1,610	-16
	DK	%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.4
		N	0	0	0	0	6	1	7	5
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	174	175	349	-1	1,101	1,100	2,201	1	
t-test (pre-post)			-0.873 (df=347)				-0.631 (df=2,192)			
GREECE	Leave	%	26.9	42.2	34.8	-15.3	42.0	58.3	51.3	-16.3
		N	46	76	122	-30	398	728	1,126	-330
	Remain	%	73.1	57.2	65.0	15.9	57.8	41.1	48.3	16.7
		N	125	103	228	22	547	513	1,060	34
	DK	%	0.0	0.6	0.3	-0.6	0.2	0.6	0.4	-0.4
		N	0	1	1	-1	2	7	9	-5
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	171	180	351	-9	947	1,248	2,195	-301	
t-test (pre-post)			3.094** (Satterthwaite's df=346.7)				7.770*** (df=2,184)			
ITALY	Leave	%	33.3	47.7	41.2	-14.4	29.3	37.2	33.2	-7.9
		N	47	82	129	-35	322	409	731	-87
	Remain	%	66.7	52.3	58.8	14.4	70.7	62.7	66.7	8.0
		N	94	90	184	4	778	690	1,468	88
	DK	%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	-0.1
		N	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	-1
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100.1	100	0
	N	141	172	313	-31	1,101	1,101	2,202	0	
t-test (pre-post)			2.598** (Satterthwaite's df=304.8)				3.966*** (Satterthwaite's df=2,188.8)			
NETHERLANDS	Leave	%	25.0	31.1	28.6	-6.1	25.8	31.8	28.8	-6.0
		N	29	52	81	-23	284	350	634	-66
	Remain	%	75.0	68.3	71.0	6.7	73.8	67.8	70.8	6.0
		N	87	114	201	-27	811	746	1,557	65
	DK	%	0.0	0.6	0.4	-0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.0
		N	0	1	1	-1	4	4	8	0
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
	N	116	167	283	-51	1,099	1,100	2,199	-1	
t-test (pre-post)			1.168 (Satterthwaite's df=257.6)				3.101** (Satterthwaite's df=2,180.9)			
POLAND	Leave	%	29.9	34.7	32.6	-4.8	22.8	27.7	25.2	-4.9
		N	40	59	99	-19	252	305	557	-53
	Remain	%	69.4	65.3	67.1	4.1	77.2	72.1	74.6	5.1
		N	93	111	204	-18	854	794	1,648	60
	DK	%	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.2	-0.2
		N	1	0	1	1	1	3	4	-2
	Total	%	100.1	100	100	0	100	100.1	100	0
	N	134	170	304	-36	1,107	1,102	2,209	5	
t-test (pre-post)			0.851 (df=301)				2.687** (Satterthwaite's df=2,191.8)			

(Continued)

Table A.5: (Continued)

			Businessmen				Citizens			
			Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post	Pre-Brexit	Post-Brexit	Overall	Difference Pre-Post
PORTUGAL	Leave	%	17.9	24.0	21.6	-6.1	15.9	21.2	18.8	-5.3
		N	20	42	62	-22	156	259	415	-103
	Remain	%	82.1	75.4	78.1	6.7	83.9	78.3	80.8	5.6
		N	92	132	224	-40	826	957	1,783	-131
	DK	%	0.0	0.6	0.4	-0.6	0.2	0.5	0.4	-0.3
		N	0	1	1	-1	2	6	8	-4
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
N		112	175	287	-63	984	1,222	2,206	-238	
t-test (pre-post)			1.288 (Satterthwaite's df=255.0)				3.269*** (Satterthwaite's df=2,173.9)			
SPAIN	Leave	%	17.5	14.8	16.1	2.7	21.9	19.8	20.8	2.1
		N	30	26	56	4	222	235	457	-13
	Remain	%	82.5	85.2	83.9	-2.7	77.8	79.7	78.8	-1.9
		N	141	150	291	-9	790	946	1,736	-156
	DK	%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	-0.2
		N	0	0	0	0	3	6	9	-3
	Total	%	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
N		171	176	347	-5	1,015	1,187	2,202	-172	
t-test (pre-post)			-0.700 (df=345)				-1.168 (Satterthwaite's df=2,114.4)			
UNITED KINGDOM	Leave	%	48.6	41.7	45.1	6.9	42.9	44.3	38.7	-1.4
		N	85	73	158	12	473	488	961	-15
	Remain	%	50.9	57.7	54.3	-6.8	56.4	55.6	56.0	0.8
		N	89	101	190	-12	622	613	1,235	9
	DK	%	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.5
		N	1	1	2	0	7	1	8	6
	Total	%	100.1	100	100	0	100	100	95.1	0
N		175	175	350	0	1,102	1,102	2,204	0	
t-test (pre-post)			-1.291 (Satterthwaite's df=345.9)				0.532 (df=2,194)			

Source: EUENGAGE wave1

t-test based on leave (0) and remain (1) categories adjusted for unequal variances at p<.05 or lower level if present. * statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** statistically significant at 0.001 level.

Dependent variable

T1: "As you may know, the British Prime minister, David Cameron announced a referendum to be held on 23 June this year, to ask the British people whether they want to leave or stay in the EU. In your opinion, should the UK leave the EU or remain a member of the EU?" (0=The UK should leave the EU; 1=The UK should remain a member of the EU).

T2: "As you may know, in the referendum held on 23 June the British people voted to leave the EU. In your opinion, should the British people have voted to leave or remain a member of the EU?" (0=The British people should have voted to leave the EU; 1= The British people should have voted to remain a member of the EU).

Independent variables

Concern (economic crisis): To what extent are you concerned or not about each of the following issues? The current European economic crisis (0=Not very concerned/Not concerned at all; 1= Very concerned/Somewhat concerned).

Concern (immigration): To what extent are you concerned or not about each of the following issues? The current flow of immigrants to Europe (0=Not very concerned/Not concerned at all; 1= Very concerned/Somewhat concerned).

Attitude towards immigrants (index): Additive index, rescaled from 0 (negative opinions) to 1 (positive opinions), of the following six items.

1. Immigrants increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in [COUNTRY] (0=Agree; 1=Disagree).
2. Immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare services (0=Disagree; 1=Agree).
3. Immigration in general will improve our culture with new ideas and customs (0=Disagree; 1=Agree).
4. Immigrants take jobs that [COUNTRY] people do not want to take anymore (0=Disagree; 1=Agree).
5. The religious practices of immigrants are a threat to the [nationality] way of life and its traditions (0=Agree; 1=Disagree).
6. Immigrants are a significant cause of crime in [COUNTRY] (0=Agree; 1=Disagree).

Europeanization (economy): Additive index, rescaled from 0 (national responsibility) to 1 (EU responsibility), of the following two items.

1. Scale 0-10: 0 "Retaining full powers for economic decision-making in each Member State" 10 "Giving the European Union more authority over Member States' economic and budgetary policies".
2. Scale 0-10: 0 "Each country should rely on its own resources to fix its economic problems" 10 "The European Union's countries should pool resources to fix economic problems".

Europeanization (immigration): Additive index, rescaled from 0 (national responsibility) to 1 (EU responsibility), of the following three items.

1. Scale 0-10: 0 “[COUNTRY] should decide for itself how many immigrants to accept each year” 10 “The European Union should decide how many immigrants should be accepted by each Member State each year”.
2. Scale 0-10: 0 “Each country should bear the costs depending on how many asylum seekers it receives” 10 “The costs of providing asylum should be shared among all the European Union's Member States”.
3. Scale 0-10: 0 “The country immigrants arrive in should be responsible for hosting them” 10 “All the European Union's Member States should be responsible for the hosting of immigrants”

Attachment to Country/Europe: People feel different degrees of attachment to their region, to their country, to Europe, and world. What about you? Do you feel very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not at all attached to...?

1 (ref.) “Attached neither to Europe nor to country” 2 “Attached to country not to Europe” 3 “Attached to Europe not to country” 4 “Attached both to Europe and to country”.

Support for EU integration: In your opinion, has the unification of the EU gone too far or should it be taken further? Rescaled 0-1: 0 “The unification of the EU has gone too far” 1 “The unification of EU should be taken further”

Days to Brexit (T1): Number of days (negative sign) to the announcement of the EU referendum results.

Days after Brexit (T2): Number of days (positive sign) after the announcement of the EU referendum results.

Ideology (left-right): In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means the extreme left and '10' means the extreme right? (Rescaled 0-1).

Areas of Europe: 1 “North” (ref.); 2 “South”; 3 “East”.

Socio-demographics:

Gender: 0 “Male” (ref.); 1 “Female”.

Age: Age in years

Level of education: 1 “Low” (primary/Secondary not-completed); 2 “Medium” (secondary completed) (ref.); 3 “High” (graduated).

Occupation: 1 “Without a professional activity” (ref.); 2 “Self-employed”; 3 “Employee”; 4 “Manual worker”; 5 “Other (SPECIFY)”.

Community type (citizens): 1 “Rural zone” (ref.) 2 “Metropolitan zone” 3 “Other town/urban centre”

Household income (citizens): 1 “Less than €8,000” (*ref.*); 2 “€8,001-€24,000”; 3 “€24,001-€40,000”; 4 “€40,001-€56,000”; 5 “€56,001-€72,000”; 6 “More than €72,000”.

Business characteristics:

Company turnover: 1 “Less than €1.6M” (*ref.*); 2 “Between €1.6M and €8M”; 3 “Between €8M and €40M”; 4 “More than €40M”.

Number of employees: 1 “Less than 10” (*ref.*); 2 “Between 10 and 49”; 3 “Between 50 and 249”; 4 “More than 250”.