ABSTRACT:

This paper theorizes how the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis have reinforced a transnational cleavage that has at its core a cultural conflict pitting libertarian, universalistic values against the defense of nationalism and particularism. Radical right and green parties take polar positions on Europe and immigration, place more salience on them, and exhibit greater internal unity than mainstream parties. The perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) detect in their classic article.

KEYWORDS: cleavage, political parties, Eurocrisis, European integration, elections.
1. Introduction

Have the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis congealed a distinctive structure of conflict in Europe? In this paper we use the building blocks of a cleavage theory of party competition to argue that Europe has been transformed by a new divide. Cleavage theory claims that the issues that divide voters are connected in durable dimensions, that political parties make programmatic commitments on these issue dimensions which are self-reinforcing, and that as a result of issue coherence and programmatic stickiness, change in party systems is a punctuated process that arises from shocks external to the party system.

Summarizing an extensive literature over the past decade, we describe the emergence of a transnational cleavage which has as its core a political reaction against European integration and immigration. The perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less decisive for parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) detect in their classic article. For challenging parties on the radical right these issues relate to the defense of national community against transnational shocks. The European Union is itself such a shock because it introduces rule by those who are regarded as foreigners, diminishes the authority exercised by national states over their own populations, produces economic insecurity among those who lack mobile assets, and facilitates immigration. Immigration is perceived as a threat by those who resent cultural intermixing and the erosion of national values, by those who must

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1 We would like to thank David Attewell for research assistance. Earlier drafts were presented at a workshop, Theory Meets Crisis, organized by the authors at the Schuman Centre, European University Institute, June 30-July 1 2016, at the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 1-3 September 2016, at a conference, “Stein Rokkan’s Heritage to Contemporary Political Science: Understanding Representational and Policy-Making Challenges in Multi-Jurisdictional Polities,” University of Bergen, September 20-21 2016, the 26th PhD Summer School of the ECPR Standing Group on Political Parties at the University of Nottingham, September 23 2016, and the Comparative Working Group at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, October 18, 2016. We thank participants at these events, and especially Jan Rovny and Frank Schimmelfennig, for comments and suggestions. This research was co-funded by the EUENGAGE HORIZON grant #649281 and by the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. We also thank the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, for hosting as Fellows in June-July 2016 and for financing and hosting the conference “Theory Meets Crisis” in June 2016, where a first draft of this paper was presented.
compete with immigrants for housing and jobs, and, more generally, by those who seek cultural or economic shelter in the rights of citizenship.

We term this cleavage a *transnational cleavage* because it has as its focal point the defense of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule. This conception has much in common with prior conceptions, but because we wish to outline its character, sources, and consequences in ways with which other scholars might disagree, we adopt a distinctive label.

The emergence of a new cleavage reveals the causal power of social forces in the face of established institutions. Perhaps the single most stunning consequence of the crises is the breakthrough of a radical right party in a country, Germany, that was perceived to be practically immune. For this reason alone, the crises can be considered to have ushered in a new era. However, virtually every country contains its own surprises, and were we to follow them we would be lost in fascinating detail.

Our focus in this article is on the general character of conflicts that have arisen, their relation to the existing structure of party competition, and how they have already reshaped party systems. The crises are critical junctures that reveal, in the open air so to speak, the latent pressures that have built up over the past two decades. They suggest that party systems are subject to discontinuities rather than to incremental change, and that the response of a party system to exogenous change comes from voters rather than parties.

In the next section we explain why we think cleavage theory can help us understand what has happened. We have no hesitation in dropping the presumption that political parties are expressions of already formed, densely organized, and socially closed groups, while building on three fundamental claims of cleavage theory: party systems are determined in episodic breaks from the past by exogenous social forces; political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, in consequence, party system change comes in the form of rising parties.
The remainder of this article provides evidence that this has indeed happened. The following section conceives the rise of a transnational cleavage as a reaction to reforms that have weakened national sovereignty, promoted international economic exchange, increased immigration, and exacerbated cultural and economic insecurity. We examine the effect of the economic and migration crises in raising the salience of Europe and immigration, and then show that the modal response of mainstream political parties was to stay put on these issues. Voters changed, but mainstream parties did not.

We then present evidence that competition on European integration and immigration is structured on the new cleavage. The TAN pole of this cleavage is staked out by the radical right.² Radical right parties take more extreme positions on these issues, place more salience on them, and exhibit greater internal unity than mainstream parties. By virtue of their commitment to GAL values, green parties are located at the alter-pole. Just as the religious cleavage and the class cleavage were raised by Catholic and socialist parties on one side of the divide, so the transnational cleavage is mobilized by radical right parties at one extreme. As the transnational divide has become salient, mainstream parties have been compelled to compete on issues that lie far from their programmatic core.

2. Cleavage theory—then and now

Cleavage theory, originating in Lipset and Rokkan (1967), conceives a national party system as the expression of underlying social conflicts. Revealingly, Lipset and Rokkan ignore strategic interaction among parties in explaining the structure of contestation. Instead, they focus on the basic cleavages that undergird party support over the medium or long-term: the national revolution that produced a cleavage between the central state and peripheral communities and between the central state and a supranational church; and the industrial revolution that produced an urban/rural cleavage, and later a work-

² TAN refers to the tradition/authority/national pole of a cultural dimension with GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) at the opposite pole.
er/employer cleavage. In each case, the political parties that were eventually formed were expressions—or, to put it more directly, instruments—of self-conscious, socially closed groups. Conflicts between workers and employers, between those living in peripheral communities and central state builders, and between secularists and defenders of the Church were rooted in collective identities that were expressed in grass-roots movements and hierarchical organizations. The solidarity that existed in these groups was much more than an expression of the social or occupational location of any set of individuals. It was experiential, the outcome of repeated conflict which defined and solidified the composition of in-groups and out-groups (Bartolini 2000; Marks 1989). The political organizations that expressed their voice were much more than convenient vessels, but “political actors that gave coherence and organized political expression to what otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences” (Kriesi 2010: 673; Bartolini and Mair 1990).

Before we go any further, it is worth noting that the existence and subsequent decline of social closure are not all or nothing. Social closure was far from complete even in the immediate post-World War II decades. Recall that around one in three British manual workers voted Liberal or Conservative in the 1950s and 1960s (Stephens 1979: 404). A classic investigation of cleavage voting in its golden age finds that, for fifteen advanced democracies, occupation explained just 4.9 percent of the variance in party choice in the median country, France under the 4th Republic, and religion explained just 8.0 percent in the median country, Canada (Rose 1974: 17). Franklin (1992: 386) provides extensive data suggesting that the median variance in left voting explained by social structure in fourteen countries declined from around 20 percent in the 1960s to around 12 percent in the 1980s. Recent literature explaining contemporary radical right or green voting attributes around 10 to 12 percent of the variance to models tapping

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3 This has affinities with Marxism. Karl Marx regarded class consciousness as the outcome of collective struggle in which individuals would come to see their fate as bound to that of their class. Objective class location had to be activated in conflict before one could speak of class as a political category.
education, occupation, rural/urban location, sex, and age (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Dolezal 2010; Norris 2005; Oesch 2008).

Lipset/Rokkan show little interest in the factors that bind individuals into collectivities (Bornschier 2009: 2). What matters in their theory is that fundamental divisions in a society give rise to durable cleavages that structure party competition. The questions they put under the spotlight are 1) What are the fundamental divisions in a society? 2) Which distinctions among a population become the bases for cleavages? 3) How do these cleavages interact to shape voter preferences? 4) How are voter preferences expressed in party formation and competition? 5) How are cleavages mediated by the rules of the game and by party strategies?

In coming to grips with these questions, we draw on cleavage theory to make the following moves:

- The strategic flexibility of a political party on major conflict dimensions is constrained to the extent it has a durable constituency of voters, a decentralized decision-making structure, a self-selected cadre of activists, a self-replicating leadership, and a distinct programmatic reputation (Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). Political parties can be flexible on particular issues, but efforts to shift position at the level of a conflict dimension are rare. That is to say, political parties are induced to seek local maxima in competing for votes (Laver and Sergenti 2009). In addition to shifting its issue position, a political party may seek to subsume an issue into the dominant dimension, blur its response, or ignore the issue (Rovny 2015: 913; Lacewell 2015). The problem for established parties is that a local, blurring, or status quo response is more effective for a single issue than for a set of strongly related issues.

- Hence, the source of dynamism in party systems in response to major shifts in voter preferences is the growth of new political parties. The basic premises of cleavage theory are that exogenous

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4 It is simply not possible, on strictly logical grounds, to identify a vote maximizing strategy for any party in a populated two-dimensional space (Laver and Sergenti 2009: 43).
forces shape democratic party systems; that change comes from voters, not established parties; that political parties are programmatically inflexible; and that as a consequence, the response of a party system to a serious exogenous shock takes the form of challenging, rather than re-formed, political parties.

➢ By the time mass political parties came on the scene, cleavages were already institutionalized. Now the sequence is reversed. Competitive party systems exist prior to the onset of any new cleavage. Hence, it makes no sense to believe that challenging political parties will be rooted in pre-existing, socially closed, groups. The connection between rising parties and voters has changed because political parties are now formed alongside a new cleavage, rather than decades or centuries after. Political parties are actors, not subjects, in the formation of social divisions.

➢ Cleavage theory is about the interaction of cleavages rather than the replacement of one alignment by another. So instead of conceiving party system change as a process of realignment in which a new dimension of conflict comes to supersede a prior dimension, cleavage theory asks how the continued existence of one division affects the party-political expression of a subsequent one. In party systems that load the dice against new parties, a new cleavage can be expected to produce intense frictions within parties. In low-barrier multi-party systems, by contrast, a new cleavage can be expected to produce new challenging parties that exist alongside, without replacing, parties formed on prior cleavages.

➢ Lipset/Rokkan were alert to social changes that were corroding class conflict, but they had no idea that the containers—national states—were going to be transformed in the decades around the turn of the twenty-first century. Territorial identity as a motive for conflict was thought to be a thing of the past. Nationalism was the dead-end result of inter-war fascism, never to be repeated. Ethnic nationalism within states was considered an inert remnant of long-past periphery-
al resistance to nation building. In the absence of territorial identity—perhaps the most powerful source of mass political mobilization—domestic conflict was compressed to left/right conflict about who gets what. When the political gorilla of nationalism left the room after World War II, domestic debate was narrowed to economic issues, i.e. the role of the state, taxes, and welfare spending. Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 13) recognized that “Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory,” but they were unable to see that national territory might be deconsolidated in authoritative redesign and the movement of peoples.

3. A Transnational cleavage

The institutional point of departure for a post-Lipset/Rokkan cleavage is a series of major reforms in the early 1990s that diminished the cost of international trade and migration while diffusing authority from central states to bodies within and among them. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) extended EU authority over wide ranges of public life, made it much easier for people to work in another EU country, created a common currency, and turned nationals into European Union citizens. The dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1989 released more than one hundred million people to trade and circulate within the European Union. The World Trade Organization (1994) was negotiated in the early 1990s, as were regional trade organizations, now totaling thirty-five in number (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks forthcoming). The 1990s were the cusp of a rapid increase in international trade, international migration, and economic inequality that have their ideological roots in the Thatcher-Reagan years. However, the consensus on transnationalism encompassed the mainstream left as well the mainstream right.

The intellectual basis for transnationalism is broad and deep. The lower the transaction costs of international economic exchange, the greater the scope for specialization and economies of scale. A core premise of neoclassical economics is that introducing common standards and diminishing barriers to
trade and investment increases economic growth. From a public goods perspective, national states are both too small and too large. Many of the most intractable problems that confront humanity—including global warming, failed states, species loss, and environmental degradation—require ongoing cooperation among states and their populations. National sovereignty and its political expression, the national veto, are obstacles to problem solving, which is why many international organizations pool authority among their member states in quasi-majoritarian decision making (Hooghe and Marks 2015). Functional efficiency in the provision of public goods calls for governance at diverse scales, including regional and global levels.

However, transnationalism proved to be highly contentious, particularly in Europe where increased trade and intermingling of peoples went hand in hand with the creation of a supranational polity (Hurrelmann, Gora, and Wagner 2015: 55-6). European integration raised fundamental issues of rule and belonging for those who wished to “defend national culture, language, community and national sovereignty against the influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state, and against external pressures from other countries and international organizations” (Marks and Wilson 2000: 455; Prosser 2016: 748-9). Beginning in 1999, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey tapped the positions of political parties on a GAL versus TAN dimension which proved to be strongly associated with support for Europe.

Transnationalism also has transparent distributional consequences, biasing the gains from trade to those who have mobile assets. Losers who feel they are slipping with no prospect of upward mobility resent the dilution of the rights and protection of citizenship by a global elite that views national states and their laws as constraints to be finessed or arbitrated. As Martin Wolf (2016) wrote in the Financial Times: “[T]he share of immigrants in populations has jumped sharply. It is hard to argue that this has brought large economic, social and cultural benefits to the mass of the population. But it has unquestionably benefited those at the top, including business.” Resentment can be sharp among those who
value national citizenship because they have few alternative sources of self-worth. Nationalism has long been the refuge of those who are insecure, who sense they are losing status, and who seek standing by identifying with the group. The promise of transnationalism has been gains for all, but the experience of the past two decades is that it hurts many. Hence, opposition to transnationalism is for many a populist reaction against elites who have little sympathy for national borders (Inglehart and Norris 2016; van Kessel 2015).

4. The social basis

From the late 1990s, several writers began to consider European integration from a cleavage perspective. Explaining the rise of the vote for the radical right in Switzerland, Kriesi (1998: 180) pointed to “the emergence of yet another new cleavage – the cleavage opposing the new middle class winners of the transformation of Western European societies to the group of losers of the very same process.” In these years, a flow of publications suggested that conflict over Europe cut across the left-right divide, that Europe was part of a larger cultural conflict, and that this conflict was socially structured. In a chapter titled, “Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?” Evans (1999: 220) made the case that Europe had “the potential to cross-cut and restructure partisan divisions in the British electorate.” Marks and Wilson (2000: 433) suggested that European integration amounts to a “constitutional revolution,” which they analyze from a cleavage perspective. Hooghe et al. (2002: 979) went on to argue that “Nationalism, anti-immigration, and traditionalism go hand in hand” and constituted a distinct dimension of conflict driven by radical right parties. And in his influential book, Bartolini (2005: 395; 404) asserted that European integration was a process of fundamental territorial re-articulation that could produce a new cleavage.

5 Inglehart (1971: 992) detected a post-industrial cleavage in which a young, educated section of the middle class would realign on libertarian values and workers would be potential recruits for conservative parties. In his early formulation, Inglehart made the connection with internationalism: “[T]he libertarian position seems linked with internationalism. This follows from the fact that, according to our analysis, the post-bourgeois groups have attained security in regard to both the safety and sustenance needs; insofar as the nation-state is seen as a bulwark protecting the individual against foreign threats, it is less important to post-bourgeois respondents” (1971: 997).
“rooted in ... life chances and material opportunities” that would “cut heavily across, reshuffle, and re-shape” national political parties.

In a series of empirically rich books, Kriesi, Grande, and co-authors (2006; 2008; 2012) have explored how European integration and immigration have structured preferences and political conflict in Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria by pitting the winners of globalization who favor transnational integration against losers who seek demarcation. Winners and losers have contrasting economic interests and cultural preferences, with the difference most pronounced on the cultural dimension. Winners and losers have social-structural characteristics that are equally distinctive: “Two of the most important groups on the winners’ side, highly educated people and socio-cultural specialists, are far more supportive of opening borders than are those with lower levels of education and those who are unskilled workers” (Kriesi et al 2012: 73).

The most active pole of this cleavage connects national and western values, defense of national sovereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade skepticism. These are reinforcing issues for those who feel they have suffered transnationalism—the down and out, the culturally insecure, the unskilled, the de-skilled, i.e. those who lack the education needed to compete in a mobile world. Education emerges as a powerful structuring factor with a double effect. It is necessary for those who rely on their own talents to live an economically secure life in a world with low barriers to trade. Just as importantly, education shapes the way a person looks at the world and their fellow humans. Education allows a person to see things from the other side, a key to empathy for those who have a different way of life (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013).

Education appears to shape attitudes on trade, immigration, and globalization because it affects both values and economic interests (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007).\(^6\)

\(^6\) Access to higher education shapes a person’s life-long attitudes (Triventi 2013: 499). Controlling for socioeconomic status and attitudinal variables, Coffé and Voorposte (2010: 442) find that “Young people whose parents vote for the SVP [Swiss People’s
This view gained credibility when political economists investigating the economic undergirding of trade attitudes found a powerful and unexpected educational effect (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002). Individuals with limited education are much more likely to have an exclusive national identity (Polyakova and Fligstein 2016: Table 5), and there is evidence of a “widening educational gap in Eurosceptic attitudes” since the Maastricht Treaty (Hakhverdian et al. 2013: 534). Kuhn et al (2016: 38) find that “people with low levels of educational attainment are more sensitive to increased economic inequality than are highly educated individuals.” Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (2014) show how cultural values, in particular cosmopolitan beliefs, drive the positive association between support for Eurocrisis bailouts and higher education. Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) conclude that cultural concerns are more decisive than concerns about wages and taxes in explaining attitudes to immigration among less educated respondents. Students of immigration had always considered non-economic alongside economic factors, but the role of community, identity, and framing appears to be even stronger than originally thought (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007).

5. The Eurocrisis and the migration crisis

In the same way that the Bolshevik revolution was a critical juncture in the expression of the class cleavage, the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a transnational cleavage. These crises have raised the salience of Europe and immigration in public debate, intensified divisions within mainstream parties, and have led to an upsurge of rejectionist political parties (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). At the very least, it is “tempting” – to adopt a Party] are significantly more likely to support the SVP.” Longitudinal survey research suggests that attitudes underpinning right-wing extremism are rooted in early childhood, persist over a person’s life, and are transmitted intergenerationally. Analyzing nineteen waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Avdeenko and Siedler (2015) find that a male whose parents express affinity toward a right-wing party is thirteen percent more likely to support a radical right party, controlling for income, education, and unemployment.
word that Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 47) use in a similar context – to say that something fundamental is taking place, namely the generation of a distinct, rooted, and durable conflict that will overlay and disrupt the existing structure of party competition.

The crises themselves provide some clues regarding their larger significance. The first, economic, crisis transmuted into a distinctly European crisis when Chancellor Merkel declared soon after the Lehman Brothers collapse that every country must act separately to defend its financial institutions. Under intense pressure from German public opinion, which was vehemently opposed to Eurozone bailouts, Merkel committed her government to preserving Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty, the anti-bailout clause prohibiting shared liabilities or financial assistance. Eurozone governments were trapped in a postfunctionalist dilemma. On the one side they were impelled by an unrelenting functional logic toward fiscal union. On the other they were unnerved by tenacious domestic resistance.

The result was a series of incremental reforms that staved off disaster while prolonging the agony of austerity. Fearing open debate, parliamentary votes, and popular participation, national governments reverted to conventional diplomacy which had the intended effect of empowering national executives and, at least temporarily, avoiding EU institutions (Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier 2015). The European Stability Mechanism was based on a treaty modification which, ingeniously, avoided referendums by requiring only a two-line amendment to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Since 2012, the European Central Bank, a technocratic institution insulated from popular pressures, has been instrumental in providing much needed liquidity. Piecemeal reforms, alongside banking union and upgraded financial surveillance, did just enough to save the Eurozone and avert the default of heavily indebted countries. National governments have taken the path of least political resistance, keeping the

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7 In June 2010, these governments set up a limited liability company under Luxembourg law with seventeen (national) shareholders to provide emergency loans to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. In September 2012, they set up an intergovernmental organization, the European Stability Mechanism, again in Luxembourg, this time under international (not European) law to provide a financial firewall for distressed countries. As Schimmelfennig notes, “asymmetrical interdependence resulted in a burden-sharing and institutional design that reflected German preferences and its allies predominantly” (Schimmelfennig 2015: 179).
Euro afloat with regulatory measures, while avoiding populist pressures that would arise in major treaty reform (cf Börzel and Risse, forthcoming).

The outcome was a North-South rift between creditor and debtor nations (Laffan 2016; Tsoukalis 2014). Discursive analysis reveals that this rift has sharp national edges and feeds on simplistic national stereotypes (Mylonas 2012). Redistribution was perceived as an issue with profound constitutional implications for national communities (Otjes and van Der Veer 2016). The net result was to raise the salience of European integration in domestic debate, particularly among groups and parties taking extreme positions (Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016; Risse 2014).

Expert estimates summarized in Figure 1a show that the salience of European integration has increased markedly since 2006, from a mean of 4.60 in that year to 5.93 in 2014, a difference that is highly significant (p=.000). The Figure also reveals that salience is skewed to Euroskeptic parties, which is what one might expect on an issue that has become polarized. Northern imposition of ordo-liberalism and fiscal austerity backed by a system of sanctions prolonged the Eurocrisis while it failed to contain the rise of nationalist political parties. Ironically, radical right parties gained in the very countries where national interest shaped government policy. In the South, by contrast, austerity and currency inflexibility produced economic misery and resentment which was mobilized chiefly by the radical left.
Note: Salience is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from “not importance at all” (0) to “of great importance” (10). The continuous line is the fit line for 2014 (N=208); the dashed line is the fit line for 2006 (N=158). Source: 2006 and 2014 data from the CHES trend file.

Figure 1b: Salience of immigration

Note: Salience is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from “no important at all” (0) to “extremely important” N= 157. (10). The continuous line is the fit line for 2014 (N=208); the dashed line is the fit line for 2006 (N=158). Source: 2010 data from the CHES trend file.

Figure 1b reveals that the salience accorded to immigration is similar to that for European integration. Political parties taking extreme positions on immigration tend to emphasize the issue more than those taking moderate positions. And, similar to party salience on Europe, the U-curve is tilted up for parties that take strong rejectionist positions. Party salience on immigration in 2010 (Figure 1b) is considerably higher in the northwestern and southern countries (6.63 and 6.23, respectively, on a zero to ten scale) than in central and eastern Europe (4.09). Whereas countries in the Northwest and South were recipients in the flow of population within Europe, those in the East were donors. A regional breakdown of the salience data suggests that even before the migration crisis of 2015, immigration was perceived to be a major issue in the Northwest and South. The salience of immigration in 2010 exceeds the salience of European integration at every wave of the CHES data.
The party salience question on immigration was asked to experts only in 2010, so we cannot assess change. However, mass surveys suggest that the migration crisis, which became acute from August 2015, ratcheted up concern with immigration in the general public. In Spring 2014, prior to the crisis, 15 percent of those surveyed by Eurobarometer selected immigration as “one of the two most important issues facing [our country] at the moment.” In no Eastern country was immigration flagged as important by ten percent of the respondents, while nine countries in the North or South registered double-digit figures. In Spring 2016, the overall figure had increased to 28 percent, a level of concern second only to unemployment (33 percent) and greater than for the economic situation (19 percent), health (16 percent), or terrorism (16 percent). Central and eastern European countries were no longer insulated. Immigration was a top-two issue in all Eastern countries except Romania.

6. Sticky Political Parties

Cleavage theory is a theory of discontinuity in the response of party systems to serious exogenous shocks. Change comes chiefly in the form of new political parties that challenge existing parties on a new cleavage (de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Rovny 2012). The positional maneuverability of political parties established on prior cleavages is constrained by self-selected activists, self-replicating leaders, and embedded reputations. Far from rational actors making optimal decisions, political parties can be considered to be satisficers with “their own ‘bounded rationality’ that shapes the way in which [they] come to terms with new challenges and uncertainties” (Marks and Wilson 2000: 434; Dalton and McAllister 2015; Kitschelt et al 1999; Marks and de Vries 2012). Complex organizations, in general, adapt well to gradual change, but are challenged to respond to major change in their environment (Aldrich 2007).

The evidence is in line with this. Political parties in Europe appear to be sticky, as a cleavage perspective would lead one to expect. Party systems have responded to concerns about European integration
and immigration, but this has not happened because political parties have shifted position. Figure 2 displays kernel density estimations (KDE) using Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data on party positioning on European integration for 215 national political parties in twenty-four European countries (Bakker et al. 2015). Each curve represents the probability distribution for a change in party positioning between successive waves across five consecutive surveys: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Negative numbers on the X-axis denote a decline in support on a seven-point scale, and positive numbers an increase in support. The probability distribution is strongly peaked: 90.1 percent of the political parties surveyed move less than one point in either direction across consecutive surveys. There is a bit more movement across longer time spans, but not much. Just 17.2 percent of the parties shift more than one point over three CHES waves, and 20.0 percent shift more than one point over four CHES waves. This is consistent with Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016: 145) finding, based on their expert survey, that parties “do not change their integration stance to any great degree.”

8 Kernel density estimation is a non-parametric method in which the data are treated as a randomized sample and the distribution is smoothened. We use Stata’s default, the Epanechnikov estimator, which selects a smoothing bandwidth of 0.123 for the two-wave kernel function and a bandwidth of 0.171 for the three-wave function.
Figure 2: Kernel Density Curve for Change in Party Position on European Integration, 1999-2014

Note: Change in support for European integration on a seven-point scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor) over two waves (N=566); three waves (N=388); four waves (N=230); and five waves (N=98). Source = 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 data from the CHES trend file.

Expert evaluations of party positioning on immigration go back to 2006. Over the period 2006 to 2014 we detect similar stability (see Table 1). Of 140 parties that we track over the period, only three shift more than two points in any one direction on immigration. The average absolute change over this period is 0.59 on immigration and 0.55 on European integration, both on a seven-point scale. Parties tend

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9 Positioning on immigration is estimated on an eleven-point scale ranging from “strongly opposes tough policy on immigration” (0) to “strongly favors tough policy on immigration” (10). For comparability, we rescale the variable zero to seven, and reverse the scale so that a higher value indicates a pro-immigration stance.
to switch back and forth over time. The average raw change over this eight-year period is just −0.02 points on immigration and +0.05 points on European integration.

Table 1. Change in Party Positioning on Immigration and European Integration, 2006 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change over three waves</th>
<th>Absolute change</th>
<th>Directional change</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>European integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean value</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of parties</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015). European integration is scaled from strongly opposed (1) to strongly in favor (7). For comparability we rescale the original eleven-point scale for immigration to a seven-point scale ranging from restrictive (1) to liberal (7).

Before we move on, we need to assess the validity of this finding. Party manifestos, in general, reveal greater change than expert judgments (Dalton and McAllister 2015: 767ff). There are several possible reasons for this. One is that coding of party manifestos at the level of an individual issue might produce greater change than expert evaluation at a more general dimensional level. This would be the case if political parties were able to maneuver on specific issues, but were more constrained on bundles of issues. A second possibility is that experts think along cleavage lines in “recording the longstanding core principled positions of parties,” which might lead them to downgrade efforts by parties to shift their positions (McDonald et al. 2007). This would happen if manifestos record attempts by parties to shape how they are perceived, while experts evaluate how political parties are actually perceived. If so, one would expect experts to use manifestos as one source among others to estimate party positioning. Experts can plausibly be regarded as Bayesians who use party manifestos alongside other indicators, such as speeches made by party leaders, to update their judgments.
One might expect voters to be Bayesians too. Given the time and cognitive constraints on their political attention, voters tend to rely on generalized conceptions of party identity (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). These tend to be stable over time. The European Election Survey (EES) asks voters to place political parties on European integration, and the results are similar to those using CHES data (see appendix). Dalton and McAllister (2015: 768) find striking consistency across time for the left/right positioning of parties, with associations from election to election around 0.96. Remarkably, the consistency in party positioning appears to decay little across three or even four elections. On this evidence, one must look beyond party positioning to explain how party systems respond to exogenous shocks.

This is a scenario for disruption. If existing parties cannot radically shift their issue positions, one would anticipate 1) sharp tensions within mainstream parties on a new dimension, particularly in high barrier systems, and 2) the growth of challenging parties, particularly in low barrier systems. The evidence we have is in line with this. Figure 3 reveals that serious internal dissent is highest among political parties that take a middling position on European integration in 2014. In response to a new cleavage, moderation does not produce consensus. Dissent is lower among parties that take polar positions on the key issues.
Figure 3: Dissent on European integration

Note: N=208 political parties. Dissent is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (party was completely united) to 10 (party was extremely divided) in response to “What about conflict or dissent within parties over European integration over the course of 2014?” Source: Data for 2014 from the CHES trend file.

Conservative parties may be particularly prone to internal dissent because they combine neoliberal support for transnationalism and nationalist defense of sovereignty (Marks and Wilson 2000). Four of the six parties with a dissent score higher than 5.5 in 2014 are Conservative: the British Conservative Party (dissent=7.3), Lithuania’s Order and Justice (6.0), Italy’s Forza Italia (5.9), and France’s UMP (5.8). Institutional rules play a role here. Britain and France, the European democracies with the highest barriers to party entry, have had exceptional levels of intra-party dissent in 2014 and over the 1999 to 2014 period as a whole. The British Conservative party has been more deeply riven than any other party, and in the wake of the Brexit referendum is more bitterly divided than ever (Hobolt 2016; Tzelgov 2014).
7. The rise of parties on the transnational cleavage

Moderate political parties based in the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan have declined across Europe. On average, the vote share for social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative, and liberal parties fell from 75 percent in the first national election after 2000 to 64 percent in the national election prior to November 2016. With few exceptions, these parties have continued to support European integration at a time of increasing skepticism. In 2014, just seven of 112 mainstream parties took a position on the negative side of our European integration scale.

Consensus on Europe among mainstream parties did not matter much when the issue was marginal. Mainstream parties sought to de-emphasize the issue to “retain the current dimensional competition” (De Vries and Hobolt 2012: 263; Green-Pedersen 2012: 126-7). Prior to the Eurocrisis, Peter Mair (2007: 12) could write that the famed European giant described by Franklin and van der Eijk (1995) “is not only sleeping, but has been deliberately sedated, so that Jack – in the shape of the mainstream parties – can run up and down the European beanstalk at will.” No longer. The giant has awakened in an era of constraining dissensus when attitudes over Europe are expressed in national elections, European elections, and, above all, in national referendum campaigns which escape mainstream party control (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Grande and Hutter 2016: 40; Treib 2014).

In much of Europe the crises have reinforced a new transnational cleavage that has at its core a cultural conflict pitting libertarian, universalistic values against the defense of nationalism and particularism (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Golder 2016: 488; Höglinger 2016). Recent literature has produced a series of convergent concepts to describe this: demarcation vs. integration (Kriesi, Grande, et al. 2006; 2012); libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian (Bornschier 2010); universalism vs. particularism (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Beramendi et al. 2015); cosmopolitan vs. communitarian (Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2013); GAL vs. TAN (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).
Europe and immigration—issues that have risen sharply in salience as a result of the crises—are flashpoints in the generation of this cleavage. These issues are perceived from diametrically opposing standpoints by TAN and GAL political parties. Whereas social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative, and liberal parties are similarly positioned on these issues, TAN parties and GAL parties take distinct positions that place them at the polar extremes. The coefficient for variation among TAN and GAL parties is 0.53 on European integration and 0.96 on immigration. For mainstream parties it is 0.19 and 0.38, respectively (CHES 2014).

Whereas political parties formed on prior cleavages conceive of Europe and immigration as loosely connected issues, TAN and GAL parties conceive them as intimately connected (March and Rommerskirchen 2015). The association between the positions that mainstream parties take on Europe and immigration is 0.33; for radical right and green parties it is 0.82 (CHES, 2014). Transnationalism in the form of support for European cooperation and free movement is strongly consistent with the social libertarian, cosmopolitan, and universalist values of green parties. Equally, but in the opposite camp, rejection of European integration and immigration lie at the core of TAN defense of the nation against external forces (Tillman 2013). TAN and GAL parties take more extreme positions on Europe and immigration than mainstream political parties. They tie these issues into a tightly coherent world view. They consider them as intrinsic to their programs. And, correspondingly, they give these issues great salience.

Every country in Europe has been deeply affected by the political fallout of the crises, but the way in which party systems have responded varies widely. Cleavage theory suggests that this reflects the party-political expression of prior cleavages and the character of the crises. What matters from a cleavage perspective is how issues that might otherwise be unconnected form a coherent program, how political parties gain a reputation around such programs, how those programs are differentiated from those of existing parties on prior cleavages, and how parties on a new cleavage are polarized in response to those issues.
In most western European countries, the conflict over transnationalism has been taken up as a new cleavage by TAN and GAL parties and as an extension of the prior economic left/right cleavage by radical left parties. The circle at the center of Figure 4 encompasses eight countries with such party systems. In contrast to radical right and green parties, radical left parties conceive transnationalism as a distributional issue arising from the effects of international economic exchange (Hobolt and de Vries: 2016: 7; Brigevich and Edwards 2016; Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, and van der Brug 2016). They reject European integration on the ground that it hurts those who cannot take advantage of transnational mobility, but they retain a conventional leftist commitment to working-class internationalism and do not take a strong position against immigration.

**Figure 4: Green, TAN, and radical left vote, 2014**

In the countries of eastern Europe, most of which are encompassed in the long narrow ellipse in Figure 4, the GAL side of the transnational cleavage is weak or absent. The chief response to the crises has
been the growth of the vote for radical right parties. This is filtered through pre-existing cleavages (Casal Bèrtoa 2014). In some countries, Communist rule forged an affinity between economic left and TAN values. This was opposed by those who favored market reforms and cultural openness (Coman 2015: 3; Marks et al. 2006). Here, Left-TAN versus right-GAL conflict was reinforced by the prospect of EU membership which required market-oriented reform and liberal democratic institutions (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009: 188). In countries where sizeable ethnic minorities had been at the core of a communist federation (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia), former communist parties supported multiculturalism and leaned GAL, while the anti-communist right defended the ethnic majority and espoused TAN values. Hence, in these societies, an affinity between Left-GAL and Right-TAN developed (Rovny 2014a, b).

In response to the crises, both groups of east European countries have seen the rise of radical right parties. However, the response came later than in the West. All but Slovenia and Slovakia were outside the Eurozone at the onset of the crisis, and so were shielded from the bitter distributional battles that marked southern Europe. Further, immigration became a hot issue across eastern Europe only from May 2015 following the European Commission’s migrant distribution scheme. Prior to that time, most were emigrant societies (Allen: 2015: 8-10; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Koev 2015; Rovny 2014a).11

In Figure 4 the United Kingdom is located among the countries of Eastern Europe with a radical TAN party and no radical left party. The reason for this lies chiefly in the UK’s plurality electoral system which exacerbates conflict within the major parties and punishes minor parties lacking territorially concentrated support. The transnational cleavage has been expressed outside the party system in the Brexit referendum and by the flash rise of the Independence party. The Conservative party is riven by conflict

10 Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016: 142) note that in Central and Eastern Europe “party reputations are less strongly embedded in the electorate.” Crossnational variation in the ideological space is also greater (Savage 2014; Rovny and Polk 2016) and there is a larger role for non-ideological issues concerning corruption, good governance, and populism. This has produced political parties combining moderate agendas on economic and socio-cultural issues with a radical anti-establishment rhetoric (e.g. Res Publica in Estonia, New Era in Latvia, SMER in Slovakia, and TOP09 in the Czech Republic). The phenomenon is described as “centrist populism” (Pop-Eleches 2010) and “mainstream reformism” (Hanley and Sikk 2016: 523).

11 The salience of immigration for radical right parties in Eastern Europe is 6.56 on a zero to ten scale, compared to 9.40 in western Europe.
between its nationalist and neoliberal factions, and in the absence of a radical left party, the Labour party has shifted to the left.

Southern European countries have seen the rise of radical left parties in response to the crises. Large-ly as a consequence of austerity, the Eurocrisis reinforced rather than challenged economic left-right conflict centered on distribution and welfare. This has sharpened the economic case against European integration (Otjes and Katsanidou 2016). Whereas TAN parties in the North strive for the ethnic homogeneity of the nation, radical left parties, predominant in the South, emphasize civic nationalism and territorial control (Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou 2012). The distributional framing of the Eurocrisis explains also why, in the South, radical right parties have so far not been the chief beneficiaries of mainstream disaffection. In Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, radical right parties started from a very low support base. They have had to contend with conservative parties with a strong TAN inclination, which have so far been effective in accommodating cultural opposition to transnationalism (Alonso and Kalt-wasser 2014). Only in Italy and Greece did radical right parties have more than two percent of the vote prior to the crisis (Ignazi 2003). In Italy, radical TAN support has remained just above ten percent, while in Greece it increased from 3.7 percent in 2007 to 10.7 percent in the 2015 national election (Ellinas 2014; Lamprianou and Ellinas 2016). However, in both countries, the radical left has been the major target for the expression of discontent.

8. Conclusion

The experience of the past ten years following the economic crisis and migration crisis leads us to reconsider the research program initiated by Lipset and Rokkan. The reasons for the rejection of the program from the 1980s are several, and they remain persuasive. Party systems have unfrozen as new polit-
tical parties have risen and old parties have declined. More fundamentally, the organizations that tied voters to parties—including churches for confessional parties and unions for socialist parties—encompass a smaller share of the population and have less influence on those they do encompass. Finally, the life-long attributes that structured political preference—chiefly social class and religion—have lost their predictive power.

However, we believe that these developments do not exhaust cleavage theory. Cleavage theory hypothesizes that the response of a political party to a new social division is constrained by its location on a prior social division. Just as it was difficult for a party based on religious conflict to subsume class conflict, so it is difficult for a political party based on class conflict to subsume conflict over transnationalism. Hence, cleavage theory explains party system change as a disruptive process rather than an incremental process. Extant political parties are in constant motion as they seek to adapt their positions to the preferences of voters, but they are able to sustain their support only in normal times. Their efforts to adapt are constrained by the policy commitments of self-selected activists and leaders, by brand reputations embedded in the expectations of voters, and by the interests and values of their social base.

Hence, the dynamics of long-term and short-term change appear to be different. Up close, one can detect almost continuous adjustment by political parties to the preferences of voters. Over longer reaches of time, they appear to be moving in quicksand. The crises reveal this starkly, and provoke a theoretical challenge for future research: How can one put short-term strategic response and long-term cleavage constraints on the same page?

Cleavage theory implies that party system change is discontinuous. It is characterized by periods of relative stability as political parties jostle to gain support and by periods of abrupt change when new political parties rise up in response to a critical juncture. The evidence presented here suggests that the crises of the past decade may be such a critical juncture for Europe. In a Downsian model of issue competition, one would expect existing political parties to respond to voter preferences by supplying appro-
appropriate policies. However, as cleavage theory predicts, the positional flexibility of political parties is heavily constrained. Change has come not because mainstream parties have shifted in response to voter preferences, but because voters have turned to parties with distinctive profiles on the new cleavage. These parties raise issues related to Europe and immigration that mainstream parties would rather ignore. Radical TAN parties set the frame of competition on these transnational issues, and green parties take diametrically opposite positions. Both parties give these issues much greater salience in their appeals to voters than mainstream parties, and they are less handicapped by internal divisions.

The result, according to cleavage theory is not realignment, but accretion. The shaping power of prior cleavages diminishes over time, but few die completely. The territorial cleavage, the religious cleavage, and the class cleavage have each lost bite, but none has been extinguished. Cleavage theory conceives layers of partisan attachment rather than the replacement of one dimension of contestation by another. The party system of a country reflects its history of prior struggles as well as its current divides.

Because the expression of a cleavage depends on the institutionalization of prior conflicts, a uniform response to a new cleavage is unusual. The one exception in Lipset and Rokkan’s account is the class cleavage, rooted in the industrial revolution, which produced major socialist parties across the board. The transnational cleavage has had distinctly different expressions across Europe. The major contrast is between the South, where the crisis has widened the class divide, and the North, where cultural concerns about community and immigration have pulled less educated voters away from left parties to radical right parties.

Lipset and Rokkan would not be surprised to find that a period of transformative transnationalism has given rise to an intense political reaction. Viewed from the present, the cleavage structure of Europe begins with one sweeping jurisdictional reform, the rise of the national state, and finishes with another,
the internationalization of economic exchange, migration, and political authority. The cleavage arising from national state formation is still very much in evidence in minority communities that continue to resist national assimilation (Hooghe and Marks 2016). The cleavage arising from transnationalism may also endure. It is grounded in educational opportunities that have persistent effects over a person’s life, and which are conveyed to offspring. However, the functional pressures that have given rise to transnationalism are perhaps even more durable. Transnational exchange and supranational governance reflect the benefits of scale in human affairs. Even if the European Union were to fail, immigration stop, and trade decline, the forces that have led to transnationalism are likely to persist.
References


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## Appendix

**Table A.1: Party position, dissent, and salience on European integration and immigration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on European integration</strong></td>
<td>“How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party’s leadership took over the course of [year]? On a seven-point scale: 1=strongly opposed 2=opposed 3=somewhat opposed 4=neutral 5=somewhat in favor 6=in favor 7= strongly in favor”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salience of European integration</strong></td>
<td>“We would like you to think about the salience of European integration for a party. Over the course of [year], how important was the EU to the parties in their public stance?” On an eleven-point scale: 0=no importance, never mentioned 10=great importance, the most important issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dissent on European integration</strong></td>
<td>“What about conflict or dissent within parties over European integration over the course of [year]?” On an eleven-point scale: 0=Party was completely united 10=Party was extremely divided”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on immigration</strong></td>
<td>“Position on immigration policy.” Eleven-point scale: 0=fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration 10=fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salience of immigration</strong></td>
<td>“Importance/salience of immigration policy for each of the following parties” On an eleven-point scale: 0=not important at all 10=extremely important”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: scale is reversed in analysis, and for Table 1, recalibrated to a seven-point scale.*

Table A.2: Categorizations by geographical region, party family, time point

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>North = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK; South = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain; East = Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Party family**

"Mainstream parties" are political parties that Lipset and Rokkan recognized in the major party families that expressed the historical religious or class cleavage, i.e. the Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal, and conservative party families. We categorize a political party as mainstream if it is a member (or applied to be a member) of the European People’s Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), or the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), or if not represented in the current or previous European Parliament, it is affiliated with a corresponding mainstream pan-European political party: European People’s Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR), the European Democratic Party (EDP), European Christian Political Movement (ECPM).

"New cleavage parties" are political parties that identify with the Green or radical right party family.

We categorize a party as green if it is a member (or applied to be a member) of the Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), or if not represented in the current or previous European Parliament, it is affiliated with the European Green Party (EGP). We exclude regionalist political parties in the European Free Alliance (EFA).

We categorize a party as radical right if it is a member (or applied to be a member) of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD/EFD), or Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENL), or if not represented in the current or previous European Parliament, it is affiliated with a corresponding pan-European political party: the Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe (ADDE), the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF), the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), the EUDemocrats (EUD), Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD), or the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF/MELD).

"Radical left" parties are those that are member (or applied to be member) of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the European parliament, or if not represented in the current or previous European Parliament, affiliated with the Nordic Green Left Alliance (NGLA), the Party of the European Left (PEN), the European Anti-Capitalist Left (EACLS), or the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties (IMCWP).
Post-crisis election 
(Figure 4) Vote totals for green, radical right, and radical Left parties in the national election prior to November 2016. In the three countries that had not yet conducted a second national election since the crisis we substitute vote totals by vote shares projected by three or more opinion polls from Summer-Fall 2016. The vote percentages are for the elections (or poll average) in Belgium (2014), Denmark (2015), Germany (2013), Greece (2015), Spain (2016), France (2012), Ireland (2016), Italy (poll average), the Netherlands (2012), UK (2015), Portugal (2015), Austria (poll average), Finland (2015), Sweden (2014), Bulgaria (2014), Czech Republic (2013), Estonia (2015), Hungary (2014), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2016), Poland (2015), Romania (poll average), Slovakia (2016), Slovenia (2014).

A. 3: Change in party positioning on European integration reported by voters (EES) and experts (CHES)
The European Election Survey (EES) asks voters to place political parties on European integration, and the CHES expert survey asks experts to place political parties on European integration. By comparing wave-to-wave party shifts calculated by Adams, Ezrow, and Wlezien (2016) for eight countries in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 EES surveys with wave-to-wave party shifts in the 1999-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010 CHES expert surveys, it is possible to compare how voters and experts view change in party positioning. Across consecutive waves, the mean absolute change in party position on European integration is 0.52 on a 10-point scale compared to 0.59 for CHES, converted to the same scale. So on average, voters and experts perceive the same amount of change in party positioning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voters (Adams et al.)</th>
<th>Experts (own calculations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute mean</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| minimum; maximum    | -1.35; 1.41           | -1.48; 2.71               

Adams et al. conclude that citizens’ perceptions of party shift track experts’ perceptions, albeit with a modest bivariate correlation (r=0.26), while estimates of party positions using Euromanifestos do not track citizens’ perceptions.
Table A.4: GREEN PARTY FAMILY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>CHES party abbreviation</th>
<th>Party name in English</th>
<th>CHES party id</th>
<th>Vote in post-crisis election/poll</th>
<th>CHES GAL/TAN position (2014)</th>
<th>CHES economic left/right position (2014)</th>
<th>CHES EU position (2014)</th>
<th>Family affiliation in European Parliament (most recent)</th>
<th>European/international family affiliation (most recent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Polls</td>
<td>GRUNE</td>
<td>Austrian Green Party</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ECOLO</td>
<td>Ecolo</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Groen!</td>
<td>Groen!</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>2107</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>no MEP</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Socialist People’s Party</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>EER</td>
<td>Estonian Greens</td>
<td>2207</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>VIHR</td>
<td>Green League</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>VERTS</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<td>Politics can be Different</td>
<td>2309</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>E14</td>
<td>Together 2014</td>
<td>2310</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>GP</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>no MEP</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>LKS</td>
<td>Latvian Russian Union</td>
<td>2402</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ZZS</td>
<td>Greens and Farmers</td>
<td>2405</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Greens/ EFA</td>
<td>EGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>LVZS</td>
<td>Lithuanian Peasant &amp;</td>
<td>2507</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>EGP</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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Legend: Greens/ EFA = Greens–European Free Alliance; EGP = European Green Party
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Table A.6: RADICAL LEFT PARTY FAMILY

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<th>CHES economic left/righ t position (2014)</th>
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<th>Family affiliation in European Parliament (most recent)</th>
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Legend: ECR = European Conservatives and Reformers; ENF = Europe of Nations and Freedom; EFD = Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy; ACRE = Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe; UEN = Union for Europe of the Nations; ADDE = Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe; AENM = Alliance of European National Movements; APF = Alliance for Peace and Freedom; EAF = European Alliance for Freedom; MELD = Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy; MENF = Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom.
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Legend: EACL = European Anti-Capitalist Left; GUE = European United Left/Nordic Green Left; NGLA = Nordic Green Left Alliance (NGLA); PEL = Party of the European Left; IMCWP = International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties.