



THE EUENGAGE PROJECT: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

***Paolo Bellucci*, Sabrina Cavatorto*, Maurizio Cotta*,
Pierangelo Isernia* and Luca Verzichelli****

**CIRCaP, University of Siena, Italy*

Paper prepared for presentation at the *Political Institutions and Elite Behavior: Experimental Approaches*. SPSA Conference-within-a-Conference: San Juan, Puerto Rico, Saturday, January 9, 2016 - Panel 5, Workshop: Experimental Research Proposals on Political Institutions and Elites.

Corresponding author:

Pierangelo Isernia

Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences

University of Siena, Italy

e-mail: isernia@unisi.it

I. INTRODUCTION

EUENGAGE is the acronym of a three-years European research project funded under the Horizon2020¹ Research program of the EU Commission with the goal to inquire into the current tensions between supranational EU governance and popular mobilisation at the national level, critically questioning EU driven policies and EU legitimacy, and to propose remedial actions based on sound empirical research on the relationship between public opinion, national and supranational political elites.² The University of Siena is the European project coordinator of a consortium including researchers from seven universities and research centers and a leading survey company.³

The project is structured around four main research questions:

- Will a majority of public opinion remain supportive of European integration or, on the contrary, will it begin to see integration as a threat to its basic interests?
- Will the political leaders remain confident about the value of the EU project, or will they look back to re-nationalising options?
- Will the political leadership be able to reconcile the specific interests of the different national populations with the requirements of a large supranational Union, or will the gap between public opinion and politicians continue to grow?
- Can the internal diversities among member states be reconciled in a common enterprise, or will centrifugal drives prevail?

In this perspective, EUENGAGE intends to set up an interactive, dynamic, multilevel and replicable quasi-experimental research design that, using a variety of instruments and techniques, will allow not only to study the process of representation in vivo, but also to experiment how innovative and efficient interactions between citizens and politicians can increase the awareness of citizens of the common problems of the Union, and the ability of the European leadership to respond innovatively to the discontent of public opinion.

In this paper we first introduce the theoretical background of the EUEngage project and then we focus our discussion on the main characteristics of the research design to study the elite-public linkage.

¹ Project Grant Agreement number 649281 associated with document Ref. Ares(2015)113886 under the call identifies H2020-EURO-SOCIETY-2014, topic EURO-4-2014 - Political Challenges for Europe. We thank all members of the consortium for their willingness to share the information contained in this paper.

² For further information, please visit the website: <http://www.euengage.eu>.

³ The partners are: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands - Prof Liesbet Hooghe; the University of Mannheim, Germany - Prof Hermann Schmitt; the London School of Economics and Political Science. UK - Prof Kenneth Benoit; the Median Research Center, Rumania - Prof Gabor Toka; and UNITELMA-Sapienza, Italy - Prof Nicolò Conti) and TNS, Social & Opinion, Brussels (Pascal Chelala)

II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS⁴

The medium to long-term evolutionary trend of the EU system of supranational governance (compounding a major expansion of its territorial sphere, the build-up of an increasingly articulated institutional system, and the accumulation of broader policy competencies) has given rise to a multitude of problems concerning the relationship between public opinion (particularly in some member states) and political leadership (Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe & Marks 2009; Risse 2010). It has become clear that the pace of integration proposed from the top and some side-effects of integration — fiscal austerity, transnational redistribution, economic insecurity, immigration — are difficult to accept for significant constituencies in Europe. This misalignment between political leadership and public opinion raises a crucial question for any system of governance that aims – as the European Union repeatedly affirms - to be inspired by democratic principles of popular representation, accountability and the rule of law. In conclusion, Europe today faces three major challenges:

- a) increased citizen dissatisfaction with the European Union;
- b) greater distance between the mainstream European political leadership and large sectors of public opinion; and
- c) more significant centrifugal drives in the Union stemming from asymmetric economic conditions and austerity policies.

The recent financial and economic crisis, the most serious ever faced by the EU, has further exacerbated these challenges. Public support and trust in the capacity of EU institutions and collective leadership to effectively resolve problems have seriously declined over the last few years. Centrifugal drives calling into question the existence of the Union itself, or at least of its present configuration, have become more compelling. Even though the peak of the crisis has been overcome, the rise of Eurosceptic feelings and a more specific opposition to some of the most advanced instruments of the Union, such as the Euro, is visible in many countries (Fuchs, Magni-Berton and R. Roger 2010). It is also noteworthy that some of the effects of the crisis (particularly unprecedented levels of unemployment) still persist in large areas of the Union and continue to affect important sectors of the European populace.

The potential consequences of the persistence and further development of this situation should not be underestimated. How much Europe, and what kind of Europe, have become deeply contested topics. Moreover, outright opposition to EU membership (hard Euro-scepticism) (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000) has reached very high levels in several countries as seen during the European parliament elections of 2014. The upshot is that the future of the European project itself is at stake.

For the reasons mentioned above, we contend that the European Union is at a crossroads. There is a great need for institutional reforms, bold innovations in the political discourse, and policy proposals formulated by European and

⁴ This section of the paper heavily draws upon the EUENGAGE technical Annex to the Project, especially section 1.

national leaderships that address the three major challenges feeding into contestation and the public-leader divide. Our task is to diagnose the challenges, identify a range of possible institutional and policy solutions, and then explore, through a series of experimental exercises, whether a dialogue between European elites and the public is possible and it can help in developing a range of acceptable solutions, investigating their scope, and suggesting the most feasible and effective institutional steps. Our driving principle is that only solutions decided jointly by citizens and elites, through exploiting more efficient mechanisms of communication, can produce a durable re-equilibration of Europe's system of governance.

In this context, the EUEngage project pursues three main objectives:

1. *Theoretically*, EUENGAGE will systematically explore the changing orientations of public opinion and national and European political leadership with regard to the identity, cohesion, institutions and policies of the EU. In this way, it seeks to ascertain which aspects of the European enterprise are seen more critically, gauge the gaps between the views of citizens and political leaders, understand their antecedents and consequences, and study ways of addressing these gaps. To explore these issues we will focus on three main policy areas: immigration, the financial/economic crisis and foreign and security policy, with particular reference to the EU borders at East (Ukraine) and at South (Libya).

2. *Methodologically*, EUENGAGE proposes to set up an interactive, dynamic, multilevel and replicable quasi-experimental research design. Using a variety of instruments and techniques, the design will allow us not only to study the process of representation *in vivo*, but also to test experimentally how innovative and efficient interactions between citizens and politicians can increase citizens' awareness of the common problems and interests of the Union, along with the ability of European leaders to respond innovatively (with institutional and policy solutions) to appease the discontent of public opinion.

3. *In policy terms*, the results of the analysis from the proposed research design will lead to the elaboration of policy scenarios about the future institutional structure of the EU. This will contribute to, and raise the level of, EU policy discussions about the existing imbalance between the national and supranational arenas.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

III.1. The Overall research design

The project is made up of two overlapping circles (see Fig. 1), one wider circle covers the full membership of the EU, and a second, narrower one, covers in greater detail a subset of 10 members states (Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom) selected as they cover the main dimensions of variation across the

Union (North/South, strongly hit/less strongly hit by the crisis, old/new members, Eurozone/non Eurozone countries) that have had the greatest relevance in the recent past.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

We consider EUENGAGE as an empirical primer both in theoretical terms and methodological scope. We will not only study mass and elites interactively and over time, but also, simultaneously, we will study how they interact using social media analysis (mostly focused on tweeters). We will make elite and public discuss and deliberate in controlled ways so as to study what the consequences of this interaction are for both of them. All these interactions will take place while we observe traditional media environments as well as the social media in which our public and elites are embedded. This design will not only allow us to explore and test in a unique way, using a variety of empirical sources, several hypotheses relevant to political and social sciences but also offer a first attempt to approach the study of public opinion-elites in a way that can be systematically and repeatedly used to better gauge and assess the evolution of the political challenges facing Europe and the acceptability of different proposals. This combination of observational and experimental analysis is the most fruitful way to reach sound empirical conclusions about existing patterns and their likely evolution.

To analyze this complex set of interactions we dissected the following elements:

1. Public Opinion and Elite attitudes.

To this purpose, we plan a 2-waves panel of public opinion and elite, “feeding” into each of the two sides the views of the other side, and then analyzing the reactions produced and the resilience of attitudes over time via deliberative experiment that will bring together (via an electronic e-forum platform) groups of citizens and politicians that will interact between wave 1 and wave 2 of the surveys to discuss institutional solutions and their consequences.

2. The social media

We also analyze the social media (Twitter), documenting the exchanges between politicians (especially those we will be able to interview) and the public. Social media research offers a particularly efficient means to document continuously the mood of public opinion. Through analyzing the political discourse about Europe on Twitter, we have the potential to measure popular opinion and discourse on Europe in real-time. Many political parties and legislators across Europe use Twitter, as do many of the institutions of the European Union, including the European Parliament (e.g. @Europarl_EN). Each public Twitter user in the European political sphere, furthermore, has networks of followers who provide text, aim Tweets at each other or at European handles, or use Europe-specific “#hashtags” referring to specific events, themes, places, and debates. This generates a rich set of information that can be tapped to determine not only what is being discussed in the social media

sphere about Europe, but also the sentiment about these topics, broken down by types of followers, country origin, and time. Using network scaling models of follower networks, it is also possible to locate actors such as parties and followers in a common opinion space.

3. Electronic media.

The project collect a corpus of news articles related to European affairs, and also all related user comments, from the most widely used on-line news media in each of the ten EU selected countries. We propose using automated coding with a range of available software, including Alceste for qualitative-quantitative analyses of thematically similar but large amounts of text.

3. Party

Next to the citizenry and the media, political parties are one of the main actors in the EU system of governance. They link citizens' political preferences with policy-making bodies at different levels of the EU system of governance. At the same time they are able to shape these popular preferences by political statements, public speeches and (when in government) government action. We intend to identify, in a comprehensive manner, the problem emphases and issue positions of political parties as well as their political vision for the future, using a variety of data, among which we will use the followings:

- Party Euromanifestos (at the time of the European Parliament elections in 2014),
- Expert survey of party positions (two waves of surveys on the positions of parties in all EU countries in 2015 and 2017).
- Analysis of leaders' political discourse to describe the evolution of leader responses during the economic crisis and, in particular, at critical junctures and to systematically explain changes in the attention, sentiment and position of leader's discourse.

III.2. The Public-Elite link

The challenges the EU polity is experiencing are, to an extent, part of a deep-seated change in the very nature of political representation. At the core of this is the increasing "de-territorialization" of political representation due to pressures coming both from above (such as multilevel governance and increasing inter-penetration of international and supra-national institutions within the domestic realm) and from below (such as global and local civil society using electronic media and social activism) (see Urbinati and Warren, 2008 for a more general theoretical framework). Nonetheless, the European project adds to this change distinctive elements. The "twin imbalance" of the European Union (increased central powers but weak mechanisms of democratic accountability and representation) and of national states (established mechanisms of democratic accountability but decreasing powers) generates a specific challenge against the current status quo in the process of European integration. In the rest of the paper, we present in some detail how we intend to analyze this public-elite linkage.

The Survey Fieldwork

We follow Entman and Herbst (2011) when they argue for the need to distinguish several "referents" of both public opinion and elites. As to public opinion, we look at three empirical referents of "the comprehensive preferences of a majority of individuals on an issue" (Entman and Herbst, 2001: 203):

- the general public, as measured by mass representative surveys through questionnaires
- the organized public, as measured by a survey of representatives from different economic groups
- new social groups, as measured by blogs and tweets

As to the elites, many recent contributions have stressed the difficulties of political elites in facing a growing and problematic politicization of the European Union issue. This project moves from the idea that the critical juncture of the recent crisis has expanded the scope of constraints on elite's actions beyond the problematic mass-elite relationship of the last decade (Hooghe and Marks 2009) and has introduced new problems for the European policy makers and national executive leaders who need to find a difficult equilibrium between responsiveness and responsibility (Mair 2010, Goetz 2014). This problematic situation raises questions about the real capabilities of elites to offer efficient and acceptable alternatives, reduce the sense of mistrust and defend the EU membership as a value.

To study public opinion and elites using survey research we adopt an on-line panel design (see Table 1). The public opinion panel is based on two waves of public (including organized and general public) surveys respectively. An original sample of approximately 1,300 people per country will be interviewed in the first wave, under the assumption that, due to attrition rate, the sample size per country will be around 1,000 at the end of the second wave. Should the numbers fall below the threshold of 1,000, we will replace the drop-offs with a fresh sample replicating the socio-demographic characteristics of those who dropped off. The mass surveys will be conducted via CAWI.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The survey will be scripted, hosted and managed centrally by TNS. TNS will provide for the recruitment of the sample in all 10 countries and, as far as the on-line business sample, it will be sourced through a leading UK international on-line panel provider, Research Now.⁵ The sample will include a variety of economic and business sectors and firms of different size. We will interview approximately 160 businessmen per country. They will be selected according to an on-line panel, using the sector and the company size as filters. The

⁵ Research Now is one of the few panel companies currently offering an international B2B panel to the Market Research Industry.

sample includes managers from export-oriented SMEs (i.e. with between 10 and 249 employees) as well as big business in the following business sectors: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, information and communication, financial and insurance activities, administrative and support services, education.

Our choice of an online panel survey is dictated by several methodological and theoretical considerations. CAWI administration mode as compared to CATI or CAPI has some disadvantages, of which two are distinctively relevant for our case. The first is attrition rate and its potentially biasing effects, The second is the differential Internet penetration in EU countries that can bias representativeness in favor of those with higher Internet skills (and often better educated, younger and more politically active). We see both difficulties as surmountable given the multifaceted nature of public opinion here adopted (beside weighting correction techniques for main socio-demographics, and given all we know already from the literature about the political profile of European citizens). We see the panel conditioning effects as posing less of a problem in our design since the two waves will take place about one year one from the other and, therefore, the experience of the previous interview should have a negligible effect on responses to the second wave (Lugtig, Das and Scherpenzeel, 2014).

On the other hand, CAWI has some distinct advantages. The first is that the recruitment process makes it easier for people to join a repeated administration of the survey. Online panel surveys have fewer problems than telephone administered panel surveys. Second, online surveys are particularly well suited for administering complex experimental treatments, such as the ones that we intend to include in the EUENGAGE Project. Third, a CAWI administration mode is also well suited for businessmen and economic elites, as our experience in the Transworld European project shows. This choice is recommended due to the difficulty of reaching and contacting people from the business sector by phone. In Greece, due to the lack of an on-line business panel, it will be possible to complete the interviews with Greek senior business decision-makers using a mixed mode, phone-to-web approach.

As to the elites, a two-wave repeated survey, involving samples of national and EU politicians, will be conducted in the 10 selected countries. The elite survey (with a sample of approximately 70 politicians per country) will be conducted in mixed mode (including CAWI, CATI and CAPI/PAPI mode).⁶ Both the elite and mass surveys will be fielded in the same period, respectively between March and May 2016 and the Spring 2017 respectively for wave 1 and wave 2. Both groups will be administered an almost identical questionnaire (see Annex 1 and next section) maximizing the number of questions asked in both waves.

⁶ The following national experts are involved in the fieldwork: Heinrich Best and Lars Vogel (Jena); Daniel Gaxie (Sorbonne), Miguel Jerez (Universidad Granada), Zdenka Mansfeldová (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), Catherine Moury (Nova Universidade Lisboa), Kyriaki Nanou (University of Nottingham), Dimitrios Sotiropoulos (University of Athens).

In-between Wave 1 and Wave 2, we will implement an on-line deliberative e-democracy forum to study the micro-foundational mechanisms of representation on both sides of the aisle.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire length will be approximately 20 minutes (excluding socio-demographics) amounting to approximately 40 Question Units (see Annex 1). The questionnaire will include for the mass survey a targeted set of population-based experiments embedded in both panel surveys to study how public opinion connect, based on party cues, on diverse institutional designs and EU-wide transnational redistribution. The experiments use a "question as treatment" design and they examine the effect of different factors on citizen preferences. Analytically, the questionnaire is organized in six blocks.

- A warming-up section to assess salience of issues.
- A policy section on three issue-areas (Immigration, Financial/economic crisis and foreign and security policy) each of them organized, following the same format, to measure:
 - support for different policy-alternatives;
 - scope of governance (the most appropriate level of governance, national or EU) ;
 - accountability/blaming;
 - solidarity issues.
- A section on European institutions and attitudes
- An experimental section to tap solidarity and redistributive issues.
- A section on Predispositions
- A section on socio-demographic background data.

Beside the warming-up, section aimed at measuring salience and concern for the three issue-areas on which the questionnaire zeroes in, we start with a set of questions about the main policy and institutional issues as they are defined and framed by parties (using both party manifestos and expert surveys). This section ask to the general public respondents to position themselves and the parties they feel closer to on several policy issues and to the elite to position themselves and public opinion, as they perceive it, on the same issues. This will allow a comparison of elite and masses both in their positions and in the way they mirror the counterpart's position. For a selected group of issues, it will be possible to compare individual positioning, at both elite and mass level, with the way party manifestos and expert survey position the parties on the same issues.

The experimental section will explore three sets issues: solidarity and willingness to sacrifice for other EU citizens (comparing it with similar attitudes toward their own countrymen and non-EU subjects); policy preference on different institutional solutions in the three issue areas based on different framings of the issues and support for different level of EU institutional

integration. We look at a set of test factors: the nature of the source (cueing effect), the nature of the recipient/target, the attribution of responsibility for the situation of the target country/people; and the evolving nature of the economic/political context.

As an example, to explore the impact of identity on redistributive attitudes, we will manipulate the order of questions. Respondents in both surveys are assigned to one of the three following conditions: a share of respondents answer items on the strength of their identification with their national and EU community before proceeding to items on EU-wide redistribution. Another share of respondents receive questions about their identification after having answered the same items on redistribution. The questions-as-treatment design simultaneously allows us to measure the degree to which people actually identify with the national and European collective and how this affects their attitudes to different institutional scenarios for redistribution.

To study the effect of elite cues on public preferences over redistribution we will be assigning respondents in the public opinion survey to one of three conditions: 1) an 'elite consent' condition that makes salient that all main parties in a country's parliament support transnational redistribution; 2) an 'elite dissent' condition that makes the position of mainstream parties salient while also showing that some parties oppose transnational redistribution; and 3) a control condition with no elite cues.

The following predispositions will be also measured: Altruism/Humanitarianism, Identity, Trust (Institutions, Horizontal & Vertical), Cosmopolitanism, Attitudes toward Globalization, Perception of Inequality/Egalitarianism, Utilitarian/Affective EU Support, political (interest, attention, subjective efficacy, satisfaction democracy, influence politics on life) and social capital, political tolerance and process space. Given the length of the questionnaire, we will exploit the panel nature of the survey to maximize the number of questions asking part of the predispositional measures and the socio-demographic variables in wave 1 and the other predispositions in wave 2, under the assumption that predispositional measures do not change much over time. The participants in the deliberative experiment will receive also instruments to measure Civility (civil orientation toward conflict), Conflict avoidance, Perspective taking ability, Dogmatism, Ambivalence and Need for cognition.

The deliberative experiment

We start discussing (see Davies and Chandler, 2011) five main points relevant for designing our deliberative on-line experiment: the purpose, participants, time-space dimension, communication medium and structure of the deliberation process. The main purposes of the deliberative on-line experiment are three. First, we intend to study the impact of knowledge, arguments and discussion on individual deliberation, attitude formation and attitudinal change as related to the institutional accountability of different proposals discussed

and emerging from the first wave of surveys. Second, we aim to help both citizens and politicians generate new ideas and hypotheses about institutional design and their implications for both accountability and effectiveness in addressing the main crisis hot spots. Third, we want to study how - in a n actual context of interactions - political representatives and represented see their own and the other's roles.

We will recruit a group of participants randomly chosen from the pool of respondents of the first CAWI wave, using some form of financial incentive. We will recruit 45 people per country, divided and randomly assigned to three discussion groups. Two groups (Test Group A and Test Group B) will receive a briefing document containing balanced information on the topics under deliberation prior to the on-line experiment. By contrast, the third group (Test Group C) will receive instructions on the experiment but no factual information on the topics to be discussed. Both the briefing document and the technical appendices will be prepared first in English and then translated into national languages. Before deliberation (T1), participants in Test Group A and Test Group B will be administered an on-line survey with the same questions they will receive after participation in the on-line deliberative e-democracy forum. This questionnaire will serve to determine both the effects of correct information on individual attitudes and preferences, and its mediating effects on deliberation dynamics.

The mass-elite deliberative experiment will take place between Wave 1 and Wave 2 of the multi-country panel survey in May-June 2016 and it will last approximately 2 weeks (see Table 2). Participants will be randomly chosen from the pool of 13,000 (1,300 per country) of the first CAWI wave, using some form of monetary incentives.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Information treatment: Two groups (Test Group A and Test Group B, see Table 1) will receive a briefing document containing balanced information on the topics under deliberation prior to the on-line experiment. By contrast, the third group (Test Group C) will receive instructions on the experiment but not factual information on the topics to be discussed. Both the briefing document and the technical appendices will first be prepared in English and then translated into national languages. Before deliberation (T1), participants in Test Group A and Test Group B will be administered an on-line survey with the same questions they (as well as participants in group C) will receive after participation in the on-line deliberative forum (T2). This questionnaire will serve to determine both the effects of correct information at the net of deliberation on individual attitudes and preferences and its mediating effects on deliberation dynamics.

Deliberative treatment: Deliberation will be taking part live and synchronically in all countries through a web-based platform provided by TNS and under the moderation of professional facilitators. On the days of the experiment,

participants will be given the necessary instructions on how to log on to their “discussion room” and interact with other fellow citizens. Discussion will start upon ensuring that all attendees have access to the on-line platform. Two groups (Test Group A and Test Group C) will be given the opportunity to interact with a couple of politicians. The participants of the remaining group (Test Group B) will discuss among themselves but no interaction with politicians will be allowed so as to control for different group dynamics, communication and interaction patterns during deliberation. Test Group A and Test Group B will also comment on the politicians’ responses and proposals in an open-ended and post-discussion chat. It would be possible in some countries for the politicians to talk via teleconference and all participants to watch and type questions to him or her. Although we will allow for multimodal communication, the main medium will be text messages written via a computer. This is also the medium through which panelists will receive the information material and instructions for participation. The full text of all discussions as well as the author and timestamp of each comment will be recorded. Participants will be assigned an id-number and will identify each other through pseudonyms. Anonymity will be guaranteed throughout the whole experiment. After deliberation, the participants will receive a short on-line survey to fill in (T2).

Control groups: For the sake of experimental control, two groups (Control Group A and B), who will not participate in the deliberation, will take the post-session survey (T2). While Control Group A will receive the background information material, Control Group B will not be administered the information treatment either. These two groups are intended as a control for deliberation and information effects.

Gamification

During the deliberative experiment we will conduct in sequence a Coordination Game followed by a Public Goods Game (PGG)/Ultimatum Game to further explore solidarity and redistributive attitudes. The coordination game will take place at the beginning of the deliberative experiment. Participants will be assigned to a task in which they have to coordinate in order to achieve a specific goal. The coordination game will be used to create in-group-out-group cleavages, to foster cooperation within the group, to assess the nature of the ethical criteria used to assess redistribution and to provide differential starting endowments for the different groups. We are still debating what kind of activity (cognitive or normative) will the member of the group perform. In the epistemic case, we would ask them to find a correct answer to a maximization/optimization problem, while in the normative one, we will use Rawls theory to test ethical redistributive criteria. At the end of this first stage, participants will be assigned a certain number of tokens according to the ability they showed during the task (i.e., a higher level of coordination will be related to a higher number of tokens). The tokens earned in the coordination game will be used as endowment for the PGG/Ultimatum phase of the gamification.

In the PGG/Ultimatum Game phase, a public goods game will be played under the following constraints:

- Iterations (3: one for each of the three issue areas: Foreign and security Policy, Immigration and Economy)
- Deliberative conditions (2: information and interaction with politicians)
- Kind of game: PGG / Ultimatum Game
- Language/Nationality: 60 National groups and national language + cross-national English-speaking groups.

In an attempt to maximize variation and insure a factorial design we aim at 60 national groups (7 persons x group) + 6 English-speaking mixed nationalities groups (5 persons x group) = N 450. Each country will have 6 national groups, to cover all six conditions (3 deliberative x 2 game conditions).

In the PGG, participants will be given the opportunity to contribute to a common project choosing the number of tokens from their endowment, obtained during the coordination game phase, to be transferred into a public pot (see e.g. Fischbacher and Simon Gächter, 2006, Appendix A). In the Ultimatum game a country group (i.e., the proposer) selects an offer to make to another country group (i.e., the responder). The responder can choose to accept or to reject. In the first case, the pie is divided as proposed by the participant in the proposer role. In case of rejection of the responder no one gets anything.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

To summarize, the main questions this project intends to assess at the present stage are the following:

- How to assess the magnitude of change (or the overall rate of stability) of the different patterns of elite and public opinion attitudes towards the process of European integration, focusing on its main dimensions: identity, visions of political representation at the EU level and scope of governance?
- How to assess the mutual influence between elite and public in shaping new attitudes towards European integration?
- How to assess the influence of new forms of political discourse and new political/electoral actors on these changing attitudes?
- How to assess the influence of new form of social communication on these changing attitudes?
- How to assess the different reactions of public and elites to the incremental introduction of new cognitive and affective stimula related to the challenges and the opportunities for the future of EU integration.

References

- Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2004). Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results? *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(4), 589–610.
- Adams, J., & Ezrow, L. (2009). Who Do European Parties Represent? How Western European Parties Represent the Policy Preferences of Opinion Leaders. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(01), 206.
- Adams, J., Haupt, a. B., & Stoll, H. (2008). What Moves Parties?: The Role of Public Opinion and Global Economic Conditions in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(5), 611–639.
- Adams, J., & Somer-Topcu, Z. (2009). Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties' Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(04), 825.
- Bartolini, S. (2005). *Restructuring Europe: Centre formation, system building and political structuring between the nation-state and the European Union*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from
- Bayley, Paul, and Geoffrey Williams, eds. (2012). *European Identity: What the Media Say*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bakker, Ryan, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Vachudova (2013). *Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2010*. Party Politics.
- Bellucci, Paolo, Marina Costa Lobo, and Michael Lewis-Beck (2012). "Economic crisis and elections: The European periphery", *Electoral Studies* 31(3):469-71.
- Bermeo, Nancy, and Larry M. Bartels (2014). *Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes, and Protest in the Great Recession*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Best, Heinrich, György Lengyel, and Luca Verzichelli (2012). *The Europe of Elites. A Study into the Europeanness of Europe's Political and Economic Elites*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bosco, Anna, and Susannah Verney (2012). "Electoral Epidemic: The Political Cost of Economic Crisis in Southern Europe, 2010-11", *South European Society and Politics*. 17 (2): 129-154.
- Brack, Nathalie, and Oliveir Costa (2012). *Diverging views of Europe: Euroscepticism within EU institutions*. London: Routledge.

Cheneval, Francis, and Frank Schimmelfennig (2013). "The Case for Democracy in the EU." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(2):334-50.

Conti, N. (2014), *Party Attitudes Towards the EU in the Member States. Parties for Europe, Parties Against Europe*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Cotta, M. (2014). Facing the Crisis: The European Elite System's Changing Geometry. In H. Best & J. Higley (Eds.), *Political Elites in the Transatlantic Crisis* (pp. 58–80). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crum, B. (2013). Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(4), 614–630.

De Wilde, Pieter, and Michael Zürn, M. (2012). 'Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(1):137-153.

De Vries, C., Van der Brug, W., Van der Eijk, C., & Van Egmond, M. (2011). "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting: The Role of Political Information". *Electoral Studies*, 30(1): 16-28.

Entman, Robert M., and Susan Herbst (2001). "Reframing Public Opinion as We Have Known It." In *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*, edited by W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman, 203-25. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Follesdal, Andreas, and Simon Hix (2005). "Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik", *European Governance Papers* (EUROGOV), No C-05-02, available at <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf>.

Fuchs, Dieter, Magni-Berton, R. Roger (2009) Dieter Fuchs, Raul Magni Berton, and Antoine Roger. 2009. *Euro-scepticism: Images of Europe Among Mass Publics and Political Elites*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich.

Gábor, T., & Popescu, M. (2009). "Public Television, Private Television and Citizens' Political Knowledge." *EUI Working paper series*, RSCAS 2009/66. Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Gábor, T., & Popescu, M. (2012). "Cross-National Patterns in Political Bias in European News Media" presented at the 2012 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Antwerp, Belgium, 10-15 April 2012.

Goetz, K. H. (2014). A Question of Time: Responsive and Responsible Democratic Politics. *West European Politics*, 37(2), 379–399.

Hobolt, Sara B., and James Tilley (2014). "Who's in Charge? Voter Attribution of Responsibility in the European Union." *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole Wilson (2002). "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35:965–89.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2008). *European Union? West European Politics*, 31(1-2), 108–129.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks (2009). "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus." *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1):1-23.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevidich, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Vachudova. (2010). *Measurement Validity and Party positioning: Chapel Hill expert surveys of 2002 and 2006*, *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (4): 684-703.

Koopmans, R., Erbe, J., & Meyer, M. F. (2010). "The Europeanization of Public Spheres: Comparisons across Issues, Time, and Countries". In Koopmans, R. & Statham, P. (Eds.). *The Making of a European Public Sphere. Media Discourses and Political Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham (2010). *The Making of a European Public Sphere. Media Discourse and Political Contention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschieer, and Timotheos Frey (2008). *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lugtig, P., Das, M., & Scherpenzeel, A. (2014). Nonresponse and attrition in a probability-based online panel for the general population. In M. Callegaro, R. P. Baker, J. Bethlehem, A. S. Göritz, J. A. Krosnick, & P. J. Lavrakas (Eds.), *Online Panel Research. A Data Quality Perspective*. (pp. 135–153). Chichester: Wiley.

Mair, P. (2009). *Representative versus Responsible Government*. Presented at the MPIfG Working Paper, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.

Majone, Giandomenico (1998). "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards." *European Law Journal* 4(1):5–28.

- Marks, Gary, Marco Steenbergen, Liesbet Hooghe, Ryan Bakker (2007). Cross-Validating Data on Party Positioning on European Integration. *Electoral Studies*, 26, 1: 23-38.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2002). "In Defense of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing the Legitimacy of the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4):603-34.
- Müller, W. C., & Strøm, K. (1999). *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Europe make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mutz, Diana C. (2011). *Population-Based Survey Experiments*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pierson, P. (1996). The Path to European Integration A Historical Institutional Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29(2), 123-163.
- Risse, T. (2010). *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Russo, F., & Cotta, M. (2013). Beyond euroscepticism and europhilia: Multiple views about Europe. *Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica*, (3/2013).
- Sanders, david, and Gabor Toka. 2013. "Is anyone listening? Mass and elite opinion cueing in the EU." *Electoral Studies*. 32(1):13-25.
- Schmitt, Hermann, Bernhard Wessels, and Cees van der Eijk (2013). "Parties, Candidates and Voters in the 2009 Election to the European Parliament." Pp. 221-240 in *An Audit of Democracy in the European Union*, eds. Susan Banducci et al. Florence: European University Institute (ebook available at: www.piredeu.eu/Database/DOCS/PIREDEU_Audit_of_Democracy_2012.pdf)
- Fritz W. Scharpf (2009). "Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity." *European Political Science Review* 1(2):173-204.
- Scharpf, F. W. (2014). No exit from the euro-rescuing trap? (No. 14/4). MPIfG Discussion Paper. Retrieved from <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/94362>
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2014). European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 321-337.
- Schuck, A., Xezonakis, G., Banducci, S., & De Vreese, C. H. (2011). "Party contestation and Europe on the news agenda: The 2009 European Parliamentary election". *Electoral Studies*, 30, 41-52.

Schumacher, G., de Vries, C. E., & Vis, B. (2013). Why Do Parties Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2), 464–477.

Sweet, Alec Stone, and Wayne Sandholtz (1997). "European integration and supranational governance." *Journal of European Public Policy* 4(3):297-317.

Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart (2000). "Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation." *Opposing Europe Working Paper No. 1*, Sussex European Institute (Available at: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI/pdfs/wp36.pdf>)

Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul, (2008). *Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. II. Comparative and theoretical perspectives*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

Thomassen, Jacques and Hermann Schmitt (2004). "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union." *Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning* Vol 45, No 1, pp. 377-410.

Urbinati, Nadia, and Mark E. Warren (2008), "The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory", *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 387-412.

Tsoukalis, L. (2014). *The Unhappy State of the Union*. London: Policy Network. Retrieved from <http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4602/The-Unhappy-State-of-the-Union>

Wuest Andreas M and Schmitt Hermann (2007) Comparing the views of parties and voters in the 1999 election to the European Parliament. In: Van der Brug, Wouter and Van der Eijk, Cees (eds) *European Elections and Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 73–93.

Figure 1 - The overall research design




Table 1 - Survey Waves and Deliberative experiment

CAWI SURVEY I (Spring 2016)	DELIBERATION EXPERIMENT (2-3 weeks)					CAWI SURVEY II (Spring 2017)
WAVE 1 Quest.	WAVE 1.a Quest.	GAMIFICATION			WAVE 1.b Quest.	WAVE 2 Quest.
		Coordination	PGG/Ultimatum			
			I*	II	III	

* one iteration per issue-area, namely foreign and security policy, immigration and the financial crisis.

Table 2 - Deliberative experiment on line

	T0		T1			T2	T3
	Questionnaire at recruiting time (wave1)	Information before deliberation	Questionnaire before deliberation	Deliberation with fellow citizens	Deliberation with politicians	Questionnaire after deliberation	Questionnaire (wave2)
Test group A (N=15 per country)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Test group B (N=15 per country)	X	X	X	X		X	X
Test group C (N=15 per country)	X		X	X	X	X	X
Control group A (N=50 per country)	X	X	X				X
Control group B (N=50 per country)	X					X	X