Europe’s Crises and Political Contestation

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*Draft* – Comments welcome
Have the Eurocrisis and the refugee crisis congealed a distinctive structure of conflict in Europe? In this paper we use the building blocks of a cleavage theory of party competition to argue that domestic conflict in Western Europe has been transformed by a new divide. Cleavage theory claims that the issues that divide voters are connected in durable dimensions, that political parties make programmatic commitments on these issue dimensions which are self-reinforcing, and that as a result of issue coherence and programmatic stickiness, change in party systems is a punctuated process that arises from shocks that are external to the party system.

Summarizing an extensive literature over the past decade, we describe the emergence of a transnational cleavage which has as its core a political reaction against European integration and immigration. For challenging parties on the radical right these issues relate to the defense of national community against transnational shocks. The European Union is itself such a shock because it introduces rule by those who are regarded as foreigners, diminishes the authority exercised by national states over their own populations, produces economic insecurity among those who lack mobile assets, and facilitates immigration. Immigration is perceived as a particular threat by those who resent cultural intermixing, by those who must compete with immigrants for housing and in the labor market, and, more generally, by those who seek cultural or economic shelter in the rights of citizenship.

The emergence of a transnational cleavage reveals the causal power of social forces in the face of established institutions. Perhaps the single most stunning consequence of the crises is the breakthrough of a populist right party in a country, Germany, that was perceived to be practically immune. For this reason alone the crises can be considered to have ushered in a new era. However, virtually every country contains its own surprises, and were we to follow them we would be lost in fascinating detail.

Our focus in this paper is on the general character of conflicts that have arisen, their relation to the existing structure of party competition, and how they have already reshaped party systems. The crises are critical junctures that reveal, in the open air so to speak, the latent forces that have built up over the past two decades.

In the next section we explain why we think cleavage theory can help us understand what has happened. We have no hesitation in dropping the presumption that political parties are expressions of already formed, densely organized, and socially closed groups while holding on to three fundamental claims of cleavage theory: party systems are determined chiefly by exogenous social forces; political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, in consequence, party system change comes in the form of rising parties.

The following section conceives the rise of a transnational cleavage in reaction to reforms that weakened national sovereignty, promoted international economic exchange, increased immigration, and exacerbated cultural and economic insecurity for those who were nationally rooted. We then examine evidence on the response of mainstream political parties and find that very few shifted their positions on the key issues of European integration and immigration. Voters changed, but mainstream parties did not.

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1 We would like to thank David Attewell for excellent research assistance.
The final section shows that competition on European integration and immigration is structured by challenging parties—the radical right, the radical left, and green parties—not by mainstream parties. Challenging parties take more extreme positions on these issues, place more salience on them, and exhibit greater internal party unity on these issues. Apparently, political conflict in Western Europe has been transformed by the consolidation of a cultural dimension about community that cuts across established left/right conflict.

Cleavage theory—then and now

Cleavage theory, originating in Lipset and Rokkan (1967), conceives a national party system as the expression of underlying social conflicts. Revealingly, Lipset and Rokkan ignore strategic interaction among parties in explaining the structure of their contestation (Bérhoa and Enyedi 2016: 265). Instead, they focus on the basic cleavages that undergird party support over the medium or long-term: the national revolution that produced a cleavage between the central state and peripheral communities and between the central state and a supranational church; and the industrial revolution that produced an urban/rural cleavage, and later a worker/employer cleavage. In each case, the political parties that were eventually formed were expressions—or, to put it more directly, creatures—of self-conscious, socially closed groups. Catholic parties, such as the German Zentrum, were political instruments through which Catholics defended an established way of life. Socialist parties lagged decades behind the forces that created a class of wage laborers, and in all but a few late developing countries, were dwarfed in membership and resources by trade unions (Bartolini 2007; Marks 1989). In the disparaging words of Ernest Bevin, head of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, “the Labour party has grown out of the bowels of the TUC [Trades Union Congress]” (Marks 1989: 3). By the time socialist parties came on the scene, workers in most countries had several decades of experience in the school of organized class conflict.

The political parties that Lipset and Rokkan describe are grounded in solidary groups that express the life-long identity of those who belong. Conflicts between workers and employers, between those living in peripheral communities and central state builders, and between secularists and defenders of the Church were rooted in collective identities that were expressed in grass-roots movements and hierarchical organizations. The solidarity that existed in these groups was much more than an expression of the social or occupational location of any set of individuals. It was experiential, the outcome of repeated conflict which defined and solidified the composition of in-groups and out-groups.²

Before we go any further, it is worth stressing that the era of social closure is demonstrably over. Political parties are no longer political arms of already formed collective bodies. Voters are no longer encased in life-long, or even inherited, loyalties. The decline in the proportion of voters closeted in class and religious organizations can be regarded as a concrete fact that varies in degree across countries, but not in sign. However, this fact is not as corrosive for a cleavage perspective as might be thought.

² Interestingly, this has affinities with Marxism. Karl Marx regarded class consciousness as the outcome of collective struggle in which individuals would come to see their fate as bound to that of their class. Objective class location had to be activated in conflict before one could speak of class as a political category.
Lipset/Rokkan show little interest in the factors that bind individuals into collectivities (Bornschier 2009: 2). What matters in their theory is that fundamental divisions in a society give rise to durable cleavages that structure party competition. The questions they put under the spotlight are 1) What are the fundamental divisions in a society? Which distinctions among a population become the bases for cleavages? 2) How do these cleavages interact to shape voter preferences? 3) How are voter preferences expressed in party formation and competition? How are cleavages mediated by the rules of the game and by party strategies?

In coming to grips with these questions, Lipset/Rokkan make the following substantive moves:

1) The strategic flexibility of a political party on major dimensions of conflict is constrained to the extent it has a durable constituency of voters, a decentralized decision-making structure, a self-selected cadre of activists, a self-replicating leadership, and/or a distinct programmatic reputation. Political parties can be flexible on particular issues, but efforts to shift position at the level of a conflict dimension are rare. That is to say, political parties are induced to seek local maxima in competing for votes (Laver and Sergenti 2009).

In addition to shifting its issue position, a political party may seek to subsume an issue into the dominant dimension, blur its response, or ignore the issue (Rovny 2015: 913). The problem for established parties is that a local, blurring, or status quo response is more effective for a single issue than for a set of strongly related issues.

2) Hence, the source of dynamism in party systems in response to major shifts in voter preferences is the growth of new political parties. The basic premises of cleavage theory are that exogenous forces shape democratic party systems; that change comes from voters, not established parties; that political parties are relatively fixed; and that as a consequence, the response of a party system to a serious exogenous shock takes the form of challenging, rather than reformed, political parties.

3) The mass enlargement of the franchise was a one-time event that took place over half a century or less. By the time mass political parties came on the scene, cleavages were already institutionalized. Now the sequence is reversed. Competitive party systems exist prior to the onset of any new cleavage. Hence, it makes no sense to believe that challenging political parties will be rooted in pre-existing, socially closed, groups. The connection between rising parties and voters has changed because political parties are now formed alongside the development of a cleavage, rather than decades or centuries after. Political parties are actors, not subjects, in the formation of social divisions.

4) Cleavage theory is about the interaction of cleavages rather than the replacement of one alignment by another. Realignment can be expected only in two-party dominated systems where the dimension of contestation is, by definition, the axis between the parties. In high-barrier two party systems, a new cleavage can be expected to produce particularly

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3 It is simply not possible, on strictly logical grounds, to identify a vote maximizing strategy for any party in a populated two dimensional space (Laver and Sergenti 2009: 43)
intense frictions within parties. In low-barrier multi-party systems, a new cleavage can be expected to produce new challenging parties that exist alongside, but do not replace, parties formed on prior cleavages. Hence, realignment theory is most appropriate for a subset of party systems — those with high barriers to the entry of new political parties.

5) Socio-economic location is the basis for the class cleavage, but it is not a necessary basis for a new cleavage. Only those cleavages arising from the industrial revolution — rural vs. urban and worker vs. employer — are political economic. Peripheral resistance to state building is based on community rather than socio-economic location (Hooghe and Marks 2016), and the same is true for the religious cleavage (Rovny and Polk 2016). The contrast features prominently in Lipset/Rokkan (1967: 13ff). Territorial conflict is based on commitment to a community in which “you vote with your community and its leaders irrespective of your economic position.”

6) Functional conflict concerns the distribution of products, resources, and positions in which “you vote with others in the same position as yourself whatever their localities, and you are willing to do so even if this brings you into opposition with members of your community.” What is common to both is predictability. As Peter Mair (2001: 38) stresses, “Predictability then becomes a surrogate of structuration: the more predictable a party system is, the more it is a system as such, and hence the more institutionalized it has become. This is also what freezing is about.” Social structure is just one possible source of predictability; community is another: “Perhaps the longterm impact of cleavages is also better explained by the persistence of the collective identities they entail than by the immutability of their social structural basis” (Bornschier 2009: 3).

Lipset/Rokkan were intently aware of the social changes that were underway when they were writing, but they had no idea that the containers — national states — were going to be transformed from within and without in the decades around the turn of the twenty-first century.

A transnational cleavage

By the early 1960s it had already become clear that mass education, affluence, and the expansion of the welfare state were moderating traditional class conflict. Lipset (1964: 273; 1960) pointed to “the fact ... that there has been a reduction in the intensity of class-linked political struggles in most of Europe.” In his Letter to the New Left, C. Wright Mills emphasized that “only at certain (earlier) stages of industrialisation, and in a political context of autocracy, etc., do wage-workers tend to become a class-for-themselves” (1960:

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4 In the United States, realignment scholars look for landslide elections, high interparty membership turnover, and “a shift which increases policy agreement within the parties and decreases it across party lines” (Sinclair 1982: ch.1).

5 Because territorial oppositions are geographically concentrated, they can exist as a second dimension even in high barrier systems.

6 Interestingly, “Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory.” The creation of state arenas was prior to conflict over the allocation of socio-economic values, and Lipset/Rokkan suggest that this is a necessary condition (Caramani 2004: 31; Bartolini 2005: 386; Bornschier 2009: 2).
Generational tensions on the left were coming sharply into view. Ronald Inglehart (1971: 992) detected a post-industrial cleavage in which a young, educated section of the middle class would realign on libertarian values and workers would be potential recruits for conservative parties. In his early formulation, Inglehart made the connection with internationalism: “[T]he libertarian position seems linked with internationalism. This follows from the fact that, according to our analysis, the post-bourgeois groups have attained security in regard to both the safety and sustenance needs; insofar as the nation-state is seen as a bulwark protecting the individual against foreign threats, it is less important to post-bourgeois respondents” (1971: 997). However, the international connection fell into insignificance in Inglehart’s later exposition of postmaterialism and it was not picked up again until the 1990s.8

One reason for this was the appeal of dealignment theory which focused on the weakening of partisanship and increasing electoral volatility, both of which signified a permanent shift from cleavages to issue-based party competition. Over the long-term, affluence and education appeared to increase unpredictability as voters came to have the cognitive assets to make instrumental voting decisions. In place of structured conflict, dealignment conceives a liquid political landscape in which voters have ephemeral party-political preferences and political parties continuously adapt to new issues (Dalton and Wattenberg 2001). The rise of Green parties and radical right parties in the 1980s and 1990s were niche phenomena that were consistent with the idea that the destructuring of party systems and the weakening of cleavages would lead to a more diversified party-political market catering to more varied consumer tastes (Flanagan and Dalton 1984; Franklin, Mackie, Valen 1992; Franklin 2010).

At first, European integration appeared consistent with the destructuration view. It raised new issues—the transfer of national sovereignty, the erosion of national borders, and transnational mobility—that were neither connected to the predominant left/right dimension nor to new politics issues of gender, moral conduct, or environmental protection.9 While scholars were aware of a significant residue of anti-immigrant attitudes in Western societies, its natural constituency—industrial blue collar workers—was dwindling. Opposition to transnationalism was regarded as the relic of an outdated, and ultimately hopeless, reaction. When the 2004 European Election Survey summarized responses to the question “what do you think are the most important problems in [country] at present,” immigration and minority politics did not reach the five percent threshold to be listed as a separate issue.

The institutional point of departure for a theory of transnational cleavage is a series of major reforms in the early 1990s that diminished the cost of international trade and migration while diffusing authority from central states to bodies within and among them. The dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1989 released more than one hundred million people to trade and circulate within the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) negotiated in the early 1990s extended EU authority over wide ranges of public life, made it much

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7 Author’s parentheses.
8 Inglehart (1977: 168) observes that the European Union provides “access to a large economic unity without loss of a sense of identity.” Inglehart (1981) does not refer to international issues.
9 Bartolini (2005: 369; 375) describes European integration chiefly in terms of the “formation of a transnational space for transactions” arising from a “new phase of nation-state boundary transcendence.”
easier for people to work in another EU country, created a common currency, and turned 
nationals into European Union citizens. The World Trade Organization (1994) was 
negotiated in the early 1990s, as were regional trade organizations, now totaling thirty-five 
in number (Hooghe, Marks, Lenz forthcoming). The 1990s were the cusp of a rapid increase 
in international trade, international migration, and economic inequality that have their 
ideological roots in the Thatcher-Reagan years. It is worth recalling that Margaret Thatcher 
agreed to sacrifice the national veto for qualified majority voting in order to push European 
market integration. However, the consensus on transnationalism encompassed the 
mainstream left as well the mainstream right.

The intellectual basis for transnationalism is broad and deep. The lower the 
transaction costs of international economic exchange, the greater the scope for 
specialization and economies of scale. A core premise of neoclassical economics is that 
introducing common standards and diminishing barriers to trade and investment increases 
economic growth. From a public goods perspective, national states are both too small and 
too large. Many of the most intractable problems that confront humanity—including global 
warming, failed states, species loss, and environmental degradation—require ongoing 
cooperation among states and their populations. National sovereignty and its political 
expression, the national veto, are obstacles to problem solving, which is why many 
international organizations pool authority among their member states in quasi-majoritarian 
decision making (Hooghe and Marks 2014; Hooghe, Marks, Lenz forthcoming). Functional 
efficiency in the provision of public goods calls for governance at diverse scales, including 
regional and global levels.

However, by the early 2000s transnationalism was proving to be highly contentious. 
European integration raised issues of national sovereignty in stark terms. Big-bang 
enlargement in 2004 facilitated the movement of several million people from Central and 
Eastern Europe (European Commission 2014). In 2009, at the onset of the crisis, an 9.9 
percent of respondents in the EU-West flagged immigration as the most important or 
second-most important issue facing their country, albeit with considerable crossnational 
variation—from one percent in Germany and Portugal to 20 percent or more in Austria, 
Italy, and Britain (EES 2009).

Elites who stand to gain economically from immigration are particularly responsive 
to altruistic arguments for liberal immigration policies. Martin Wolf (2016) wrote in the 
Financial Times that “[T]he share of immigrants in populations has jumped sharply. It is hard 
to argue that this has brought large economic, social and cultural benefits to the mass of the 
population. But it has unquestionably benefited those at the top, including business.” 
Resentment can be sharp among those who value national citizenship because they have 
few alternative sources of self-worth. Nationalism has long been the refuge of those who 
are insecure, who sense they are losing status, and who seek standing by identifying with 
the group. Those who feel they are slipping with no prospect of upward mobility may resent 
dilution of the rights and protection of citizenship by an elite that does not need or 
value that protection.

At the same time, it became clear that the economic benefits of transnationalism 
were concentrated among the populations of developing countries, and in the West, they 
grew almost exclusively to those with mobile assets, i.e. professionals and those with 
financial capital. On a global level, those between the 75th and 90th percentiles—chiefly
medium and low income workers in Western Europe and the United States—saw almost no benefit from 1988 to 2015 (Oxfam 2016). The gains of transnationalism are concentrated on an elite that has become detached from local concerns and national loyalties. Many in this global elite view national states and their laws as constraints to be finessed or arbitraged. The promise of transnationalism has been gains for all, but the experience of the past two decades is that it delivers gains for a few. Hence, opposition to transnationalism is for many a populist reaction against elites who have little sympathy and no need for national borders and who have reaped the gains of trade while others pay the costs.

The Euro-crisis came in two parts. The first, economic, crisis created a north-south rift (Laffan 2016: 32; Tsoukalis 2014: 54-58). In the south, concern with unemployment and fiscal austerity overshadowed all other issues, while in the north, debate focused on the putative costs of support for the south. Opposition to immigration was muted in the south, but continued to gain traction in the north, where both economic and cultural issues were increasingly framed from a national perspective. Our re-analysis of EES data for 2014 finds that 17.4 percent of respondents in eight northern Western European countries considered immigration the most important or second most important issue, up from 9.2 percent in 2009. The corresponding figures for Spain, Portugal, and Greece are 2.3 percent in 2014 and 7.9 percent in 2009.

The refugee crisis, which became acute from August 2015, ratcheted up concern with immigration. A word score analysis of David Cameron’s speeches since the Eurocrisis reveals how references to Europe became more closely tied to national community than to the economy (Figure 1) with a spike in September 2015. In the most recent Eurobarometer (November 2015), 37.5 percent of EU-West respondents flag immigration as one of the two most important issues facing their country. For the first time in Eurobarometer history, immigration is ex aequo in importance with the most salient economic issue, unemployment (Eurobarometer 2015: 17). Immigration is the top problem in eight of fifteen Western EU member states and a close second in three more. The north/south split continues. In the north, the figure is 49 percent; in the south, it is 11.3 percent.

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10 A recent astute analysis is Tsoukalis (2016).
11 We thank Sebastian Popa for providing the data for 2014. These figures are averages across countries. Belgium, Austria, Ireland, and Italy are not yet available for 2014, and we exclude these countries from the 2009 calculations.
Figure 1: Content of the British Prime Minister’s speeches on Europe

Note: This figure shows the quarterly aggregated raw number of mentions of “Europe” in UK Prime Minister Speeches in the presence of national community keywords (nation, community, immigration) in red, and in the presence of economic keywords (trade, inequality, debt, recession, austerity, unemployment) in blue, with presence denoting a window of 20 words. Data generously shared by Martijn Schoonvelde (Schumacher et al. 2016).

As the table in the appendix suggests, there is an emerging consensus among comparativists and EU scholars that European integration, immigration, and universalist-particularistic values are joined at the hip. Several scholars describe the conflict over Europe from a cleavage narrative. Hooghe et al. (2002: 976-7) connect the rise of the New Right with a reaction “against a series of perceived threats to the national community” including immigrants and, most importantly, European integration, which “combines several of these threats and poses one more: it undermines national sovereignty.” Recent writing highlights the fusion between cultural and economic values and interests. Bartolini (2005: 401) hypothesizes that “European integration could well be the catalyst cementing these old and new value orientations and material interests,” and Häusermann and Kriesi (2015: 206) observe that “the distinction between the realm of economic and cultural politics [has] become blurred” as a result of denationalization and financial austerity. Kriesi, Grande, and co-authors (2008; 2012) advance a sustained argument that combines the impact of Europeanization and domestic educational and occupational change to hypothesize a cleavage pitting winners of Europeanization against its losers who seek to defend their shrinking benefits through demarcation.

The most active pole of the transnational cleavage connects the protection of national (and western) values, defense of national sovereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade skepticism. These are reinforcing issues for those who feel they have suffered transnationalism—the down and out, the economically insecure, the unskilled, the de-skilled, i.e. those who lack the education needed to compete in a mobile world. Education has a double effect. It is necessary for those who rely on their own talents to live an
economically secure life in a world with low barriers to trade. Just as importantly, education shapes the way a person looks at the world, including fellow humans. Education allows a person to see things from the other side, which is a key element in empathy for those who have a different way of life.

Education appears to shape attitudes on trade, immigration, and globalization because it affects values as well as economic interests (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007). This view gained credibility when political economists looking to specify the economic undergirding of trade attitudes found a powerful educational effect that was independent of economic factors (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002). Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (2014) show how cultural values, in particular cosmopolitan beliefs, drive the strong positive association between support for Eurocrisis bailouts and higher education. Students of immigration had always considered non-economic alongside economic factors, but the role of community, identity, and framing appears to be stronger than originally thought (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007). Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) conclude that cultural concerns are most salient among lower educated respondents and that these are considerably more powerful in explaining attitudes to immigration than concerns about wages and taxes. Using Eurobarometer trend data from 1973 to 2010, Hakhverdian, Van Elsas, van der Brug, and Kuhn (2013: 534) find a “widening educational gap in Eurosceptic attitudes” since the Maastricht Treaty.

Education may have loosened the bonds between individuals and the communities in which they live, but access to higher education is quite highly intergenerational (Triventi 2013: 499). This is consistent with a sociological account of partisanship: “[A]n account of [political] preferences starts building on people’s endowments and social practices in the pursuit of their life plans, both in the productive sphere of economic involvement as well as the reproductive sphere of social relations, in the family and other primary groups” (Kitschelt 2010: 660; see also Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Hutter 2014). Recent research finds that radical TAN parties are part of a movement subculture that exists among as well as within countries (Caiani and Kröll 2015). Longitudinal survey research suggests that attitudes over immigration that underpin right-wing extremism are rooted in early childhood, persist over a person’s life course, and are transmitted intergenerationally. Analyzing nineteen waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Avdeenko and Siedler (2015) find that a male whose parents express affinity toward a right-wing party is thirteen percent more likely to support a radical right party, controlling for income, education, and unemployment. More generally, the authors find that the strongest associations in party affinity between parents and sons (daughters are evidently more independent) are for support of right-wing parties, followed by the Greens and Die Linke.

**Party inflexibility**

Cleavage theory is a theory of discontinuity in the response of party systems to serious exogenous shocks. To the extent that a political party has a distinct cleavage location, so one would expect its positional maneuverability to be constrained by self-selected activists, self-replicating leaders, and reputational considerations. Complex organizations, in general, adapt well to gradual change, but are challenged to respond to a major change in their
environment (Aldrich 2007). Mainstream political parties are confronted with the consolidation of a new dimension of conflict, not just a change in preferences on an existing dimension.

The evidence we have is in line with this. Political parties in Western Europe appear to be sticky, as a cleavage perspective would expect. As we will see, party systems have responded to concerns about European integration and immigration, but not chiefly because political parties have shifted their positions. Figure 2 displays two kernel density estimations (KDE) using Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data on party positioning on European integration for 190 parties in fourteen Western European countries (Bakker et al. 2015). The thick line represents the probability distribution for change in party positioning between two successive waves averaged across five consecutive surveys: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 (n=397). Negative numbers on the X-axis denote a decline in support on a 7-point scale, and positive numbers an increase in support. The thin line represents change in party positioning across three waves (n=297).

**Figure 2: Change in party position on European integration using waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 1999-2014**

![Figure 2](image)

Note: Support for European integration is measured on a 7-point scale.

Just 9.3 percent of political parties have moved at least one point (negative or positive) on the 7-point scale across consecutive surveys. Only two political parties have moved more than two points: Greece’s radical left Syriza, which dropped from 6.0 in 2002 to 3.1 in 2006, and the Danish Liberal Alliance, which shifted from 6.1 in 2010 to 3.8 in 2014.

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12 Kernel density estimation is a non-parametric method in which the data are treated as a randomized sample and the distribution is smoothened. We use Stata’s default: the Epanechnikov estimator, which selects a smoothing bandwidth of 0.123 for the two-wave kernel function and a bandwidth of 0.171 for the three-wave function.
One sees more movement across longer time spans, but not much. Just 16.2 percent of the parties in the sample shift more than one point over three CHES waves. Three parties shift two points or more: once again Syriza, which drops to 2.2 in 2010 from its 2002 high of 6.0, and two parties that become markedly more pro-European: the Irish Greens, from 2.75 in 2002 to 5.0 in 2010, and the Swedish miljöpartiet de gröna, which crossed into pro-European territory in 2014, increasing to 4.4 from 2.0 in 2006.

Expert evaluations of party positioning on immigration reach back only to 2006. Over this short period we detect similar stability. Table 1 compares change in party positioning on immigration and European integration from pre-crisis to post-crisis and Figure 3 compares the kernel density distributions. The average absolute change over the three waves from 2006 to 2014 is 0.64 on immigration and 0.47 on European integration, both on a 7-point scale. In many cases, average expert judgements of party positions suggest that parties switch back and forth over time, so the average directional change over the eight-year period as a whole is very small, amounting to a move of 0.12 points towards a softer stance on immigration and of 0.15 towards pro-European integration. Figure 3 indicates that the distribution on immigration is flatter and leans to the negative side, though there is a fat tail of positive values. The minimum and maximum values for immigration in Table 1 are less extreme than for European integration. The bottom line is that party positioning on both European integration and immigration appears to have been quite stable over the past decade.

Table 1. Change in party positioning on immigration and European integration, 2006 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three waves</th>
<th>Absolute change</th>
<th>Directional change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>European integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean value</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min, max</td>
<td>0; 2.30</td>
<td>0; 2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Positioning on immigration is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from “strongly opposes tough policy on immigration” (0) to “strongly favors tough policy on immigration” (10). For comparability, we rescale to a 7-point scale and reverse it so that higher values indicate pro-immigration stances.

14 This is consistent with Akkerman (2015: 54) who concludes on the basis of a fine-grained analysis of election manifestos that “the impact of radical right parties on mainstream policy agendas tends to be overestimated.”

15 Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffé (2015: 10) find that the presence of a radical TAN party has little effect on the positioning of other parties in the same party system.
Before we move on, we need to assess the validity of this finding. Party manifestos, in general, reveal greater change than expert judgments. There are several possible reasons for this. One is that coding of party manifestos at the level of an individual issue might be expected to produce greater change than expert evaluation at a more general dimensional level.\textsuperscript{16} This would be the case if political parties were able to maneuver on specific issues, but less so on bundles of issues.\textsuperscript{17} A second possibility is that experts are biased to “recording the longstanding core principle positions of parties,” which would lead them to underrate shifts in positioning (McDonald et al. 2007). An alternative explanation is that experts evaluate how parties are perceived, whereas manifestos seek to shape perceptions. This would be the case if experts were Bayesians who use party manifestoes (among other sources) to update, rather than reconstruct, their judgements. If so, one might expect the same from voters. The European Election Survey (EES) asks voters to place political parties on European integration, and the results are similar to those using CHES data. The mean absolute change in party position on European integration across consecutive waves of the EES for 1999, 2004, and 2009 is 0.52 on a 10-point scale, compared to 0.59 for CHES, converted to the same scale (Adams, Ezrow, and Wlezien forthcoming).\textsuperscript{18} On this evidence,

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\textsuperscript{16} However, see Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen, and Bakker (2007) which compares diverse measurement instruments for a single issue, positioning on Europe.

\textsuperscript{17} Akkerman (2015) hand codes manifestos for immigration and integration policy in seven West-European countries from 1989 and 2010 and finds relatively little change in party positioning. Radical right parties have become radicalized, but mainstream parties, with the exception of the liberals, appear not to have shifted much.

\textsuperscript{18} We compare wave-to-wave party shifts calculated by Adams, Ezrow, and Wlezien (forthcoming) for eight countries in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 EES survey with wave-to-wave party shifts in the 1999-2002, 2002-2006,
one must look beyond party positioning to explain how party systems respond to exogenous shocks.

This is a scenario for disruption. If existing parties cannot radically shift their issue positions, one would expect exacerbated tensions within mainstream parties on the new dimension, particularly in high barrier systems, and the growth of challenging parties, particularly in low barrier systems. The evidence we have is in line with this. Figure 4 reveals that internal dissent is highest among political parties that take a middling position on European integration. Dissent is lower among parties that take polar positions, and is lowest among parties that take extreme anti-European positions. Conservative parties are particularly prone to dissent because they combine neoliberal affinity with transnationalism and defense of national sovereignty. The British Conservative party has been more deeply riven on Europe than any other party in Western Europe in 2014 and over the 1999 to 2014 period as a whole. Today, in the run-up to the Brexit referendum, the party is more bitterly divided than ever. Britain, as the European democracy with the highest barriers to party entry, has more intra-party dissent in 2014 and over the 1999 to 2014 period than any other EU country.

**Figure 4: Dissent within political parties on European integration, CHES 2014**

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<th>EES (Adams et al.)</th>
<th>CHES (own calculations)</th>
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<td>mean</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>absolute mean</td>
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<td>minimum; maximum</td>
<td>-1.35; 1.41</td>
<td>-1.48; 2.71</td>
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Adams et al. (forthcoming: 8) find that citizens’ perceptions of party shifts track experts’ perceptions, albeit with a modest bivariate correlation ($r=0.26$), while estimates of party positions using Euromanifestos do not.
The rise of parties on the transnational cleavage

Party systems have responded through the rise of parties that emphasize distinctive positions on globalization, European integration, and immigration (Bornschier 2010; Kriesi 1998). We conceive political parties as programmatically constrained actors with “their own ‘bounded rationality’ that shapes the way in which [they] come to terms with new challenges and uncertainties” (Marks and Wilson 2000: 434; Kitschelt et al 1999; Marks and de Vries 2012). Green parties, radical left parties, and radical TAN parties have raised the salience of a transnational cleavage that cross-cuts the established left/right divide. We conceive a “challenging” political party as one that not only takes a distinctive position on issues, but frames party competition along a distinct dimension of conflict.

Figure 5 shows the gradual erosion, and since the onset of the Eurocrisis, the accelerated decline, of the mainstream vote in national elections aggregated across fourteen West European countries – from just under 75 percent until 2010 to less than 60 percent in 2014. Mainstream decline is mirrored by electoral gains for radical left, radical TAN, and green parties. The dashed lines project electoral outcomes estimated from public opinion polls conducted in Spring 2016.

Mainstream support has eroded across Western Europe, but this plays out differently in the north and south. The decline of the mainstream parties is sharpest in Southern Europe—from 75 to 80 percent up to 2010 to 58 percent in 2014. The main beneficiaries are radical left parties in the south and radical TAN parties in the north. The electoral reaction to the crisis was sudden in the south, and more gradual and delayed in the north. The big electoral shift in the south coincides with the height of the Eurocrisis when, in national election after national election, voters abandoned mainstream parties for challengers. Between 2010 and 2014, the vote for challenging parties increased from 13.1 to 25.4 percent. In the north, challenging parties started from a higher base and initially made more modest gains (from 22.7 in 2010 to 26.2 in 2014), but according to the latest opinion polls, a further increase of support is on the way.

19 Alternatively, political parties have been defined as challengers when they “were not part of any national-level government in the thirty years preceding the Euro crisis,” and “are thus unconstrained by the responsibilities of government and are often found on the political extremes” (Hobolt and Tilley 2015: 8, and 3; see also van de Wardt, de Vries, Hobolt 2014; Hobolt and de Vries 2015). This definition has considerable overlap with the one used in this paper and produces broadly similar results.

20 We use the categorization in party families developed by the CHES team (Hooghe et al. 2010). This categorization relies on a party’s formal affiliation with European party federations and with party groups in the European Parliament, which tends to be overly conservative for new or short-lived political parties that have yet to formalize external relations. Closer inspection of the sixteen parties that fall in the “no family” category in the 1999-2014 waves reveals that they tend to mobilize on new politics issues; we include them in the tables and graphs as “other.”

21 We categorize Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain as the south.
Figure 5: Vote share for mainstream and challenging parties (1999-2016)

Note: Average vote share in national elections across 14 EU-West countries in the CHES survey year or nearest prior year. Dashed lines are averages of public opinion polls for May/June 2016. South = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
Radical left, radical TAN, and green parties across north and south have in common that they take distinctive positions on transnational issues. Studies of public opinion suggest that the distinct positions on Europe and immigration that challenging parties offer motivate voters to abandon mainstream parties (Hobolt and Tilley 2015; Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Van Elsas et al. 2016).

Whereas most mainstream political parties take a pro-integration stance on Europe, challenging parties are divided, with a marked bias towards opposition. With two exceptions, mainstream conservative, Christian democratic, social democratic, and liberal political parties are bunched towards the Euro-supportive north of Figure 6. Forza Italia, the second most Euroskeptic mainstream party, is located at 3.5 on the 1 to 7 European integration scale in the figure. The most Euroskeptic mainstream party, the triangle towards the bottom of Figure 6, is the UK Conservative party. The remaining Euroskeptic parties in the Figure are either radical TAN parties at the bottom right or radical left parties at the bottom left. These parties exploit an exogenous shock that has reconfigured European politics — the rupture of the permissive consensus over Europe at a time when the issue has risen into prominence. On the eve of the Eurocrisis, 49 percent of EU residents had a positive image of the EU. By 2011 this had fallen to 32 percent.22

**Figure 6: Mainstream and challenging parties on European integration**

Note: 56 mainstream parties (conservatives, liberals, Christian democrats, social democrats) and 60 challenger parties (radical tan, radical left, green, “no family”) from the 2014 CHES data.

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22 Eurobarometer question “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image”? The pre-crisis figures average percentages across five polls (Spring 2006 through Spring 2008) and the crisis figures average eight polls (Spring 2011 through Autumn 2014). The most recent released poll (Standard Eurobarometer 84 of November 2015) reports 37 percent positive, 23 percent negative, and 38 percent neutral.
The pattern in Figure 6 is an inverted U-curve. The simplest and most powerful way to explain party positioning on Europe is to square the distance of a party from the median party on the general left/right. For most years, this alone accounts for about half of the variance.\textsuperscript{23} The upshot is that Europe cross-cuts left-right conflict because it pits challenging parties against the mainstream. Radical left parties challenge on economic grounds, objecting to the distributional consequences for those who cannot take advantage of transnational mobility. Radical TAN parties challenge on cultural grounds, objecting to the consequences of transnationalism for national sovereignty and national community (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002; de Vries and Edwards 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; van Elsas, Hakhverdian and van der Brug 2016).

The predominant strategy of mainstream parties was to ignore the issue. In Peter Mair’s colorful commentary on Franklin and van der Eijk’s “sleeping giant metaphor,” published on the eve of the eve of the Eurocrisis, “the giant is not only sleeping, but has been deliberately sedated, so that Jack – in the shape of the mainstream parties – can run up and down the European beanstalk at will” (Mair 2007: 12; Katz and Mair 2009). This could not be extrapolated into an era of constraining dissensus, though it is difficult to demonstrate that there ever was a coordinated strategy of collusion or cartelization.

Since the mid-2000s, European integration has become salient, divisive and, as government leaders from David Cameron to Mark Rutte and Angela Merkel can attest, irrepressible (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016; Risse 2014). Expert estimates summarized in Figure 7 show that the salience of European integration has increased markedly since 1999, from a mean of 4.1 in that year to 5.8 in 2014.\textsuperscript{24} The Figure also reveals that salience is skewed to political parties that take extreme positions – which is what one might expect on an issue that has become polarized.

\textsuperscript{23} This variable accounts for 48 percent of the variance in 1999; 62 percent (2002); 32 percent (2006); 41 percent (2010); and 53 percent (2014).

\textsuperscript{24} The difference is significant at 0.001 in a difference of means test.
Figure 7: Salience of European integration in EU-West

Note: N=113 political parties in 1999 and 115 in 2014. Salience is measured on an 11-point scale ranging from “European integration is no importance, never mentioned” (0) to “European integration is the most important issue” (10).

The structure of competition is different on immigration. On Europe, mainstream parties find themselves bunched at the pro-integration pole facing the combined opposition of radical left and radical TAN parties. On immigration, as Figure 8 reveals, mainstream parties are bunched in middling positions, outflanked by green parties on the one side and by radical TAN parties on the other. Party positioning on immigration is linearly associated with that on the general left/right dimension (for the parties represented in Figure 8, $r=0.81$). The structure of contestation is similar in 2006 and 2010, except that the vote share of challenging parties has considerably increased.

Hence, challengers structure political contestation on transnationalism, but in different ways. On Europe, they contest a largely pro-European mainstream consensus. On immigration, they polarize existing contestation among mainstream parties. However, it is worth emphasizing that challenging political parties, not mainstream parties, are decisive in giving structure to conflict on both European integration and immigration.
Figure 8: Challenging and mainstream parties on immigration (2014)

Note: 2014 CHES data. Experts place political parties on an 11-point scale that ranges from “strongly opposes tough policy” (0) to “strongly favors tough policy (10). The scale was reversed so that high numbers indicate a pro-immigration stance.

Green parties and radical TAN parties take polar positions on both Europe and immigration. They articulate these issues as coherent packages of contraposed alternatives—demarcation vs. integration (Kriesi, Grande, et al. 2008; 2012); libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian (Bornschier 2010); universalism vs. particularism (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Beramendi et al. 2015); GAL vs. TAN (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). To the extent that one can speak of the consolidation of a transnational cleavage, these parties are key. This is the message of Figure 9 which places these parties along with radical left and mainstream parties on European integration and immigration. The axis in the figure is for the thirty-three green and radical TAN parties. It represents a linear association of 0.92. Mainstream parties are clustered along the pro-integration side of the figure, and use little space. Radical left parties are located in the top left corner, combining pro-immigration with anti-European integration. They blame European integration for rising economic insecurity, social inequality, and the erosion of national welfare institutions, but—with rare exceptions—blame neither immigrants nor immigration (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, and Van der Brug 2016; Marks et al. 2006).
Conclusion

The changes summarized in this paper have come about as voters have turned to political parties that were not in existence at the time Lipset and Rokkan wrote their classic paper. Party systems have unfrozen in ways that Lipset and Rokkan did not anticipate. However, the evidence presented here is consistent with the idea that a new cleavage has emerged in response to a transformation of relations among national states and their populations. In a Downsian model of issue competition, one would expect existing political parties to respond to voter preferences by supplying appropriate policies. However, as cleavage theory predicts, the positional flexibility of political parties is heavily constrained in response to a new social divide. Change has come not because mainstream parties have shifted in response to voter preferences, but because voters have turned to parties with distinctive profiles on the new cleavage. These parties raise issues related to Europe and immigration that mainstream parties would rather ignore. Green, radical left, and radical TAN parties set the frame of competition on these transnational issues. They give these issues much greater salience in their appeals to voters, and they are less handicapped by internal divisions.

Transnationalism has contrasting effects in the North and South of Europe. In the North, radical TAN parties are the main challengers and chief beneficiaries of the crises. In the South, distributional effects among and within countries are paramount, and the radical
left has been the principal challenger, demanding more egalitarian economic policies. These parties combine skepticism regarding austerity imposed by Northern countries with historically grounded tolerance of immigration.

Our analysis has implications for tensions within political parties (Akkerman 2015: 56; Han 2015: 561). To the extent that European integration and immigration raise cultural and economic issues that hang together, so one would expect tensions within radical left. If so this would extend a historical conflict within the left into the present. Socialist political parties, led by internationalist intellectuals, have long been more favorably oriented to immigration than working-class trade unions. In the United States, the issue split the left; in Europe it was an ongoing source of friction.

Minority nationalist parties may experience a similar tension. On the one hand, they are built on exclusive conceptions of national community and the demand for statehood. On the other, they seek the benefits of pan-European rules for economic exchange that can save them from autarky following independence. The Scottish National party, for example, gains the support of nationalist, less educated, voters who in other contexts tend to be most opposed to Europe.

Lipset and Rokkan would surely not be surprised to find that a period of transformative transnationalism has given rise to an intense political reaction. Viewed from the present, the cleavage structure of Western Europe begins with one sweeping jurisdictional reform, the rise of the national state, and finishes with another, the internationalization of economic exchange, migration, and political authority. The cleavage arising from national state formation is still very much in evidence in minority communities that continue to resist national assimilation (Hooghe and Marks 2016). The cleavage arising from transnationalism may also endure. The reaction is consolidated in durable, movement based, political parties. But the functional pressures that have given rise to transnationalism are immense. Transnational exchange and supranational governance reflect the benefits of scale in human affairs. Even if the European Union were to fail, immigration stop, and trade decline, the forces that have led to transnationalism would persist.
References


Immerzeel, Tim, Marcel Lubbers, and Hilde Coffé. 2015. “Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues.” *Party Politics*. January. DOI: 10.1177/1354068814567975.


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<th>Year of publication</th>
<th>Most common terms used</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>What is the divide?</th>
<th>What are the issues?</th>
<th>Prominent place for EU integration or internationalization</th>
<th>Immigration or multiculturalism</th>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>post-bourgeois/acquisitive (or instrumental) values</td>
<td>Inglehart (1971)</td>
<td>“This new axis of political cleavage would, initially, oppose one section of the middle class to the remainder of society. Assuming continued prosperity, however, our analysis suggests that this deviant group would grow in relative size” (992). “[T]he movement reflects a broad shift in emphasis from economic issues to life-style issues” (1012).</td>
<td>“[T]he age cohorts who had experienced the wars and scarcities … would accord a relatively high priority to economic security and to what Maslow terms the safety needs. For the younger cohorts, a set of &quot;post-bourgeois&quot; values, relating to the need for belonging and to aesthetic and intellectual needs” (991-2). “The libertarian position seems linked with internationalism. … Insofar as the nation-state is seen as a bulwark protecting the individual against foreign threats, it is less important to post-bourgeois respondents” (996-7).</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>postmaterialist/materialist value cleavage</td>
<td>Inglehart (1981)</td>
<td>“And conflict between those seeking Materialist and Post-Materialist goals has become the basis of a major dimension of political cleavage, supplementing though not supplanting the familiar polarization between labor and management” (898).</td>
<td>“The Materialist and Post-Materialist types have strikingly different opinions on a wide variety of issues, ranging from women's rights, to attitudes toward poverty, ideas of what is important in a job, and positions on foreign policy” (885).</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>New Politics value dimension/cleavage/realignment</td>
<td>Flanagan &amp; Dalton (1984)</td>
<td>“The first dimension is still defined primarily by the class conflict . . . The second dimension aligns various establishment institutions such as the bureaucracy, the police and occasionally the clergy, against rising new agents of social change such as radicals, student protesters, the women’s movement and minority groups” (11-12).</td>
<td>“the emergence of non-economic value cleavages, based upon a new set of ‘quality of life’ and self-actualising issues - environmental protection, the dangers of nuclear energy and nuclear war, sexual equality, consumer advocacy, human rights and the new morality” (12).</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian cleavage in and two-dimensional issue space</td>
<td>Kitschelt (1992, 1994)</td>
<td>“The rise of the Keynesian welfare state, together with the transformation of the economic structure that expanded the proportion of labor market participants who are highly educated, work with clients, and are female, has shifted the main axis of voter distribution from a simple alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives” (1994: 30-31).</td>
<td>“In recent decades, procedural conflicts typically relate to issues of gender, moral conduct, environmental protection, and urban planning” (1992: 13).</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Winners vs. losers (value) cleavage</td>
<td>Kriesi (1998)</td>
<td>In contrast to a traditional “structural cleavage, this new cleavage [is] &quot;opposing the new middle class winners of the transformation of Western European societies to the group of losers of the very same process” (1998: 180).</td>
<td>“I expect the value orientations of the sociocultural professionals to place a heavy emphasis on the defense of individual autonomy, and, by identification with their clients, on an egalitarian distribution of resources ... The managers, by contrast, are supposed to hold value orientations closer to those of the old middle class and the bourgeoisie, i.e., to prefer market solutions and free exchange and to have an idea of community which is more authoritarian, paternalistic and organization-centered” (199).</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Regulated capitalism vs. neoliberalism</td>
<td>Hooghe and Marks (1999)</td>
<td>“The accretion of authoritative competencies at the European level has raised the issue of national sovereignty in ever more transparent fashion. . . . Proposals for further integration are now evaluated in terms of their systemic implications as well as their policy effects” (72). “We hypothesize the emergence of a cleavage ranging from center-left supranationalists who support regulated capitalism to rightist nationalists who support neoliberalism” (1999: 76).</td>
<td>“Neoliberals want to create a mismatch between economic activity, which is European-wide, and political authority, which for most purposes remains segmented among national governments. . . . Regulated capitalists’ goal is to create a European liberal democracy capable of regulating markets, redistributing resources, and shaping partnership among public and private actors” (1999: 82, 86).</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Independence/integration dimension</td>
<td>Hix (1999)</td>
<td>“[t]here are two main dimensions of EU politics: an integration-independence dimension and a Left-Right dimension. The first</td>
<td>“This ‘national/territorial cleavage’ is manifest at the EU level if any of these features of national identity are threatened</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>gal/tan dimension</td>
<td>Hooghe, Marks, Wilson (2002); Hooghe and Marks (2009)</td>
<td>The past two decades have seen the rise of issues concerned with lifestyle, ecology, cultural diversity, nationalism, and immigration. ... One pole combines ecology (or Greenness), alternative politics (including participatory democracy), and libertarianism. We summarize this as the Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) pole. The opposite pole combines support for traditional values, opposition to immigration, and defense of the national community. We summarize this as the traditional/authoritarian/nationalism (TAN) pole (2002: 976).</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>“nomadic” vs. “standing” cleavage/dividing line</td>
<td>Bartolini (2005)</td>
<td>We can imagine the development of a dividing line that opposes material interests and cultural values of ‘nomadic’ versus ‘standing’ nature. ... The integration revolution would contrast allegiance to a relatively closed territorial entity with the internationalization of chances and opportunities’ (400-1). ... “The essential point is that market orientation and cultural orientation in the integration process may diverge sharply” (398).</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>cultural protectionism</td>
<td>Norris (2005)</td>
<td>The impact of globalization has functioned as an external shock to public opinion driving the rising demand for cultural protectionism” (23).</td>
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and/or if some nations are perceived to benefit (through gaining resources, for example) at the expense of others.” (1999: 73).
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Cleavage Type</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>demarcation vs. integration</td>
<td>Kriesi, Grande et al. (2008, 2012)</td>
<td>“In a Rokkanian perspective, the contemporary process of ‘globalization’ or ‘denationalization’ can be conceived of as a new ‘critical juncture’, which is likely to result in the formation of new structural cleavages, both within and between national contexts” (2008: 921). “We suggest that established parties are repositioning and realigning themselves as a result of the rising new conflict” (2008: 925).</td>
<td>“On the social-economic dimension, the new conflict can be expected to reinforce the classic opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position while giving it a new meaning. . . . The demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterized by an opposition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration” (2008: 924).</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian cleavage</td>
<td>Bornschier (2010)</td>
<td>“As a result of the mobilization of conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of justice and community, Western European party systems have thus been altered. . . . The lesson to learn is that the evolution of social structure does not determine the shape that political antagonism will take. The configuration of party systems and the strategies of political actors impinge…” (2007-8).</td>
<td>“[P]rocess of globalization feeds into the new cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values indirectly by weakening the state-market cleavage. European integration, by contrast, directly reinforces the new cultural divide because it provides right-wing populist actors with a highly symbolic issue that fits their traditionalist-communitarian ideology” (63).</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>class vs. new socio-structural divides/alignments/dimensions</td>
<td>Kitschelt (2010)</td>
<td>“The cumulative structural developments in post-industrial polities have promoted a re-alignment of political appeals that has strengthened and concentrated issues on a second dimension of political appeals beyond economic–distributive divides, but not necessarily at the expense of the former” (666).</td>
<td>“It looks as if we have a fairly strong baseline model that claims (1) the decline of conventional class divisions as grounds of political preference formation and (2) the persistence or rise of new socio-structural divides that impinge primarily on cultural grid (libertarian–authoritarian) and/or group (insider/outsider, multiculturalism) dimensions of preferences, but possibly also on economic distribution” (668).</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Authors</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>cosmopolitan vs. communitarian (ideological) conflict line</td>
<td>Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde (2013)</td>
<td>The basis of a cosmopolitan disposition is “a combination of individualism and universalism . . . Legal cosmopolitanism refers to the commitment to an institutionalized global order of rule of law and justice. Moral cosmopolitanism requires the respect of every human being’s status as ultimate units of moral concern . . . We consider communitarianism as the ideology underlying the other pole . . . [it] refers to the support of closing borders in order to favor and protect constitutive communities. These are ‘constitutive’ in the sense that membership is non-voluntary, cannot be easily renounced, and forms a corner-stone of identity” (580).</td>
<td>“[C]osmopolitan and communitarian understandings of the EU and attitudes towards immigrants tap into the same underlying dimension, which refers to broader ideological positions toward the opening-up of national borders” (591).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>pro-integrationist vs. anti-integrationist cleavage lines</td>
<td>Statham and Trenz (2015)</td>
<td>“The Eurozone crisis replicates existing cleavage lines between pro-integrationists and anti-integrationists that were found to drive politicization in previous rounds of integration” (297).</td>
<td>“In all Eurozone countries, the bailout measures are contested by the protectionist left and the populist right, while a great coalition between mainstream left and right parties steps forward as the defender of the common currency. Hence redistributive conflicts remain closely linked to contestation over elite preferences for delegating sovereignty” (299-300). “The Eurozone ‘debt crisis’ brings to the fore publicly across the region that ‘what you get’ (redistribution) is strongly tied to ‘who you are’ (identity)” (300)</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>universalism vs. particularism dimension/ cleavage</td>
<td>Häusermann &amp; Kriesi (2015)</td>
<td>“[W]e currently assist a third transformation of this conflict dimension into a more encompassing conflict between universalistic and particularistic preferences and attitudes. This third transformation is driven by the interaction of denationalization and financial austerity, and it moves the issue of distributive deservingness to the forefront of European politics. … With this third transformation, the distinction of the two preference dimensions into one cultural and one economic becomes obsolete” (206).</td>
<td>“The conflict line opposing universalism to particularism integrates not only the issues of immigration, EU integration, and cultural liberalism, but also questions of welfare chauvinism and welfare misuse” (227).</td>
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